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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The central part of Everett's formulation of quantum mechanics is a quantum 
mechanical model of memory and of observation as the recording of information in a 
memory.  To use this model as an answer to the measurement problem, Everett has to assume 
that a conscious observer can be in a superposition of such memory states and be unaware of 
it.  This assumption has puzzled generations of readers. 
 The fundamental aim of this dissertation is to find a set of simpler assumptions that are 
sufficient to show that Everett's model is empirically adequate.  I argue that Everett's model 
needs three assumptions to account for the process of observation: an assumption of 
decoherence of observers as quantum mechanical systems; an assumption of supervenience of 
mental states (qualities) over quantum mechanical properties; and an assumption about the 
interpretation of quantum mechanical states in general: quantum mechanical states describe 
ensembles of states of affairs coexisting in the same system.  I argue that the only plausible 
understanding of such ensembles is as ensembles of possibilities, and that all standard no-
collapse interpretations agree in this reading of quantum mechanical states.  Their differences 
can be understood as different theories about what marks the real state within this ensemble, 
and Everett's theory as the claim that no additional 'mark of reality' is necessary. 
 Using the three assumptions, I argue that introspection cannot determine the objective 
quantum mechanical state of an observer.  Rather, the introspective qualities of a quantum 
mechanical state can be represented by a (classical) statistical ensemble of subjective states.  
An analysis of these subjective states and their dynamics leads to the conclusion that they 
suffice to give empirically correct predictions.  The argument for the empirical adequacy of 
the subjective state entails that knowledge of the objective quantum mechanical state is 
impossible in principle.  Empirical reality for a conscious observer is not described by the 
objective state, but by an Everettian relative state conditional on the subjective state, and no 
theoretical 'mark of reality' is necessary for this concept of reality.  I compare the resulting 
concept of reality to Kant's distinction between empirical and transcendental reality. 
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1 
Chapter 1 
Metaphysics and the Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics 
 
 
 This thesis is about the interpretation of quantum mechanics.  However, after seventy 
years of attempts at interpreting quantum mechanics, no agreement has emerged as to what it 
means to give such an interpretation.  In this introduction, I want to sketch what I see as the 
problem about understanding quantum mechanics that requires an interpretation and what 
such an interpretation should do.  There is agreement that the present mathematical 
formulation of quantum mechanics is well developed and—mathematically—well 
understood.  There is also widespread agreement that the empirical application of quantum 
mechanics has been extremely successful.  Although it has proven to be one of the most 
intractable problems in philosophy of science to explain how theories apply to experimental 
practice and its results, it is fair to say that whatever the criteria for empirical success of a 
theory may be, quantum mechanics has not failed them or we would have heard from 
experimental physicists about it. 
 What else could be required of a theory than a clear formulation and its successful 
application to experimental practice?  One could express the desire for an interpretation thus:  
knowing a mathematical formalism and being able to apply it in certain situations does not yet 
amount to an understanding of what it is that this formalism describes.  It seems like quantum 
mechanics puts us into the situation of the uninitiated user of an elaborate piece of software 
who has learned to push certain buttons to make the computer do certain things, but who has 
no idea of what is going on inside the mysterious machine.  However, while it is possible to 
learn about the inner workings of a computer, it may be intellectual hubris to expect to learn 
about the inner workings of nature.  This sentiment was famously expressed by Richard 
Feynman: 
I am going to tell you what nature behaves like ... Do not keep saying to 
yourself, if you can possibly avoid it, "But how can it be like that?" because 
you will get "down the drain," into a blind alley from which nobody has yet 
escaped.  Nobody knows how it can be like that.1 
                                                
1(Feynman 1965, 129), quoted after (Hughes 1989, 1) 
2 
What Feynman expressed here is a conviction that has been almost universally shared by 
physicists of his generation (and, mostly, up to this day):  physics can give us successful 
predictions for experiments, it enables us to build all kinds of devices that operate just as we 
want them to, but to expect physics to tell us what 'nature is like' is a misguided demand of an 
unenlightened past for a god-like insight into the essence of things, which leads into nothing 
but fruitless speculation.  This blind alley is known under the name of metaphysics.   
 The repudiation of metaphysics is not the invention of physicists, though: they had 
predecessors in the logical positivists who wanted to clear science (and meaningful discourse 
in general) of metaphysical ballast.  To this end, they created a normative picture of science 
that has become known as the 'received view' (Putnam 1962).  Two fundamental postulates of 
this picture were that scientific theories are axiomatic logical theories that operated on 
symbols without regard for their meaning, and that meaning is given to the terms of the theory 
only by a set of correspondence rules that connect theoretical terms to observable events.2 
 This clean-cut picture of physics started to crack on both ends by the 1950s:  In 
physics, it turned out that the restriction of quantum mechanics to experimental predictions as 
the only aim was impossible in cosmology, which deals with a system not confined to a 
laboratory.  The classical version of quantum mechanics was unsuitable for this task because 
it makes explicit use of acts of measurement in the formulation of the dynamics.  This 
problem led Hugh Everett to formulate a version of quantum mechanics that treats 
measurement as a purely quantum mechanical interaction.  But, as John Wheeler put it, this 
picture carried too heavy a metaphysical ballast to become widely accepted (Wheeler 1977).  
In order to give an internal account of measurement, it was seen as postulating the constant 
splitting of our world into countless copies of itself.  Therefore, it overstepped the boundary 
between physics and metaphysics that the received view had erected and fell under Feynman's 
ban:  a theory like Everett's was mere metaphysical speculation, not science.  Nevertheless, it 
turned out that Everett's theory could be used to solve a long-standing puzzle about quantum 
mechanics:  its relation to classical mechanics.  Starting with the work of Zeh,3 it was shown 
that within Everett's theory the constant interaction of a quantum mechanical system with its 
environment resulted in the emergence of a classical behavior of that system.  This 
phenomenon, called decoherence, has increasingly become accepted as a field of research by 
theoretical physicists.4  
                                                
2See the detailed discussion in (Suppe 1977, 16-61). 
3(Zeh 1971) 
4See the references in section 3.2, which discusses decoherence in more detail. 
3 
 In philosophy of science, the shortcomings of the received view became increasingly 
clear:  the characterization of scientific theories as axiomatic systems of first order logic is too 
impoverished to give a realistic account of scientific theories, and the correspondence rules 
postulated by the received view are not sufficient to fix the meaning of theoretical terms. 
(Suppe 1977)  Beginning with the work of Patrick Suppes, a new view of scientific theories 
emerged called the semantic view:5 science should not be understood as producing a formal 
language, but rather as offering models of phenomena.  Theoretical statements are justified 
semantically (because they are true of the models in the theory) and not syntactically, i.e. by 
deduction from a set of axioms.  The models of physics are mathematical structures.  They are 
models in two senses:  they are mathematical models in the sense mentioned, i.e. giving truth 
conditions for the theoretical statements; on the other hand, they are representative (or iconic) 
models of the objects of the theory, i.e. they resemble the objects in some important respect, 
and can be used to represent them within the theory.   
 The semantic view gives a more realistic account of scientific theories.6  However, it 
still does not give us a place for the notion of an interpretation of a theory that we seek to 
explain.  Certainly, the mathematical model is an interpretation of the theory in a sense.  But 
this does not seem to be the sense that we are after.  In quantum mechanics, we have a 
beautiful mathematical model, the Hilbert space, and there still seems to be something that we 
do not understand about it.  Take, for example, the notion of a superposition:  in the Hilbert 
space the state of a system is represented by a vector.  Because the Hilbert space is a linear 
space, we can form linear combinations of such vectors called linear superpositions.  But 
what does such a linear combination mean?  It seems that we need to look at the 
representational function of models to answer this question.  However, in the case of quantum 
mechanics, the look at the phenomena is not very helpful.  It is certainly true that the 
mathematical structure of the Hilbert space reflects a phenomenal structure of experimental 
outcomes (here, the probabilities for different measurements), but the phenomenal structure is 
not any less arcane than the mathematical structure of the Hilbert space.  That nature behaves 
like that does not answer our question of how it can be like that. 
 For an answer to this question, a brief excursion is necessary.  As Nancy Cartwright 
has argued in detailed case studies (Cartwright 1983), the application of theoretical models to 
physical phenomena is far from straightforward.  It is the art of the physicist to build concrete 
models from the elements of the theory so that the concrete model simulates a given 
                                                
5See, e.g., (Suppes 1967). 
6For a detailed exposition, see Suppe 1989. 
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experimental situation.  Cartwright calls such models simulacra, and compares them to the 
notion of a thinker toy model used by Cushing (Cushing 1982).  This model building is a 
highly non-trivial task:  the tinker toy model is neither a realistic picture of the system under 
consideration, nor, properly speaking, a mathematical model of the underlying theory.  It uses 
all kinds of ad hoc assumptions, even assumptions that are in conflict with the theory.  
Nevertheless, Cartwright argues, without such model building fundamental theories cannot be 
applied to any real situations.  I will call such models phenomenal models. 
 How does Cartwright's argument relate to the semantic view?  Here is my attempt at 
reconciliation:  the underlying theory furnishes us with elements to build a phenomenal model 
for a concrete situation.  However, these elements are not mathematical structures, i.e. 
uninterpreted formal concepts.  They are mass points, force fields, physical properties, and 
their likes, that is, concepts that are at least partially grounded in our experience.  When we 
use such concepts in physics, we make substantial assumptions about what the world is like, 
and over time, we might be forced to revise these assumptions.  I will call the totality of these 
assumptions the physical model of the theory.  Unlike the mathematical model, which is a 
formal structure, the physical model is a conceptual model, and its elements are interpreted 
concepts that are never fully abstract.   
 In eighteenth century rigid body mechanics, for example, the concept of a rigid body 
was treated as elementary:  Rigidity was part of the definition of a mechanical object, that is, 
part of the physical model of mechanics.  With the development of continuum mechanics this 
concept was analyzed and explained as the effect of the inner forces of solid bodies, and it 
turned out that perfect rigidity was not only not a fundamental concept, it was an unrealistic 
idealization of the properties of solid matter.  The concept of rigidity, part of the physical 
model of rigid body mechanics, becomes a phenomenon to be explained within continuum 
mechanics.  We may think that all the assumptions in our physical models are of such 
provisional nature.  Nevertheless, it seems hard to imagine what a theory without such a 
model would be like:  It is this basic intuitive interpretation that relates the theory to our 
experience (we have a pretheoretical notion of rigidity, and therefore we know how a theory 
that contains this concept will relate to our practice.) 
 But all of this means that the two functions of a model in the semantic view are 
performed by two different structures:  there is the mathematical model, given by a 
mathematical space and diverse mathematical structures defined on it (transformation groups, 
algebras, measures, and so on); and there is the physical model, given by mass points, rigid 
rods, forces, light rays, or what have you.  The mathematical model gives a mathematical 
5 
representation of the physical model.  The physical model, on the other hand, gives an 
interpretation to the mathematical model.  Without such a model, all we have are "formulas 
with holes in them, bearing no relation to reality." (Cartwright 1983, 159).   
 It is the interpretation through a physical model that embeds the phenomenal model of 
an atom, or a laser, or any concrete physical structure into a physical theory as 
electromechanics or quantum mechanics:  Only after we have built a phenomenal model from 
the elements of the physical model, we can translate its structure into mathematical terms of 
the theory.  (And again, this translation is not trivial at all. We use all kinds of approximations 
and simplifying assumptions to arrive at a mathematical model that we actually can work 
with.)  It is through this embedding into a physical model that the phenomenal model leads to 
empirical predictions:  Phenomenal models don't come with their own correspondence rules.  
We need the theory itself to tell us what the observational effects of the phenomenal model 
will be. 
 Take the Bohr model of the atom as an example:7 it employs elements of the physical 
model of Maxwell's theory of electromagnetism to represent an atom, such as charged 
particles, or the electromagnetic field.  And although the orbits of electrons in Bohr's model 
are not possible motions for charged particles in an electrical field (because they are restricted 
by quantum conditions), the model nevertheless portrays electrons as charged particles, their 
energies as electromagnetic potential and kinetic energies, and their interactions as 
electromagnetic interactions.  It is only through this embedding that the Bohr model leads to 
empirical predictions:  the underlying electromagnetic theory is necessary to relate the 
electron jumps in the Bohr model to another theory, Planck's quantum theory of radiation.  
And without this relation, the Bohr model would not be able to say anything about the relation 
of atomic spectra to the parameters calculated with the model. 
 Physical theories are not mathematical theories:  the physical models are an integral 
part of physics.  This explains why we hardly ever find the separate correspondence rules 
postulated by the received view in the practice of physicists:  the elements of physical theories 
are not uninterpreted formal structures that need to be linked to observations by explicit 
correspondence rules.  Hence, the meaning of theoretical terms is not given by 
correspondence rules.  It is given by their interpretation in terms of a physical model. 
 What, then, is the physical model for a fundamental physical theory such as 
mechanics?  What are the basic elements we need to build the countless phenomenal models 
                                                
7(Heilbron 1977) 
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that physics employs?  I will look at this question in Chapter 2 in more detail, but I want to 
sketch the general answer already here:  these basic elements are entities like objects and their 
properties, or states and their change.  These are the kinds of things that fundamental 
mechanical theories are interpreted in:  we say that a point in phase space represents a state, or 
that a one-parameter transformation represents its change.  The theory of such entities has had 
a name since Aristotle's times:  metaphysics.  I will therefore, boldly, call the models of our 
fundamental physical theories metaphysical models.  They are metaphysical because they 
interpret the mathematical models of these theories in metaphysical terms.  But they are 
models nonetheless:  we do not need to believe that they tell us how the world truly is in order 
to use them, just that the world is like these models say in certain regards.  In theoretical 
physics, they are generally termed 'assumptions of the model', i.e. they are assumptions that 
we implicitly make by choosing a certain mathematical model.   More importantly, they do 
not reflect a non-empirical knowledge about the world, but they are tools we construct to 
interpret the mathematical models.  They are not prior to these mathematical models, and in 
the history of science they often have developed considerably later than the theory they 
interpreted.  The notion of a field only slowly emerged in the electromagnetic theory of the 
nineteenth century, and it found its final formulation only in the theory of relativity; or, most 
famously, Newton's mechanics led to a long process of reformulating the mechanical picture 
of nature that lasted into the nineteenth century.  In Chapter 2, I will try to make the notion of 
a metaphysical model more concrete by discussing such models in various mechanical 
theories. 
 A metaphysical model in this sense, then, is not something we can impose a priori on a 
physical theory.  It evolves slowly from the complex process of applying a theory to concrete 
situations.  Such a model, on the other hand, is not a useless formal embellishment: it is a tool 
we need for the construction of phenomenal models.  But it should do more than that: the 
model of a fundamental theory has to enable us to embed other theories.  The best-known 
example for this is statistical mechanics, which allowed thermodynamics to be embedded into 
classical mechanics.  This was not a reduction in the sense of the received view: statistical 
mechanics employs fundamentally new principles that are not found in classical mechanics.  
But it formulates these principles on the elements of classical mechanics (ensembles of atoms 
seen as mechanical bodies), and therefore allows us to see how thermodynamics and classical 
mechanics are related. 
 This is the deeper sense why I propose the name of a 'metaphysical model': we know 
very well that we cannot deduce thermodynamics from mechanics, and much less chemistry, 
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biology, or psychology.  Nevertheless, there is a widespread conviction that all these sciences 
do not operate completely independently from the mechanical model of nature.  Few people 
find animism in biology or dualism in psychology a promising paradigm.  But it is not very 
clear what exactly the assumption of physicalism in these sciences means.  A way to 
understand physicalism is as the principle that it should be possible to embed these sciences 
into the metaphysical model of mechanics. 
 This, then, is the answer I propose to the question of what an interpretation of quantum 
mechanics should be: it should be the description of a metaphysical model for quantum 
mechanics.  Such a metaphysical model might revise some of the assumptions about nature 
embedded in the metaphysical model of classical mechanics.  Nonetheless, the relation to the 
classical model has to be clearly formulated.  The easiest way this can be achieved is by 
embedding one model into the other.  Of course, this enterprise might fail, and we might have 
to live with a metaphysical dualism of a quantum and a classical realm.  This was Bohr's 
conviction, and it has been, under the name of the 'Copenhagen interpretation', more or less 
the standard position ever since.  However, the ongoing debate over the interpretation of 
quantum mechanics shows that it is not a very satisfying conclusion.  And different from the 
other great dualism debate in the philosophy of mind, we have not even been able to establish 
anything like a clear border between the two realms.   
 According to my claim that metaphysical models are devices to construct phenomenal 
models, this lack of a coherent metaphysical model should have an impact on our ability to 
apply quantum mechanics to concrete phenomena.  And I think that exactly this is the case in 
quantum mechanics:  Bohr's interpretation basically offers two incompatible metaphysical 
models for quantum mechanics and the general rule that it can only be decided ex post  (i.e. 
after an actual experiment is performed) which of these to apply.  This is the thesis of wave-
particle dualism.  It is plausible that such a metaphysical model makes the building of 
phenomenal models a rather daunting task.  Physicists have developed several strategies to 
deal with this problem.  The most common is the building of semi-classical models, that is:  
one first constructs a classical model for a phenomenon and then, after a mathematical 
representation of this model is found, and generally after it has been solved, one constructs an 
approximate translation of this representation into a Hilbert space representation.  One main 
problem about such methods is that they work generally only if we restrict our attention to a 
single particle.  (A typical example is the Hartree-Fock method.)  Because of this, the 
quantum mechanical treatment of complex systems is still in its infancy.  This also has far-
reaching consequences for the applicability of quantum mechanics to theories that it should 
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clearly be applied to, e.g. general relativity and cosmology, chemistry,8 or, for a more specific 
and very telling example, chaos theory. 
 For the optimists and heretics who want to pursue a unification program, there are two 
strategies:  One is the attempt to embed quantum mechanics into the classical model.  This 
was Einstein's aim and it is the goal of the different types of hidden variable theories and the 
modal interpretations.  All of these interpretations try to construct an essentially classical 
metaphysical model underlying quantum mechanics.  The main arguments against these 
attempts are various 'no hidden variable proofs' that try to show that no such model is 
possible.  I will discuss several such arguments in the course of this thesis.  While none of 
these arguments can exclude the possibility of any kind of hidden variable theory, they have 
established that any such theory has to admit some nonclassical elements.  The main question 
for the classicist camp today is which toad is easiest to swallow. 
 The second strategy is to find a metaphysical model for quantum mechanics that is 
able to embed classical mechanics.  Its early proponent was von Neumann.9  Later, this 
enterprise was taken up by Everett and his defenders.  However, because this group has 
almost exclusively consisted of physicists, the focus of their work has been the mathematical 
formulation of a "pure" quantum mechanics or quantum field theory, without trying to 
formulate a consistent metaphysical model.  This thesis attempts a metaphysical interpretation 
of Everett's formulation.  I believe it is a worthwhile task to find out what the world is like 
according to quantum mechanics, even if one, in the end, does not want to believe that ours is 
such a world. 
 
                                                
8Theoretical chemists have found their own highly ingenious ways to deal with the application of quantum 
mechanics to molecular structures.  They are mostly qualitative, but unlike many models in physics they don't 
rely on classical approximations. 
9I will argue for this unorthodox claim in section 3.4 
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Chapter 2 
The Interpretation of Mechanical Theories 
 
 
 Since the seminal work by Heisenberg, Jordan, Dirac, and Schrödinger, the Hilbert 
space has generally been accepted as the mathematical structure for the formulation of 
quantum mechanics.10  Von Neumann's Mathematische Grundlagen der Quantenmechanik 
was not only the first work to give a rigorous exposition of the Hilbert space formulation of 
quantum mechanics, it also gave the first systematic attempt at the interpretation of this 
formalism.  I will outline the interpretation of the Hilbert space formalism given by von 
Neumann before I turn to a discussion of Everett's model.  This will lead to a specific setting 
for the measurement problem as a problem of the interpretation of quantum mechanics and 
give a framework for the solution of this problem proposed in this thesis.  Von Neumann 
develops the interpretation of quantum mechanics in analogy to the interpretation of classical 
point mechanics and classical statistical mechanics.11  Therefore, I will give an account of the 
fundamental mechanical concepts and their application to quantum mechanics in this chapter.   
 
2.1 Classical Mechanics 
 Every mechanical theory assumes that it is possible to pick out a mechanical system 
that is distinguished from its environment.  If the system is sufficiently isolated from its 
environment, that is, if the action of the environment on the system is negligible, then it is 
assumed that we are able to make predictions about the behavior of the system.  Mechanics is 
the theory of the behavior of isolated systems.  For example, we might consider a mechanical 
clock.  The assumption that we have a mechanical system means that we are able to tell what 
is part of the clock and what is not and we are to shield its functioning from possible 
disturbances by the surroundings.  The system of the clock would consist of the wheels, the 
springs, the dial, the hands but not the air between the wheels, the dust, etc.  We assume that 
we can disregard the effect of the air and the dust on the functioning of the clock's parts.  
Another example of a system is a volume of gas in a given container.  The container is not 
                                                
10For an excellent, much more extensive introduction to the formalism, see (Hughes 1989). 
11Von Neumann, ibid., p. 1:  "Vor allem sollen die schwierigen und vielfach noch immer nicht restlos geklärten 
Interpretationsfragen näher untersucht werden.  Besonders das Verhältnis der Quantenmechanik zur Statistik und 
zur klassischen statistischen Mechanik ist hierbei von Bedeutung." 
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part of the system but it isolates the system from its environment, i.e., the air surrounding the 
container. 
 Mechanical systems are represented by different mathematical structures in classical 
and quantum mechanics.  In classical mechanics, a system is represented by its phase space, 
in quantum mechanics, by its Hilbert space.  We will discuss these mathematical 
representations in more detail later.  For now it is only important that they both are 
representations of the same metaphysical concept of substance.  Compare, e.g., the concept of 
a system with Aristotle's notion of substance.12   The main characteristics Aristotle gives for 
the concept of substance are: 
- While it is the subject of attributes and predicates, it is itself not an attribute or predicate of 
something else. 
- It is individual. 
- While remaining one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities13. 
Mechanical systems are the fundamental and individual subjects of theoretical description in 
mechanics. 
 The counterpart to the concept of substance is the concept of attribute.  In mechanics, 
this concept is represented by the concept of a variable.  In general, we call mechanical 
variables all changeable properties of systems as opposed to the permanent and essential 
properties that define the system, for example, the mass of a mass point, the radius of a wheel 
in the clock or the number of molecules in the container of gas.  Von Neumann distinguishes 
two kinds of attributes in mechanics:  quantities (Größen) and properties.  Their difference is 
that quantities have numerical values (the real numbers or a subset of them) whereas 
properties only have two values (yes or no). The variables in the example above are 
quantities.  Examples for properties in von Neumann's sense would be the property that the 
temperature of the gas is under its condensation temperature, or that a wheel of the clock 
moves counterclockwise.  Properties can be regarded as quantities that only assume two 
values (0 or 1), while quantities can be considered as sets of properties (e.g., 'the value of the 
quantity is smaller than a for any real number a).   
  The central idea of mechanical theories is that all variables are determined by a set of 
fundamental variables of the system, the so-called dynamical variables.  I will call this 
assumption the mechanistic postulate.  Often, the fundamental variables are the positions and 
                                                
12Categoriae 2a-4b or Metaphysica Δ 1017b 
13The last point concerns the relation of substances to time (which we will discuss in section 2.2). 
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momenta of its parts, but they can also be angles or angular momenta, or, in a field theory, the 
field strength at a specific point in space and time.  Any other facts about the system are 
considered irrelevant.  In our example of the clock, we would not give a geometrical 
description of a wheel or a description of what the wheel is made of but only its angular 
coordinate, i.e., the angle in a given frame of reference, and its angular velocity, i.e., the speed 
at which it is turning.  
 In the example of the gas, the dynamical variables are the positions and velocities of 
all the molecules in the gas.  In this case, we are not in practice able to measure a single 
dynamical variable that is the position or velocity of one gas molecule because we cannot 
pick out a single gas molecule with any physical measurement apparatus that we have today.  
Here, the dynamical variables are practically unobservable.  Still, it is assumed that they obey 
the same physical laws as observable positions and momenta (like those of macroscopic 
objects) and that they could be observed in principle.   
 The task of mechanics is to formulate the dependence of variables from the dynamical 
variables mathematically.  It was, for example, an important achievement of Maxwell's 
kinetic gas theory to express temperature and pressure of an ideal gas in terms of the 
dynamical variables of its molecules.  To be able to achieve this we have to define what kinds 
of mathematical objects suitably represent mechanical variables, i.e. find the algebraic rules 
that govern their relations.  The algebra of the dynamical variables defines the fundamental 
structure of the mechanical theory.  All other variables can be represented by algebraic 
expressions of the dynamical variables.  In classical mechanics, the algebra of the dynamical 
variables is simply the familiar algebra of the real numbers (their addition, multiplication, and 
their powers).  This means that we can do algebraic operations with the dynamical variables 
as if they were numbers, and that all other variables are simply real functions of the 
dynamical variables.  Also the mechanical properties form an algebra: they are connected by 
the usual logical connectives and therefore form a Boolean algebra. 
 Because of this algebraic representation, a specification of the dynamical variables 
also specifies the other mechanical variables.  Such a specification is called a mechanical state 
of the system.  In the simplest case, this specification consists of giving numerical values to 
all dynamical variables.  This is the case in classical point mechanics.  In the example of the 
clock, the mechanical state would be given by giving values for the positions and momenta of 
all its parts. 
 The mechanical state is the mechanical correspondence to the concept of a 
proposition, i.e., a substance's having an attribute.  The mechanistic postulate implies a kind 
12 
of propositional atomism, i.e., that all propositions depend on a set of fundamental 
propositions, the mechanical states.  The totality of all possible mechanical states forms the 
state space of the system.  The mechanistic postulate implies that all properties can be 
represented by subsets of the state space, and all variables by functions on the state space.  
The logical operations on properties are mirrored by set theoretical operations on the subsets 
(e.g. the property A∨B is represented by the subset M(A)∪M(B)).  As is well known, also set 
theoretic operations form a Boolean algebra and this algebra is isomorphic to the Boolean 
algebra of the logical operations on properties, hence this representation is consistent. 
 While the mechanical state describes the reality of the system (in the sense of the 
actual matters of fact about it), its state space can be understood as giving an account of its 
possibilities (in an absolute sense, i.e., everything the system could possibly be, not just its 
possible future states).  The state space therefore is the fundamental account of the nature of 
the system, i.e., all its intrinsic essential attributes.  The dynamical variables are coordinates 
in the state space, that is, a specific way of describing elements of the state space.  But this 
means that dynamical variables are not unique:  because any state space allows for many 
different coordinate systems, there are many different sets of dynamical variables that can 
describe the same system. 
 
2.2 Time and Space in Mechanics 
 So far, we have not explicitly addressed the role of time in mechanics.  It turns out that 
time plays a fundamentally different role than the mechanical variables.  Mathematically, this 
difference is represented by the fact that the mechanical state is a function of time, i.e., time is 
a free variable, while the mechanical variables are bound variables, their values at every point 
of time given by the mechanical state.  There is a certain ambiguity of formulation here:  we 
can either take the mechanical state as the function itself or as the value of the function at a 
given point of time.  The former is more commonly called the trajectory of the system, and I 
will restrict the notion of a mechanical state to the momentary value. 
 The goal of mechanics is to establish relations between mechanical states at different 
times that allow the derivation of a mechanical state at one time from the mechanical state at 
another time.  These relations are the equations of motion for the system.  They are either 
given in integral form (like the principle of least action) describing possible trajectories, or in 
differential form, describing how the mechanical state changes with time.  The mathematical 
equivalence of these two formulations shows that it does not matter whether we take 
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trajectories or mechanical states as the fundamental propositions of mechanics.  
Corresponding to the choice of mechanical states as fundamental propositions, I will consider 
the equations of motion in differential form as the basic dynamical law of mechanics. 
 Notice that the equations of motion do not merely describe the actual motion of a 
system, but all of its possible motions.  The actual motion of the system is determined by 
boundary conditions, i.e., the designation of some mechanical state as the actual one at a 
certain time.  The equations of motion in the Hamiltonian formulation of mechanics can be 
expressed as first-order differential equations.  This possibility has important consequences:  
under reasonable restrictions (no singularities), the equations have exactly one solution if one 
is given the mechanical state at one time.  This uniqueness of the solution is taken as an 
expression of the determinism of classical mechanics:  a complete specification of the 
dynamical variables at one time fixes all of the system's past and future variables, too.   
 It has been a long-standing problem in metaphysics how to explicate the role of time 
in mechanics.  One possible way is to assume that objects at different times are not identical, 
so that time is really part of the intrinsic or essential specifications of the object.  What we 
commonly think of as the same object at two different times are really two objects.  Their 
'identity' is really a relation (Lewis, 1986, 202-4).  This position has been attractive to 
logicians and philosophers, because it removes the apparent contradiction between change 
and the logical law of contradiction (a thing cannot be both A and non-A).  Nevertheless, it 
does not agree well with mechanics, because this relation of transtemporal identity cannot be 
based on mechanical variables.  As we have seen in the definition of a mechanical system, it 
is part of the notion of the individuality of a mechanical system.  
 A second way of thinking of the temporal structure of mechanics is by taking systems 
as simple objects and differentiating their properties by their time of occurrence, i.e. the 
proposition that a system has property A at time t has to be properly understood as the 
proposition that the system has the property 'A-at-time-t'.  This representation corresponds to 
the assumption mentioned above those trajectories, not mechanical states are the fundamental 
propositions in mechanics.  Again, this leads to a problem of transtemporal identity, this time 
for the properties. 
 The most intuitive way to represent the role of time in mechanics is by assuming that 
physical systems have temporal parts very much like a spatially extended object has spatial 
parts.  The mechanical state at a given time is a description of the part of the system at that 
time.  This picture is called the geometrization of time.  It does not attempt to reduce time to a 
specification of systems or of properties, and it takes the transtemporal identity of systems as 
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a given.  It therefore seems the most suitable to represent the special role of time in 
mechanics.  The geometrization of time does not only allay the old worry of logicians how 
temporal change can be consistent with the law of contradiction, but it also sits well with the 
symmetry of space and time demanded by the theory of relativity.  In this picture, the 
equations of motion define the relations between variables at different temporal parts of the 
system.  The fact that these equations of motions can be expressed as differential equations 
means that these relations are defined locally, i.e., only the variables at contiguous temporal 
parts are related. 
 There is a fundamental intuition about time that is not represented adequately in this 
interpretation, though:  namely, the tense structure of time, i.e., the qualitative difference 
between past, present, and future.  This is not the place to go into the many metaphysical 
theories of time that have been offered in the long history of philosophy, but I think it is fair 
to say that not a single cogent metaphysical representation of our intuitions about the tense 
structure of time has emerged so far.14  Nevertheless, there are two fundamental features 
about our experience of time that any metaphysical picture has to address: 
- The future seems 'less real' than past and present.  The idea that we can influence 
future events by our actions seems to require that, as of now, there is no matter of fact about 
future events.  Past matters of fact, on the other hand, seem to be well-defined like present 
matters of fact. 
- Even more elusive is the distinction between past and present:  both are factual (in the 
sense sketched above); nevertheless, there seems to be a sense in which only the present is 
actual while the reality of the past is merely inferred. 
 Both these intuitions are not represented in the mechanical model.  The actuality of the 
present could be represented by an extraneous statement "the time 
€ 
t0 is now" which depends 
on the time of utterance.  This statement would designate the 'temporally actual' state much as 
the boundary conditions designate the real state.  However, while it seems unproblematic to 
think of the boundary conditions as representing an objective matter of fact, because their 
truth-value is universal, the definition of the present changes with time, and therefore seems 
to require another notion of temporal change outside of mechanics.15   
                                                
14 (Van Benthem 1983) 
15Notice, though, that any such extraneous definition of the present does not agree well with special relativity:  it 
introduces an absolute concept of simultaneity which makes the Lorentz symmetry of relativistic mechanics 
appear like a strange coincidence. 
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 The distinction between past and future is even harder to represent in mechanics.  Not 
only are future mechanical states represented in the same way as past states, but the 
determinism of mechanics does not seem to leave room for contingency of future states.  
Moreover, for most mechanical systems the equation of motion is symmetrical under time 
reversal.16  Therefore, a dynamical definition of the distinction (through processes that have a 
definite direction in time) is also excluded.  On the other hand, the distinction of past and 
future is closely connected to the second law of thermodynamics, which does explicitly 
introduce this distinction.  This is a fundamental problem for the unification of 
thermodynamics and classical mechanics. 
 Classical point mechanics represents spatial properties of systems as variables, i.e., as 
properties of the mass points that make up the system.  This is not a satisfying representation 
for spatially extended objects.  Already Newton introduced the use of differential calculus to 
account for such cases:  we can think of an extended object as made up by infinitesimal parts 
that only interact with their neighbors.  Otherwise, this model (continuum mechanics) uses the 
same categories as classical mechanics.  We can distinguish between local and global 
variables:  local variables are defined on a single infinitesimal element, their values 
represented as functions over space; the global variables are defined as space integrals of the 
local variables. 
 Again, all local variables can be defined as functions of a set of local dynamical 
variables, called fields.  The mechanical state is a specification of the fields, i.e., given by a 
set of functions over space.  The assumption that a spatially extended object can be thought of 
as a composite of infinitesimal parts is reflected in the concept of the separability of the state:  
the state of a system always is the logical conjunction of the states of a complete set of spatial 
parts of the system.  For the dynamics, the assumption that infinitesimal elements only 
interact with their neighbors leads to the assumption of locality:  the evolution of the system 
can be expressed by a set of differential equations in space and time, i.e., only the values of 
the dynamical variables and their spatial differentials determine the dynamics of the system.  
Notice that in this model, space mathematically plays a similar role as time:  it is a free 
variable, and properties are defined as functions of space.  Unlike in the case of time, though, 
the interpretation of a system having spatial parts, and of all these parts coexisting, poses no 
difficulty. 
                                                
16The criterion for reversibility is that the Hamiltonian is time-independent and an even function of the 
momentum, which is always fulfilled for isolated and dispersion-free systems. 
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Notice further that continuum mechanics takes its notion of a substance from classical 
mechanics, i.e., the infinitesimal elements are thought of as individuals, and as having 
transtemporal identity.  When in the nineteenth century continuum mechanics was applied to 
electromagnetic phenomena and to light, it was therefore natural to assume such a substance 
as the bearer of these phenomena:  the ether.  Einstein's revolutionary act in the special theory 
of relativity was to emancipate the notion of a field from the idea of a substance whose 
property the field is.  This move is reflected in the abandonment of the idea of a transtemporal 
identity of spatial elements, i.e., the ideal of a velocity of the ether.  Nevertheless, even 
general relativity maintains the concept of space-time elements as individuals and as the 
bearers of properties (the fields). 
 In summary, the interpretation of classical mechanics is for the most part a rather 
unambitious endeavor:  the fundamental concept of mechanics fit easily into a logical 
structure that agrees with basic intuitions of objects and their properties.  The most 
problematic issue is the mechanical concept of time.  We will return to this topic in the 
context of the interpretation of quantum mechanics, where I will argue that quantum 
mechanics, suitably interpreted, can offer a more satisfying representation of temporal 
change. 
 
2.3 Statistical Mechanics 
 In classical mechanics, the state of a system is given by a complete specification of all 
its dynamical variables.  However, such complete knowledge of the dynamical variables is 
generally neither possible nor necessary.  In statistical mechanics, a more general notion of a 
physical state is used: the statistical state does not give a unique value for the dynamical 
variables, but a distribution over values, which is understood as giving the probabilities for 
different values.  Mathematically, the concept of probability is well understood:  it is a 
measure over the state space.  The definition of a measure on a subset of the state space 
requires the definition of a suitable set of subsets, i.e. a restriction of the Boolean algebra of 
subsets, which is called a σ-algebra of measurable subsets.  A measure maps these subsets on 
positive numbers (in our case, the probabilities).17  Such statistical states have proven 
extremely useful for the treatment of systems with many degrees of freedom like our 
                                                
17The classical text on the foundation of probability theory is Kolmogorov (1933) 
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container of gas, where it is practically impossible to determine the exact positions and 
momenta of every single molecule.   
 Nonetheless, they pose a problem for the interpretation of statistical mechanics:  a 
state in classical mechanics can be interpreted as a proposition (a substance having an 
attribute, or a set of attributes) and ascribing a state to a system simply means asserting a fact.  
But statistical states have a fundamentally different structure: They do not give a value to a 
variable, but they define a function over a range of values for the variable.  Mathematically 
speaking, the mechanical variables are treated as free variables in the statistical state, not as 
bound variables (as in the case of the classical mechanical state).  This is similar to the role of 
time and space discussed in the last section, which lead to the problematic notion of the 
coexistence of all times.  The problem seems even worse now: the coexistence of different 
values of a variable is a logical impossibility if variables are to be understood as attributes of 
a substance.  This problem is not confined to mechanics:  it applies to the use of probabilities 
quite generally.  It has given rise to a lot of attempts to clarify the metaphysical status of 
probabilistic statements.  I will only sketch the interpretations that are most relevant for 
mechanics.18 
 In the most straightforward interpretation, which goes back to Laplace's Philosophical 
Essay on Probabilities  (Laplace, 1995), probabilities are an expression of our incomplete 
knowledge of the real mechanical state of the system.  They are determined by the so-called 
"principle of insufficient reason":  if we have no reason to predict the occurrence of an event 
rather than an alternative, we should give equal probability to both.  But this principle fails to 
define a unique probability distribution for continuous variables.  Here, the notion of 
equidistribution depends on the chosen parametization of the variable.19  This problem has 
been perceived as a result of the fact that the principle of insufficient reason is merely an 
epistemic principle:  it only gives a criterion for attributions of probability to our beliefs.  
Therefore, it is not surprising that it does not define a unique notion of probability.   
 There are two responses to this problem: 
 One can accept the fact that probabilities are not objective and attempt to build a 
theory of probability that does not presuppose that there is a unique and objective notion of 
probability.  This is the premise for subjective theories of probability (de Finetti, 1937; 
Ramsey, 1950).  Such an interpretation of probability is problematic for statistical mechanics, 
                                                
18For an overview of interpretations of probability see Gillies (1973), Introduction 
19A well-known case for this is Bertrand's paradox: there is no natural notion of equiprobability for the mixing 
ration of two liquids.  See, e.g. (Mises 1957, 77-79) 
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where a well-defined notion of probability is of central importance.  For example, the entropy 
of a system is defined by the distribution of its statistical state.  Nevertheless, it is a well-
defined physical quantity that plays a fundamental role in the thermodynamic equation of 
state. 
 Alternatively, one has to try to find another way of defining probabilities that can be 
understood as representing an objective matter of fact.  The most widely accepted approach 
takes probabilities as properties not of a single system, but of an ensemble of systems.  The 
law of large numbers of the mathematical theory of probability asserts that for a sufficiently 
large ensemble of probabilistic events, the frequency of an outcome is close to the probability 
of that outcome with a high probability.  In the limit of infinite ensembles, the frequency 
converges towards the probability.  Frequentists  (Mises, 1957) have attempted to use this law 
for the definition of probability as the limit of the frequency of an outcome.  This approach is 
quite plausible for many situations in statistical mechanics, where the system is actually 
composed of a large number of similar systems (e.g., a volume of gas is composed of a 
gigantic number of molecules of the same kind).  A statistical state can then simply be 
understood as the idealized list of the actual ratios of molecules that have a given value of a 
variable.  In this case, the statistical state is an abbreviated way of writing a large number of 
mechanical states for single molecules.  But, strictly speaking, the use of the law of large 
numbers already presupposes a measure on the state space, because it only makes 
probabilistic statement for frequencies.  Therefore it already assumes a concept of probability. 
 Furthermore, statistical mechanics is not limited to such simple cases, and Gibbs has 
demonstrated that the power of statistical physics can be greatly improved if we take the 
whole of the system as the basis of our description (not the single molecule) and consider a 
statistical state in the state space of the whole system (Gibbs 1902).  Here, the simple 
interpretation of the statistical state in terms of ratios of molecules is impossible.  Gibbs 
himself invoked the notion of an imaginary ensemble of systems, but this move again opens 
up the question: how can the so defined probabilities be objective features of the physical 
system?  One possible answer is given by ergodic theory that takes probabilities not as 
defined by frequencies in simultaneous ensembles but by frequencies in the temporal 
succession of states of a system.  While this approach makes the probability distribution an 
objective feature of the single mechanical system, it still is not a mechanical property as 
defined in the last section, because it is not a function of any one mechanical state but a time 
integral over many such states.   
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 Notice that all these interpretations of statistical states are interpretations in term of 
classical mechanics, i.e., they formulate the statistical state under the assumption that an 
objective description of a system can be given by its mechanical state.  Especially in the 
context of the interpretation of quantum mechanics states, this premise has been called the 
'ignorance interpretation' of statistical states because it assumes that the statistical description 
of a system implies our ignorance about the objective mechanical state of the system.  
Regarding the distinction between subjective and objective interpretations, this coinage can 
be misleading because only subjective interpretations understand probabilities as epistemic 
concepts, and the notion of 'ignorance interpretation' seems to imply an epistemic explanation 
of probability.  What is really meant is simply an interpretation in terms of classical 
mechanics. 
 Nevertheless, none of the interpretations above offers a way to understand the 
statistical state as a property of the individual system in the mechanical sense, whether they 
interpret statistical states subjectively or as properties of some ensemble.  But this leads to a 
kind of epiphenomenalism for statistical states:  because the fundamental assumption of 
mechanical dynamics is that the future development is completely determined by the 
mechanical state, it seems impossible that a statistical state can play a causal role, and neither 
can a intrinsically statistical quantity like entropy.  The problems about the interpretation of 
time and of probability are connected in a rather mysterious way in the second law of 
thermodynamics, which says that in any thermodynamical process, the entropy never 
decreases with time.  But this means: entropy, which does not seem to be a mechanical 
property of systems, distinguishes between future and past, which classical mechanics cannot.  
What could be the missing part? 
 
2.4 The Hilbert Space 
 We will now turn to the interpretation of the Hilbert space formalism.  From early on, 
quantum mechanics was perceived as necessitating a revision of the fundamental 
metaphysical ideas in mechanics.  But at the same time, there are striking similarities in the 
structure of quantum mechanics and classical mechanics.  It is plausible to assume that 
analogous structures in both theories should be interpreted in the same way.  This is  not a far-
fetched methodological claim:  it was exactly around these metaphysical analogies that 
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quantum mechanics developed.20   The question is therefore how far these analogies can be 
taken and where the difference of the formalism forces us to abandon metaphysical tenets of 
classical mechanics.  In this section I will follow von Neumann's analysis of the analogies and 
disanalogies between quantum and classical mechanics.   
 Quantum mechanics uses exactly the same concept of a mechanical system as classical 
mechanics, i.e. the notion of individuated substances that persist through time.  This may 
seem surprising at first.  Quantum mechanics, after all, is perceived to be a theory about 
atoms and elementary particles, the microscopic constituents of matter.  One would expect, 
therefore, that there is a statement in the theory to this effect:  that it is a theory about atoms 
and not about cuckoo-clocks.  But, as a matter of fact, there is no such statement:  every 
system that can be described by classical mechanics, can be described by quantum mechanics 
as well.21 
 This fact will be of central importance to the later argument because once we have 
convinced ourselves that quantum mechanics is the correct theory to apply to atomic 
phenomena, there is nothing in the theory itself that keeps us from applying it to all other 
mechanical systems, too.  (Of course, there might be extraneous reasons to limit the scope of 
the theory.)   
 The representation of variables in quantum mechanics is fundamentally different from 
that in classical mechanics.  This reflects the fundamentally new phenomenon that forced the 
abandonment of classical mechanics in favor of quantum mechanics:  the quantization of 
variables.  It was the seminal discovery of quantum mechanics that this fact can be expressed 
by representing variables by linear operators (Heisenberg 1925).  The values of the variables 
are then represented by the eigenvalues of these operators.  As a special case, properties (in 
von Neumann's sense) are represented by projection operators, i.e. operators which only have 
the eigenvalues 0 and 1.22 
                                                
20For example, the formal analogy between Hilbert space operators and classical variables given by their 
algebraic properties is the main heuristic tool in 'quantizing' equations of motion. 
21It is this notion of a system that limits the applicability of quantum mechanics to particle physics.  The 
indistinguishability of elementary particles conflicts with the notion of individuality.  While this problem can be 
dealt with by introducing extraneous symmetry conditions imposed on the status of these particles, the 
possibility of creation and destruction of particles cannot be represented within the formalism of point mechanics 
at all.  This is taken as an indication that not point mechanics is the fundamental theory of elementary particles 
but field mechanics. 
22Again it can be shown that both notions are mathematically equivalent, but here the equivalence is far from 
trivial and only valid under certain restrictions.  The proof of the mathematical equivalence of Hermitian 
operators with sets of projection operators is discussed by von Neumann (1932), 59-88, and forms the central 
part of his discussion of the eigenvalue problem, that is the question under which circumstances variables 
represented by operators can have values.   
21 
 Linear operators are defined as mappings of a linear space onto itself.  Therefore, the 
fundamental mathematical structure in quantum mechanics is a complex linear space, the 
Hilbert space.  The linearity of the Hilbert space means that it allows for the addition of two 
elements and the multiplication of an element with a complex number.  Furthermore, a scalar 
product is defined on the Hilbert space which maps pairs of elements on complex numbers.  
This scalar product defines the notion of orthogonality of two elements. 
Quantum mechanical states are defined as one-dimensional subspaces of the Hilbert space:  if 
two elements are only distinguished by a complex factor, they represent the same state.  
Linear combinations of two states are called superpositions of these states.  This leads, 
intuitively speaking, to a large number of new elements in the space. A central problem in the 
interpretation of quantum mechanics is to understand this feature of the Hilbert space in 
metaphysical terms. 
 This structure implies that variables don't have values for all states.23  Each eigenvalue 
of an operator defines a subspace of the Hilbert space, and subspaces belonging to different 
eigenvalues are orthogonal.  This fact has an important corollary:  only states that are 
orthogonal can be distinguished by the values of a variable or, equivalently, there is no 
property that can distinguish between two nonorthogonal states (in the sense that one state has 
the property while the other one does not). 
 The connection between variables and states is not as direct as in classical mechanics:  
we cannot define all states by their values for a set of dynamical variables because there is no 
variable that gives values to all states.  Instead, the role of dynamical variables is taken by 
non-degenerate operators, that is operators who have for every eigenvalue a one-dimensional 
subspace of eigenstates.  Such an operator defines a basis on the Hilbert space, and every 
element of the Hilbert space can be represented by its complex coefficients in this basis.  
Position is the standard example of such a non-degenerate operator and the representation of a 
Hilbert space element in position basis is called a wave function.24 
 The operators form an algebra with a noncommutative multiplication given by the 
concatenation of two operators.  Two operators 
€ 
A , 
€ 
B commute if 
€ 
AB = BA.  If and only if 
two operators commute,  there is at least one basis whose elements are eigenstates of both 
                                                
23Properly speaking, operators associated with unbounded variables have no eigenstates at all.  Dirac introduced 
improper states (Delta functions) as eigenstates of such operators, while von Neumann insisted that this fact 
represented the only finite sharpness of values of unbounded variables. 
24The basis vectors are only defined up to a complex phase by the non-degenerate operator.  Therfore, properly 
speaking, we need a second noncommuting operator (the standard example is momentum) to define the relative 
phases of the basis.  Theis leads to a situation analogous to classical mechanics, where the dynamical variables 
also come in pairs. 
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operators.  The algebra again makes it possible to express variables as functions of the 
dynamical variables if we assume the mechanistic postulate, which now has the form 
(because of the linearity of the Hilbert space): every variable can be expressed by a linear 
operator on the Hilbert space, and every property by a subspace of the Hilbert space.  But in 
the case of quantum mechanics, the mechanistic postulate has an important consequence: 
subspaces of the Hilbert space don't form a Boolean algebra, but a so-called partial Boolean 
algebra.  The main difference is that the joint of two subspaces A∪B is not a subspace itself.  
Therefore, one defines instead the smallest subspace that contains A∪B as the span  of A and 
B, written A⊕B.  But this operation does not fulfill the distributive law of Boolean algebra, 
i.e. (A⊕B) ∩ C ≠ (A∩C) ⊕ (B∩C) for some A, B, C.  The mechanistic postulate now implies 
that also properties in quantum mechanics don't form a Boolean algebra, i.e. their logic is not 
the familiar logic, but a non-distributive logic called quantum logic.25   Many of the 
nonclassical phenomena in quantum mechanics can be represented by the difference between 
quantum and standard logic. 
 The representation of the dynamics of a system is given by a set of differential 
equations exactly like in classical mechanics.  As in classical mechanics, these equations of 
motion can be represented by the system's Hamiltonian, i.e. the energy expressed as a 
function o the dynamical variables.  In the Hilbert space, this leads to an especially simple 
characterization of the dynamics of a system:  it can be described as a unitary evolution 
€ 
ψ t( ) =U t( )ψ 0( ) of the state vector 
€ 
ψ , where U is a unitary operator.  This representation 
makes it obvious that the evolution is deterministic, like in classical mechanics. 
 So far, the interpretation of the Hilbert space formalism was analogous to the 
interpretation of the (Hamiltonian) formalism of classical mechanics, although the formalisms 
are quite different.  The fundamental discrepancy is given by the fact that operators do not 
attribute values to all states.  This is an obvious lacuna in the interpretation, because if a 
variable is measurable, then we should be able to measure it on any state of the system.  
Being measurable, after all, means that we can conceive of a procedure to measure the value 
of the observable.  This procedure should (at least in certain limits) not depend on the state 
the system is in.   
 This question is answered by Born's rule (Born, 1926):  If a property A is measured on 
any state 
€ 
ψ  of a system, the probability for finding the property is given by 
€ 
ψ,P A( )ψ , 
                                                
25See Hughes (1989) 178-217 
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where 
€ 
P A( ) is the projection operator representing the property.  Because of the spectral 
decomposition theorem this rule also gives the probability for the value 
€ 
α  of any variable 
(quantity) 
€ 
A  as 
€ 
ψ,PA α( )ψ .   
 This rule gives empirical predictions for the measurement of quantum mechanical 
states, but it is not an interpretation in our sense, i.e., it does not make an assertion about the 
nature of the relation between variables and their values, but it gives empirical predictions for 
their measurement.  Therefore, it leads to the question whether it can be taken as the basis of 
an interpretation of quantum mechanical states as statistical states in the sense of section 
2.3.26   
 Before we turn to von Neumann's treatment of this question, I will give a brief review 
of the representation of statistical states in quantum mechanics which again is quite similar to 
what was said in section 2.3.  First of all, it has to be noticed that an appropriate notion of 
probability in quantum mechanics has to accommodate the linear structure of the Hilbert 
space:  Probability cannot be defined as a measure on subsets of the Hilbert space, but it must 
be defined on the linear subspaces.  This leads to a generalized notion of probability, because 
the subspaces don't form a σ-algebra (compare footnote 8 in 2.3):  Instead of the operation of 
joining two subsets we have the operation of the direct sum (span) of two subspaces, because 
the joint of two subspaces is not a subspace itself.   
 Gleason's theorem27 asserts that any so defined probability measure on a Hilbert space 
(of dimension greater than two) can be represented by a positive definite Hermitian operator 
of trace 1.  Such an operator is called a density operator.  Especially, this means that a 
probabilistic distribution 
€ 
pn  over quantum mechanical states 
€ 
ψn  is represented by a weighted 
sum 
€ 
ρ = pnP ψn( )
n
∑  of the projection operators 
€ 
P ψn( )  defined by 
€ 
ψn  (von Neumann, 157-8).  
On the other hand, ever density operator can be written in this form (von Neumann, 174).  
Therefore, density operators can always be understood as representing probabilistic mixtures 
of pure quantum mechanical states or, shorter, mixed states.  This representation is not unique 
though, i.e., there is more than one way to represent a quantum statistical state (density 
operator) as a probability distribution over pure states.  This feature distinguishes quantum 
statistical states from classical statistical states, where the representation is always unique.  
                                                
26Von Neumann and Born see this rule as the central statement of a 'statistical interpretation' of quantum 
mechanics, but von Neumann makes very clear that this is not to be understood in our sense, i.e. as an 
interpretation of quantum mechanical states as (classical) statistical states.  (Von Neumann (1932) 108-9).  The 
latter is the meaning of 'statistical interpretation' that is commonly used nowadays.  
27Gleason (1957) 
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We will return to the interpretation of statistical states in the context of the discussion of 
composite systems in the next chapter. 
 Back to the question of whether pure quantum mechanical states can be understood as 
statistical states.  Von Neumann distinguishes these possibilities along the lines of the two 
possible ignorance interpretations of statistical states we discussed in the last section.   
 First, one could assume an ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanical states, i.e., 
one could explain the probabilistic dispersion of measurement outcomes postulated by Born's 
rule by assuming that the quantum mechanical state is not an irreducible pure state of a single 
system (or at a single time), but represents an ensemble of systems on which the measured 
observable has different values with frequencies given by the Born rule.  Von Neumann 
shows that this interpretation is not possible if we assume that the Born rule is valid for any 
Hermitian operator defined in the Hilbert space.  (v. Neumann, ibid., 167-71)  Von 
Neumann's argument rests on the assumption that the value assignments obey the algebraic 
rules for all variables, that is even if two operators A, B don't commute, the expectation values 
given by the Born rule satisfy the equation 
€ 
E A + B( ) = E A( ) + E B( ).  This assumption has 
been criticized, because in general, we don't have an independent method of measurement for 
each possible quantum mechanical operator. 
 Kochen and Specker showed with an example that for any Hilbert space of dimension 
greater than two there is no value assignment for three noncommuting observables on a finite 
set of states (exactly, 117, in their example) that correctly reproduces the prediction of Born's 
rule,28 weakening the premise of Gleason's theorem which only considers value assignments 
for all variables on the system and weakening von Neumann's assumption above: they only 
assume that the expectation values of commuting operators are additive.  Of course, even in 
the face of Kocher and Specker's argument one could maintain the assumption that all 
variables have values if one gave up the assumption that these values were faithfully 
represented by the measurement outcomes.  But this move would defeat the primary purpose 
of a statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics: to understand the quantum mechanical 
state as a statistical state.29 
 The second possible interpretation of the probabilistic dispersion is on the lines of a 
subjective interpretation of probability, namely, that the distribution of values in the Born rule 
is an effect of an inability to exactly measure the true value:  the Born rule describes the 
                                                
28Kochen and Specker (1967), see Hughes (1989) 162-175 for a discussion. 
29We will discuss such "hidden variable" interpretations in section 4.3. 
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statistical distribution of a measurement error.  This liberates us from the requirement that the 
probabilities in the Born rule be representable as frequencies in a statistical ensemble.  But as 
von Neumann observes (von Neumann, ibid., 110-112), the measurement error would also 
affect the measurement of two compatible variables (i.e., variables whose operators 
commute).  Therefore, it should be impossible to obtain exact correlations between the 
measurements of two compatible observables.  As a special case, if one measures the same 
variable twice, the results of both measurements should not be correlated, but each should be 
distributed independently according to Born's rule.  But this conclusion is in contradiction to 
our empirical evidence:  it is possible to find correlations in variables that are much more 
exact than the spread of the distribution of these variables given by the Born rule.  Von 
Neumann discusses the scattering experiments of Compton and Simon as an example.  Here, 
the momenta of the scattered electron and photo are exactly correlated, but they are spread 
over a wide range of possible values.  Therefore, also a subjective interpretation is ruled out.   
 Taken together, these two arguments mean that an ignorance interpretation of the 
probabilistic distribution of values for a variable given by the Born rule is impossible.  A 
measurement cannot simply be the recording of an existing value of the observable, because 
there is no consistent way in quantum mechanics to attribute values to noncommuting 
variables, and explaining the inconsistency with an inexactitude of the measurement is in 
conflict with experimental evidence. 
 There is an alternative interpretation of the dispersion of values in a quantum 
mechanical state.  It takes the state as a field, which for a single particle is quite plausible: the 
state can be described by a complex function in space, the wave function, and its unitary 
evolution can be expressed as a differential field equation, the Schrödinger equation.  
Variables that are not functions of position, such as momentum, can be understood as field 
operators, i.e. global variables of the field.  This interpretation, known as wave mechanics, 
was advocated by Schrödinger and de Broglie, and was an extremely important heuristic tool 
in early quantum mechanics.  Its main problem is to account for the probabilistic nature of the 
Born rule: While variables on fields show dispersion, the different values exist simultaneously 
(like different momenta in a wave), not stochastically.  A further problem for the plausibility 
of a field interpretation is that many-particle systems cannot be described by fields in three-
dimensional space. 
 Instead, von Neumann proposes a dynamical interpretation of the probabilities, which 
is called a propensity interpretation: if a state is not an eigenstate of an operator, the 
corresponding variable has no value for that state.  But in the case of a measurement of the 
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variable, the state 'produces' a value indeterministically.  That is: it has a propensity  for 
different values without any value being realized before a measurement is performed.  The 
probabilities of the Born rule describe the strength of this propensity for different values. 
   It is instructive to look at the Compton-Simon experiment in yet another way:  It can 
be interpreted as two successive measurements of the same variable.  The existence of exact 
correlations means then that the state of the system after the first measurement must have 
changed:  the second measurement does not show a dispersion in the measured variable 
anymore.  Therefore, it can be shown the state after the first measurement must be an 
eigenstate of the measured observable (von Neumann, ibid., 112-114). 
 Von Neumann takes this as a general principle:  the measurement of a variable 
changes the state into an eigenstate of the measured variable with a probability given by the 
Born rule.30  This principle is called the reduction postulate and the eigenstate after the 
measurement the reduced state.  Because the different possible reduced states are distributed 
probabilistically according to Born's rule, the resulting state can be represented by a density 
operator which is nontrivial (i.e. not a pure state) unless the initial state of the system was an 
eigenstate of the measured observable.  This means that the process of measurement cannot 
be described by a unitary evolution, which always transforms pure states into pure states.  
This is quite obvious when we remember that unitary evolution is a deterministic process:  
Von Neumann's argument against an ignorance interpretation of quantum mechanical states 
implies that the process of reduction must be irreducibly indeterministic.  But as we remarked 
earlier, quantum mechanics assumes that every temporal evolution of a system can be 
described by a deterministic evolution of its state.  Therefore, von Neumann has to assume 
that two fundamentally different kinds of dynamical evolution exist in quantum mechanics: a 
'normal', deterministic evolution and a special kind of indeterministic evolution that only 
takes place if a measurement is performed.   
 The impossibility of an ignorance interpretation of pure quantum mechanical states 
leads to a rather puzzling metaphysical picture:  at any given time, there is no matter of fact 
about the value of most variables.  It is only through acts of measurement that variables 
acquire a value.  But this leaves us with several open questions:  What kind of processes are 
                                                
30This assumption of the repeatability of quantum mechanical measurement has been criticized, because many 
actual measurements are not repeatable: they change the measured state even if it is an eigenstate of the 
measured variable.  But as we will see in the next chapter, non-repeatable measurements can be easily modeled 
in quantum mechanics once we have a model of repeatable measurements.  Von Neumann's interest in this 
section is not to give the most general model of a physical measurement, but to discuss the problem of values in 
quantum mechanics.  For that, the decisive fact is the possibility of repeatable measurements. 
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measurements and how can they have the power to actualize values of variables?  How is it to 
be understood that measurement does not seem to obey the law of unitary evolution?  And 
finally: macroscopic objects seem to have well-defined values for all their variables at any 
time.  How is that possible if we assume that quantum mechanics is the more fundamental 
theory and underlies also macroscopic phenomena? 
 This problem is illustrated by Schrödinger's cat paradox: Schrödinger shows us a way 
to prepare a superposition of two states of a cat, one in which the cat is alive and one in which 
it is dead.  Do we have to conclude that there only is a matter of fact about whether the cat is 
alive or dead once someone performs a measurement on the cat (or at least looks at it)?   
The complex of these questions is known as the measurement problem.  What feature could 
give measurement such a special status as a physical process?  Of course, a measurement is 
not simply the evolution of an isolated system, but it involves the interaction with a 
measurement apparatus.  Therefore, we have to discuss the quantum mechanical 
representation of interactions on a system before we can address these questions. 
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Chapter 3 
The Measurement Problem 
 
3.1  Composite Systems 
 It is a surprising feature of quantum mechanics that it makes nontrivial predictions 
about the behavior of composite systems.31  Whereas in classical mechanics any composite 
system is completely characterized by describing the states of its parts, this is not true in 
quantum mechanics.  It is easy to see why this is so.  If a composite system S consists of two 
subsystems S1 and S2, then of course every pair of states 
€ 
φ  of S1, 
€ 
ψ  of S2 is a possible state 
for the composite system.  This state is called the direct product of the subsystem states and is 
written 
€ 
φ ⊗ψ .  But then it follows from the linearity of the Hilbert space that also every 
linear combination of such direct products must be a possible state of the composite system, 
that is:  if 
€ 
φi and 
€ 
ψi are possible states of the subsystems, and 
€ 
ci are complex numbers, then  
   
€ 
ω = Σiciφi ⊗ψ i (3.1) 
represents a possible state of the composite system.  But ω in general cannot be written as a 
single direct product of any two states of the subsystems 
€ 
′ φ ⊗ ′ ψ .  This means:  in general the 
composite system can be in a state that cannot be described by giving a pure state for each 
subsystem.  Such states are called entangled states.  There are no such states in classical 
mechanics, where any pure state of a composite system is fully described by the state of its 
components.  This very important feature is often called the holism of quantum mechanics, as 
opposed to the atomism of classical mechanics.   
 There is an analogue in statistical mechanics to entangled states, though:  Generally, a 
joint distribution of several variables cannot be written as a product of distributions over the 
single variables.  This can be understood by observing that the joint distribution does not only 
tell us about how the values of every single variable are distributed, but also how the values 
for different variables are correlated.  This means:  assume we know the joint distribution of 
two variables, then we can calculate the conditional distribution of one variable given a 
distribution over the other.  In quantum mechanics, we can make an analogous statement, and 
it turns out that if the given state 
€ 
ω  of the composite system is pure, and if system S1 is in a 
                                                
31 The formalism of composite systems is described in von Neumann (1932), ch. VI.2 
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state 
€ 
η, then the conditional state of system S2 is also pure.  It is called the relative state to 
€ 
η and is defined by: 
 
  
€ 
ψrel η( ) = N η ⊗ψ i ,ω ψ i
i
∑  (3.2) 
where N is a normalization constant,  and 
€ 
ψi is any basis of S2 (Everett 1973, 38). 
 All possible states for a composite system (given in the construction in (3.1)) form a 
Hilbert space, called the tensor product space of the Hilbert spaces of the subsystems H1, H2, 
written H1⊗H2,.  It is easy to construct a basis for the tensor product space: if 
€ 
φi and 
€ 
ψ j  are 
bases of the subspaces, then the vectors 
€ 
φi ⊗ψ j  form a basis for the product space.  The 
scalar product of two vectors 
€ 
φi ⊗ψ j , 
€ 
φk ⊗ψl  is defined as   
€ 
φi ,φk ψ j ,ψ l .  For all other 
states, the scalar product follows from linearity.  The tensor product of two operators A on H1 
and B on H2 is defined by the equation 
   
€ 
A⊗ B( ) φi ⊗ψ j( ) = Aφi ⊗ Bψ j  (3.3) 
and linear combinations.  Again, there are operators on H that cannot be written as a tensor 
product of two operators on the subspaces, but any operator can be written as a sum of such 
tensor products.  The operators A on H1 and   
€ 
A⊗ 1 on H are equivalent, i.e. they have the 
same expectation values for any states 
€ 
φ  on H1 and
€ 
ψ  on H2: 
   
€ 
φ ⊗ψ, A⊗ 1( ) φ ⊗ψ( ) = φ, Aφ ψ,ψ = φ, Aφ  (3.4) 
Therefore we regard A and   
€ 
A⊗ 1 as representing the same physical quantity. 
   The fact that a general state of the composite system cannot be simply decomposed 
into two pure states of the subsystems leaves us with the question how to describe subsystems 
by a quantum mechanical state, if we are given the state of the composite system.  After all, 
we can always make separate measurements on each of the subsystems and hence be able to 
deduce a state description of the subsystems from these measurements.  Note especially that a 
composite system can be formed by any two systems even when these are perfectly isolated 
and noninteracting.  In this case, it follows from our basic assumptions about mechanical 
theories that each of the subsystems must have a well-defined state.  It can be shown (ibid., 
41) that for any state ω of the composite system there exists a mixed state 
€ 
ρω  for subsystem 
S1, so that the expectation value   
€ 
Tr(Aρω )  for any variable A on S1 is the same as the 
expectation value   
€ 
ω,( A⊗ 1)ω  for the equivalent variable   
€ 
A⊗ 1 on the composite system.  
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But this also means that any probabilistic prediction for the system S1 that the two states yield 
will be the same.    
€ 
ρω
S1( ) is always uniquely defined: 
 
  
€ 
ρω
S1( ) = φiψk ,ω
*
φ jψk ,ω φi
†
⊗φ j
ijk
∑  (3.5) 
where   
€ 
φi and   
€ 
ψk  are bases on S1 and S2, respectively, and   
€ 
φi
†
⊗φ j is the tensor product of the 
vectors   
€ 
φi and   
€ 
φ j, i.e. the operator that maps   
€ 
φi onto   
€ 
φ j and all vectors orthogonal to   
€ 
φi onto 
0.  Von Neumann calls the state   
€ 
ρω
S1( ) the projection of ω onto the factor space H1, but note 
that this is very different from the projection onto a subspace (which always produces a pure 
state.) 
 The fact that   
€ 
ρω
S1( ) is uniquely defined implies that it is independent of which bases   
€ 
φi 
and   
€ 
ψk  we choose to evaluate (3.5).  But note that in the representation of   
€ 
ρω
S1( ) given in (3.5) 
there are elements   
€ 
φi
†
⊗φ j which cannot simply be read as projection operators.  Therefore, 
(3.5) is not in a form that allows us to read   
€ 
ρω
S1( ) as a probability distribution over pure states.  
As we have seen in the first chapter, there are always such representations for any mixed 
state, but they are not uniquely defined.  Von Neumann has shown that for every   
€ 
ω ∈ H1⊗H2  
there is a representation of the form  
 
  
€ 
ω = ciφi ⊗ψ i
i
∑  (3.6) 
where the   
€ 
φi and   
€ 
ψi are elements of two bases on the two subspaces.  If one writes the 
projected states in these bases, they are 
 
  
€ 
ρω
S1( ) = ci
2
φi
†
⊗φi
i
∑  (3.7) 
and the analogue for S2.  These mixtures are diagonal and can therefore be interpreted as a 
probability distribution over the elements of the bases.  Furthermore, we can simply read off 
the relative states for any element of the bases:    
€ 
φi is the relative state to   
€ 
ψi  and vice versa.  
This representation of an entangled state is called its biorthogonal decomposition.  Also the 
biorthogonal decomposition is not always uniquely defined.   
 In general, any interaction of two systems will create an entangled state of the 
composite system.  The interaction of two systems is described by a unitary transformation on 
the composite system.  This transformation will in general not transform disentangled states 
into other disentangled states.  Therefore, after any interaction the only state we can ascribe to 
a system is the projected state, which in general will be a mixture.   
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 It is extremely important to realize that mixed states resulting from the projection of 
an entangled state cannot be given an ignorance interpretation like the mixtures of quantum 
mechanical states that we discussed in the last chapter.   It is simple to see why this is so:  if 
we give the projection mixture (3.7) an ignorance interpretation, what we say is that 
subsystem S1 is really in some pure state   
€ 
φi, but we don't know in which one; it follows that 
S2 is in the pure state   
€ 
ψrel φi( )  But this would mean that the composite system is in the 
disentangled state   
€ 
φi ⊗ψrel φi( ) , which is different from the pure state ω (3.6) we know it to be 
in.  This leads to a contradiction in the value assignment to operators.  Assume that the   
€ 
φi are 
eigenstates of a variable A.  Hence, on an ignorance interpretation of (3.7), S1 would be in an 
eigenstate of A.  As we have seen, it follows from the properties of the tensor product that the 
state of S1 and S2,   
€ 
φi ⊗ψrel φi( )  is an eigenstate of   
€ 
A⊗ 1. But ω is, by definition, not an 
eigenstate of   
€ 
A⊗ 1.  Hence, we cannot maintain that the two descriptions are empirically 
equivalent, so the ignorance interpretation is not tenable.  
 In general, any quantum mechanical system we encounter may have somewhere in its 
past interacted with some other system and may therefore be in an entangled state with that 
other system.  But then it follows from our reasoning above that the system is in a mixed 
state, and this mixed state cannot be given an ignorance interpretation.  I will call a mixture of 
this kind an objective mixture.  It might at first sight seem more plausible in a situation like 
this to maintain that there really is no state at all that describes the system, and that only the 
composite system has a well-defined quantum mechanical state.   But besides the argument 
used earlier, that we can perform any measurement on each subsystem and hence must be 
able to summarize our measurement results in a state description, this line of reasoning would 
also lead us to the conclusion that no system but the universe as a whole will have a quantum 
mechanical state properly, because we can say with confidence for any system that at some 
point in the past it has interacted with another system.  Hence, if we did not allow objectively 
mixed states for quantum mechanical systems, quantum mechanics would become 
inapplicable to any system in nature.   
 In the formalism introduced in section 2.4, we treated mixed states as the analogue of 
classical statistical states.  But we did not discuss the interpretation of mixed states in 
quantum mechanics there.  We implicitly assumed that all mixed states can be understood as 
ignorance mixtures in analogy to the approach generally taken in statistical mechanics.  The 
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argument above shows that this approach is not possible for quantum mechanics.  We must 
accept mixed states as equally objective as pure states.   
 The argument against an ignorance interpretation of projection mixtures was based on 
the fact that this would lead to a different and experimentally distinguishable state of a 
composite system.  But on the other hand, it is obvious that for any measurement confined to 
a single subsystem there is no difference in the empirical predictions of Born's rule whether 
we give the mixed state an ignorance interpretation or whether we treat it as an objective 
mixture.  This follows simply from the fact that the mixed state itself gives us any empirical 
prediction that we can have.  Its interpretation does not matter.  Let us call this feature the 
local indistinguishability of objective and ignorance mixtures.  While local 
indistinguishability cannot be an answer to the measurement problem, it is an important 
indicator of what the measurement problem is about:  it is not a problem about certain 
empirical predictions of quantum mechanics that could be solved by changing the theory, but 
it is a problem about the interpretation of the theory, i.e. a problem about how to describe the 
reality that is reflected in these empirical predictions. 
 
3.2  Decoherence 
 If we confine our attention to a single system and only consider measurements on this 
system we can therefore say:  interactions will transform pure states of the system into 
mixtures.  This process is called decoherence.  It has only recently gained the interest of 
theoretical physicists in order to explain the emergence of classical behavior in quantum 
mechanical systems.32  The theory of decoherence is important for an interpretation that 
wants to maintain that quantum mechanics is the fundamental theory of nature and classical 
mechanics only an approximation for macroscopic systems.  Decoherence is supposed to 
answer the fundamental problem for such an interpretation: why is it that macroscopic 
systems always seem to  behave classically if they are to be understood as large quantum 
mechanical systems?   
 The general line of the answer is that this happens because of the interaction of 
systems with their environment, especially the thermal electromagnetic field (which of course 
is always present unless at temperatures close to absolute zero).  This interaction 
spontaneously turns superpositions of eigenstates of certain variables (namely, macroscopic 
                                                
32  For an introductory account, see Zurek (1991) 
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classical variables) into mixtures of these variables.  Of course, on von Neumann's 
interpretation of possessed values discussed in the last chapter, this process will not be 
sufficient to explain the existence of definite values for the classical variables.  For these 
mixtures are not ignorance mixtures, but the local projected states of a superposition in the 
combined system of the object and its environment.  Hence, on von Neumann's account, they 
do not have a possessed value.  We will return to the question of possessed values in our 
discussion of Everett's interpretation.33  For now, we can say that the objective mixtures 
which a process of decoherence produces are locally indistinguishable from ignorance 
mixtures. 
 This is not the place to discuss in detail the research done on decoherence which is 
still a very new field and which has not yet furnished us with a general theory applicable to all 
macroscopic objects.  But it is clear from the discussion so far what the question is that any 
theory of decoherence has to answer.  While any interaction can transform the initial state of a 
system into a mixture, it needs to be shown that this mixture actually is a mixture of states 
that have a classical interpretation.  This means:  the basis that diagonalizes the density matrix 
is determined only by the interaction (and not the initial states of the systems) and it is 
approximately a basis of "classical" states, i.e., eigenstates of classical variables like position 
and momentum.  In general, the basis determined by a decoherence interaction that 
diagonalizes the projected states is called a decoherence basis. 
  The central interaction to be considered for decoherence is the interaction of a system 
of charged particles with a thermal electromagnetic field.  Unruh and Zurek (1989) have 
treated this case in a simple calculable model of a harmonic oscillator and a scalar field 
interacting with this oscillator.  For this interaction, they derived an exact equation for the 
density matrix of the harmonic oscillator and solved this equation numerically for different 
initial conditions and strengths of interaction.  The result they obtained is:  there is very fast 
decoherence, that is, the decoherence is much faster than the relaxation time, i.e., the time of 
reaching the thermodynamic equilibrium.  This means, decoherence happens long before any 
considerable amount of energy is exchanged between the oscillator and the scalar field.  
Hence, the interaction with the field turns the state of the harmonic oscillator into a classical 
state already before it affects the state in any way that is classically accountable.  It is 
                                                
33  I consider it a strong argument for Everett's interpretation that it is able to accommodate the theory of 
decoherence, whereas this is not possible in a traditional interpretation.  Most recent proponents of decoherence 
subscribe to some kind of an Everett interpretation, e.g. Unruh and Zurek (1989), Gell-Mann and Hartle (1991), 
Halliwell (1993).  
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plausible to assume that the same happens for more complex systems and the full 
electromagnetic field, even when the complexity of these problems has made it impossible, at 
least as of yet, to formulate equations of motion or even to solve them. 
 Another interesting question about decoherence is treated by Amann (1992):  the 
question of delocalization in molecules, that is, the fact that in many molecules atoms do not 
have well-defined positions. On the other hand, macromolecules do have well-defined shapes, 
as is well-known from decades of biochemical research into the structure of organic 
molecules.  Amann has shown that whereas in smaller molecules superpositions of position 
eigenstates often are energetically the most favorable states, such superpositions decohere in 
larger molecules because of the interaction with the thermal electromagnetic field.   
 In all cases of interaction with an electromagnetic field, it is important to note that the 
escaping photons travel at the speed of light and hence cannot be caught up with anymore 
after the interaction happened.  This means:  unless a measurement device is already in place 
before the decoherence happens, there is no experimental method to ever distinguish the local 
projected mixture of the system that has undergone decoherence from an ignorance mixture, 
because it is never possible even in principle to show the fact of a superposition of the 
combined system and electromagnetic field.  
 The effect of decoherence can be described as the introduction of superselection rules.  
Superselection rules say that certain states of a quantum mechanical system are never 
transformed into each other by any unitary time transformation matrix that is physically 
possible for the system.  Consider, for example, a composite system consisting of two 
separate parts that are completely isolated from each other.  Here, the Hamiltonian operator is 
simply the sum of the Hamiltonians for the subsystems:  
   
€ 
H = H1 ⊗ 1+ 1⊗ H2 (3.8) 
Its eigenstates are the disentangled states   
€ 
φi ⊗ψ j  where   
€ 
φi,   
€ 
ψ j  are the eigenstates of   
€ 
H1 and 
€ 
H2 .  From this it follows that H never transforms a disentangled state into an entangled state 
and, on the other hand, that an entangled state  
 
€ 
cijφi ⊗ψ jij∑   (3.9) 
and the corresponding mixture of projected states  
 
€ 
cij
2P φi( )⊗ P ψ j( )ij∑  (3.10) 
will evolve in exactly the same way.  Therefore, also the evolution of the system will never 
give us any clue whether the system is an entangled state or in a mixed state.  
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Proof of the statements above: 
If 
€ 
H = H1⊗1 + 1⊗H2, then the unitary transformation operator U of the combined 
system is: 
    
€ 
U = e−itH  = e− itH1⊗1  ⊗ e− it1⊗H2  , 
because 
€ 
H1 and 
€ 
H2  commute (they are operators on different Hilbert spaces.)  But this 
is simply 
€ 
U =U1⊗U2, where   
€ 
U1 = e− itH1   is the unitary transformation operator on S1 
and analogous   
€ 
U2 = e− itH2  .  Hence, for any disentangled state 
€ 
φ ⊗ψ , the transformed 
state is 
€ 
U φ ⊗ψ( ) =U1φ ⊗U2ψ , which is a disentangled state, again.  
On the other hand, every state of the combined system can be represented in 
biorthogonal form as 
€ 
ciφi ⊗ψ ii∑ , where the 
€ 
φi  and 
€ 
ψ i  are some sets of orthogonal 
states in 
€ 
H1 and 
€ 
H2 .  The projected states in this representation are 
€ 
ci
2P φi( )i∑  and 
€ 
ci
2P ψ i( )i∑  . The time-transformed state is  
  
€ 
U ciφi ⊗ψ ii∑( ) = cii∑ U1φi ⊗U2ψ i( ),  
which again is in diagonal form, because the 
€ 
U1φi and 
€ 
U2ψ i  are sets of orthogonal 
states, too (because 
€ 
U1 and 
€ 
U2  are unitary operators.)  Therefore, the projected states 
of the transform are  
  
€ 
ci
2P U1φi( )i∑ = ci
2U1P φi( )U1−1i∑ ,  
and analogously for 
€ 
H2 .  But these are the time-transforms of the projected states, 
q.e.d. 
 Generally, if there is any interaction between the subsystems, the superselection rules 
break down and entangled states will develop differently than the corresponding projected 
mixtures.  But if each subsystem is coupled with its environment in such a way that 
decoherence results (and moreover, that decoherence happens on a shorter time scale than the 
interaction between the different subsystems), then entangled states will decohere quickly into 
mixtures of disentangled states:  assume that the interaction results in an entangled state 
€ 
cijφi ⊗ψ jij∑ .  The interaction with the environment leads to a state 
€ 
cijφi ⊗ψ jij∑ ⊗ω ij  
(assuming for simplicity that the interaction doesn't change the 
€ 
φi  and 
€ 
ψ j .)  If all the 
€ 
ω ij  are 
pairwise orthogonal (i.e. if decoherence is complete), this has as a projected state for the 
systems without the environment the mixture 
€ 
cij
2P φi( )⊗ P ψ j( )ij∑ , which is a mixture of 
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the disentangled states 
€ 
φi ⊗ψ j .  Hence, the system will essentially behave like a classical 
Markovian stochastic system:  the interaction between different subsystems will not create 
entangled states but mixed states of each subsystem.  Whereas, properly speaking, this is a 
dynamic effect and not the result of a universal superselection rule, it leads to the same 
phenomenological results: disentangled states always evolve into disentangled states (possibly 
mixtures), and entangled states behave like the corresponding projected mixtures (they 
actually evolve into them.)  Therefore, this effect of decoherence has been termed, somewhat 
sloppily, the introduction of superselection rules in decoherent systems.34  
 Superselection rules have first been used to address the measurement problem by 
Beltrametti and Cassinelli (1981).  They did not introduce them as a dynamical effect, though, 
but simply gave an ad hoc postulate of superselection rules for classical systems.  This way of 
introducing superselection rules causes problems for the account of measurement that 
dynamical superselection rules don't have (Hughes 1989, 285-87).  The application of 
superselection rules caused by decoherence to the measurement process will be discussed in 
the next section. 
 Altogether, we can hope that decoherence is an answer to the question how classical 
behavior of macroscopic systems can be consistent with quantum mechanics:  it gives a 
mechanism that makes the interference effects of quantum mechanics disappear and gives rise 
to a classical domain.  But two problems still remain:   
 (1) So far the process has only been analyzed for very simple models.  It is a 
problem for applied physics to treat decoherence for sufficiently realistic models of complex 
systems.  This involves complicated questions of matter-field interactions and it may not be 
possible to give exact solutions for the more complex cases.  But the research in this field is 
just beginning and with the help of experimental results and numerical methods we can 
expect further insight into the workings of decoherence.  Nevertheless, it is plausible to 
assume that for normal macroscopic objects that are in constant interaction with particles and 
fields in their environment, decoherence will be pervasive and local superpositions are highly 
unstable.  
 (2) A question of a very different kind is how we are to interpret the projection 
mixtures of decoherence as reduced states in von Neumann's sense.  As we have seen, a 
straightforward ignorance interpretation of objective mixtures will not do.  This means: 
                                                
34  I am not aware of any research being done on the subject, but it seems to me that a study of complex 
decoherent systems could give us new insight into macroscopic chaotic systems like the human brain, where the 
combination of quantum effects and decoherence very well might play a substantial role in the dynamics.    
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although the local indistinguishability makes us expect that these projection mixtures will, for 
all practical purposes, look like ignorance mixtures of pure states, we still need the reduction 
postulate to attribute values to such projection mixtures.  The fundamental question now is:  
can we eliminate this notion of a measurement altogether and give a strictly objective account 
of whether and how variables can have values in objective mixtures?  This is a question about 
the interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics and it will be addressed in the next 
sections.   
 
3.3  The Interaction Model of Measurement 
 Let us return to our discussion of the measurement problem.  Any measurement 
involves an interaction between the system that the measurement is performed on, and the 
measurement apparatus ("apparatus" here can very well mean a human observer).  Therefore, 
it is important to characterize measurement as an interaction if we want to find an answer to 
the measurement problem.  This attempt has a long history:  a quantum mechanical model of 
measurement as an interaction was first introduced by von Neumann (1932, 233-37) and was 
used by many authors in their attempt to give an explanation of the reduction postulate.35  It 
has very much become the standard setting for discussions of the measurement process, and it 
will play a central role in this thesis.  Nevertheless, it raises a lot of questions about its general 
applicability, especially because it extends the use of the quantum mechanical formalism to 
macroscopic measuring apparatus.  Because of our lack of empirical confirmation for 
quantum mechanics as a theory of macroscopic systems, this extension is not trivial.   
 The first argument against such an extension is that quantum mechanics is so 
fundamentally different from classical mechanics that it gives obviously absurd descriptions 
of macroscopic systems.  Macroscopic systems are never found in superpositions of different 
states.  But rather than seeing this as an argument against the universal applicability of 
quantum mechanics, one can understand it as a more general form of the question of the 
measurement problem: why is it that quantum mechanics does not seem applicable to 
macroscopic systems if it is applicable to their microscopic parts? 
 The second argument against the interaction model of measurement is that it is too 
restrictive in its idealization of any actual measurement process, and that it cannot deliver 
what its proponents claim once these restrictions are given up.  In this section, I shall try to 
                                                
35  E.g., Wigner (1976), Everett (1973), Jauch (1968), Daneri, Loinger, Prosperi (1962), Healey (1989), van 
Fraassen (1991). 
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defend the model from this suspicion by showing that it can be generalized to accommodate 
approximate measurement interactions.  For this, I will draw on the discussion of interactions 
in the last section.  First, let us discuss von Neumann's original model: 
 There are two systems, a measured system S and a measurement apparatus M.  The 
initial state of S is any state 
€ 
φ ∈HS, the initial state of M is some specified "ready" state 
€ 
ψ o .  
This state 
€ 
ψ o need not be unique or a pure state.  Already von Neumann observed that the 
question whether 
€ 
ψ o  is mixed or pure is irrelevant for the discussion of the reduction.36  For 
simplicity of notation, I shall assume that 
€ 
ψ o  is a pure state.  Von Neumann imposes the 
following criterion on a physical interaction between S and M to be a measurement of an 
variable A on S:   
 If the initial state of S is an eigenstate 
€ 
φi  of the measured variable A, then the 
interaction will lead to a state 
€ 
′ φ i ⊗ψ i , where 
€ 
ψ i is an eigenstate of some variable B on M, 
which we will call an indicator state (because 
€ 
ψ i indicates that S was in 
€ 
φi ).  For two 
orthogonal eigenstates 
€ 
φi , 
€ 
φ j  of A, also the resulting eigenstates 
€ 
ψ i, 
€ 
ψ j  of B are orthogonal.  
The reason for this criterion is that it is necessary to guarantee that by a single observation of 
M we can say in which eigenstate of the variable A the system S was.   As we have seen in 
section 2.4, only orthogonal states are distinguishable by single measurements. 
 There is an obvious circularity in the criterion.  All it says is that, once a measurement 
interaction has taken place: if we are able to observe eigenstates of B, then we are also able to 
observe eigenstates of A.  For this reason alone it is clear that the criterion by itself will not 
suffice as a definition of measurement.  One might hope that in the case of a macroscopic 
measuring apparatus we can circumvent the circularity because it is clear what an observation 
of B means.  But this cannot work:  for the characterization of the measurement interaction we 
need a quantum mechanical description of the measuring apparatus, and with this come all the 
nonclassical states that are possible for a quantum mechanical system, like superpositions or 
objective mixtures.  But once we allow these states, it is not clear any more what 
"observation" means—this was the problem we sought to explore, after all.  Therefore, we 
need another postulate to tell us when a measurement is complete.   
 Von Neumann's addresses this problem by observing that every measurement consists 
of a chain of interactions that eventually has to lead to a human observer's consciousness.  It 
                                                
36   Von Neumann (1932), p. 233 refutes the proposal that the transition from a pure state to an ignorance 
mixture could be explained by assuming that M was initially in an unknown state represented by an ignorance 
mixture. 
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is this endpoint that defines a measurement.  He claims that it is the involvement of 
consciousness that causes the process of reduction (which we will discuss later in this 
section).  We will return to this issue in the next section.  
 Besides this criterion, von Neumann imposes a second criterion on a measurement 
interaction:  the measured eigenstates are not changed by the process of measurement:   
 
€ 
φi ⊗ψ o →φi ⊗ψ i.   (3.11) 
This criterion is too restrictive and highly unrealistic, because many measurements change the 
measured state.  This criterion is only plausible when we consider the reason why von 
Neumann introduced the model of measurement in the first place:  he wanted to account for 
the possibility of repeatable measurements because repeatability was his main argument for 
postulating the reduction process (see footnote 20 in section 2.4).  I propose to take this 
criterion as a definition and call a measurement repeatable if it fulfills this criterion.   
 What follows from the definition of a measurement process for a general state of the 
measured system?  Because of the linearity of any unitary transformation matrix, criteria (1) 
and (2) suffice to tell us the final state of S.  If the initial state of S is expressed on the basis of 
eigenstates of A as 
€ 
ciφii∑ , then the interaction with M will lead to: 
 
€ 
ciφii∑( )⊗ψ o → ciφi ⊗ψ i( )i∑ . (3.12) 
The final state is entangled.  The projected states on the subsystems are 
 
€ 
ci
2P φi( )i∑  and 
€ 
ci
2P ψ i( )i∑  .   (3.13) 
  Because the 
€ 
φi  and the 
€ 
ψ i are pairwise orthogonal sets of states, each 
€ 
φi  and 
€ 
ψ i are relative 
states of each other.  The biorthogonal decomposition can simply be read off from the 
mixtures:  With probability 
€ 
ci
2, S is in state 
€ 
φi  and M is in state 
€ 
ψ i. 
 That is:  the measurement interaction turns a superposition of eigenstates of the 
measured variable into a mixture of these states, with a probability distribution 
€ 
ci
2 that obeys 
Born's statistical interpretation of quantum mechanical amplitudes.  On the other hand, the 
measuring apparatus is in a mixture of indicator states 
€ 
ψ i that are exactly correlated to the 
€ 
φi  
(and hence have the same probability distribution).   
 This looks very much like everything we need to explain the measurement process:  
the interaction turns superpositions into mixtures, and even gives them the right probability 
distributions.  So what is the problem?  To be sure, there are two: 
 1. The mechanism only works if the interaction exactly fulfills criteria (1) and (2).  
If the measurement is not repeatable or if it is not exact, the biorthogonal decomposition rule 
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does not even approximately represent the state of S after the measurement as a mixture of 
eigenstates of A.37  I will argue that this problem can be addressed by considering the 
decoherence of measurement devices. 
 2. As we already discussed in section 3.1, the mixtures resulting from an 
interaction are not the right kind of mixtures:  while we need an ignorance mixture as the 
outcome of a measurement, which is really a pure state (we just don't know which), the 
interaction model gives us an objective mixture, which is objectively different from any pure 
state.   
 In the remainder of this section, I will generalize von Neumann's model to 
accommodate approximate measurements and return to the second question in section 3.4.  
Let us begin with a more detailed analysis of the measurement interaction. 
 Von Neumann assumes for simplicity that the 
€ 
φi  form a complete basis.  This is 
equivalent to the requirement that the measured variable A be nondegenerate on HS.  This 
requirement is not necessary, though.  It is obvious that if our model allows us to measure any 
nondegenerate variable, we can also measure any degenerate variable (there is less 
information required for the latter).  The requirement then is:  Be 
€ 
Φ i the subspace spanned by 
the eigenvectors of the i-th eigenvalue.  If the initial state of S is some 
€ 
φi ∈Φ i , then the 
resulting state 
€ 
ψ i of M must be an element of a subspace 
€ 
Ψi corresponding to the i-th 
eigenvalue of some variable B on M.  Obviously, the subspaces 
€ 
Ψi have to be pairwise 
orthogonal to assure that measuring B will be sufficient to tell which subspace 
€ 
Φ i the system 
S was in. 
 So far, a measurement is treated as exact:  the final states or subspaces of the 
measuring apparatus are perfectly correlated with the initial states of the system.  There is no 
mistake possible.  Let us try to generalize the model to accommodate approximate 
measurements:  if we keep the repeatability criterion, the most general form the interaction 
can take is 
€ 
φi ⊗ψ o →φi ⊗ψ i. Therefore, all that criterion (1) amounts to is the requirement 
that the 
€ 
ψ i are pairwise orthogonal.  Hence, this is the only requirement that we can relax.  
And this is indeed what we need:  if the 
€ 
ψ i  are not orthogonal, the state of M will not give 
unambiguous information about the state of S.  It is only possible to give probabilistic 
statements about the correlation between about the value of B on M and the value of A on S.  
                                                
37  Albert (1992),194-6, who credits the argument to Yakir Aharonov.  
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In this way, the Hilbert space formalism can elegantly account for approximate 
measurements.38   
 If we don't use pure states but subspaces, the account of approximate measurements is 
analogous: all interactions can be seen as a transformation of a given set of initial subspaces 
€ 
Φ i on S into a set of final density operators 
€ 
σ i  on M in the following way:  if S is initially in 
some unknown state in the subspace 
€ 
Φ i, this fact can be modeled by attributing to it the 
density operator  
 
€ 
ρi =
1
Ni
P Φ i( ), (3.14) 
where 
€ 
P Φ i( )  is the projection operator onto 
€ 
Φ i and 
€ 
Ni  the dimension of 
€ 
Φ i.  (If 
€ 
Φ i is of 
infinite dimension, we have to use unnormalized density operators and can only give 
conditional probabilities.)  This assignment of a density operator to an unknown state is called 
the von Neumann rule and corresponds to the maximum entropy principle in statistical 
mechanics.  We will discuss it further in chapter 5.  Again, 
€ 
ρi ⊗ψ 0  gets mapped to some 
density operator 
€ 
Σ i  of the product space HS⊗HM by the measurement interaction.  This 
operator is projected onto a density operator 
€ 
σ i  in HM. 
 From that, we can give a general characterization of an approximate measurement:  an 
interaction is a measurement for a set of orthogonal subspaces 
€ 
Φ i if the final projection 
mixtures 
€ 
σ i  are sufficiently distinct.  To define distinctness of density operators, we can use a 
scalar product for operators defined by 
€ 
A,B = tr(AB).  If the scalar product is zero, we call 
the density operators orthogonal, and the measurement is exact.   
 Notice, however, that in the case of an approximate measurement the final states do 
not project to a mixture that is diagonal in the original eigenstates 
€ 
φi , because in the final 
states 
€ 
ciφi ⊗ψ i( )i∑ , the 
€ 
ψ i are not orthogonal.  As Albert has noted (Albert 1992), even 
approximately orthogonal 
€ 
ψ i can completely change the decomposition of the mixed state of 
S.  As an example, take a measurement of the variable A having an eigenbasis 
€ 
φ1,φ2 on S.  
Ideally, an initial state 
€ 
φ1 + φ2( ) 2  should lead to a final state 
 
€ 
ξ = φ1ψ1 + φ2ψ 2( ) 2 ,  (3.15) 
                                                
38  The only alternative to this that I can see is to assume that the interaction is not unique because of external 
disturbances.  But if the external disturbances are modeled quantum mechanically, we will again have a unique 
interaction, now on the combined system of S, M and environment and the result will be as above:  the final 
projected states of M are not orthogonal.   
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where 
€ 
ψ1,
€ 
ψ 2  are orthogonal states on M.  Now think of the measurement interaction 
introducing a small error Δ, so that the final state is 
 
€ 
′ ξ = φ1 ψ1 + Δψ 2
 
 
 
 + φ2 Δψ1 +ψ 2
 
 
 
 ( ) 2  (3.16) 
(where I ignore an overall normalization constant).  This has as biorthogonal decomposition: 
 
€ 
′ ξ = 1+ Δ( ) φ1 + φ2( ) ψ1 +ψ 2( ) + 1− Δ( ) φ1 −φ2( ) ψ1 −ψ 2( )[ ] 2 2  (3.17) 
which, for Δ as small as you want to choose it, represents 
€ 
ρξ ′
S( ), the projected state of S as a 
mixture of orthogonal pure states of S in the following way: 
 
€ 
ρξ ′
S( ) =
1+ Δ
2 P
φ1 + φ2
2
 
  
 
  
+
1− Δ
2 P
φ1 −φ2
2
 
  
 
  
 (3.18) 
But the states 
€ 
φ1 + φ2( ) 2  and 
€ 
φ1 −φ2( ) 2  are states that are maximally incompatible with 
the basis we had set out to measure (
€ 
φ1 and 
€ 
φ2).  This means:  we cannot say that the 
measurement interaction turns the state of S into a mixture of states that even approximately 
are eigenstates of the measured variable.  By the same argument, also M will not be in a 
mixture of eigenstates of B.  
 What would be a physically more plausible outcome of an approximate measurement?  
Consider an approximate position measurement:39  a plausible result from the model should 
be that the apparatus is in a mixture of (orthogonal) eigenstates 
€ 
ψ′ i of some macroscopic 
variable B (which can be read off by an observer and tells her the approximate value of A), 
and that the system is in a mixture of states that are correlated to the 
€ 
ψ′ i, but not necessarily 
orthogonal or eigenstates of any particular variable.  Rather, we expect wave packets of a 
certain width (depending on the error of the measurement) centered around the approximate 
value for A.  Obviously such wave packets are neither pairwise orthogonal nor are they 
defined as eigenstates of some variable on S.  Can we, instead of the biorthogonal 
decomposition rule, find some other rule for decomposing the final state that makes more 
sense physically?   
 This can be done by assuming that the measuring apparatus is decoherent.  In this 
case, the final state of the measuring apparatus gets quickly correlated with the environment, 
and therefore the final superposition 
€ 
ciφi ⊗ψ ii∑  of the combined system turns into a 
mixture.  Let us call the decoherence basis of the measuring apparatus a pointer basis 
€ 
ψ′ i.  
Obviously, if M is a decoherent system, then the final states 
€ 
ψ i must be elements of the 
                                                
39  Von Neumann has treated this in a simple model (von Neumann, 1932,  236-7). This model is discussed in 
more detail in Everett (1973), 56-60 and 100-103  
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pointer basis, otherwise the superselection rules for M will have the result that the information 
about S is not retrievable by any measurement on the measuring apparatus alone.   
 In the case of an approximate measurement the 
€ 
ψ i will only be approximately 
identical to the pointer basis 
€ 
ψ′ i.  That is, we can express the 
€ 
ψ i as  
 
€ 
ψ i = bijψ ′ jj∑  with bij ≈ δ ij . (3.19) 
Then the final state of the measurement interaction is 
 
€ 
ξ = ciφi ⊗ψ ii∑ = cibijφi ⊗ ′ ψ j =ij∑ ′ c j ′ φ j ⊗ ′ ψ jj∑  (3.20) 
with 
 
€ 
′ φ j = N j cibijφii∑  (3.21) 
where 
€ 
N j  is a normalization constant, and 
€ 
′ c j = 1 N j .  In the terminology we introduced in 
section 3.1, 
€ 
′ φ j  is the relative state to 
€ 
′ ψ j , given 
€ 
ξ . 
 Now this final state decoheres because of the interaction of M with its environment, 
the decoherence basis being 
€ 
′ ψ j .  That is, the state develops into a state 
 
€ 
′ ξ = ′ c j ′ φ j ⊗ ′ ψ j ⊗ω jj∑  (3.22) 
where the 
€ 
ω i  are a set of orthogonal states of the environment.  To calculate the projected 
states after formula (3.4), we use the bases 
€ 
φi , 
€ 
ψ′ i, and 
€ 
ω i  in the systems S, M, and the 
environment (remember that it doesn't matter which bases we use to calculate the projected 
state) and obtain for S: 
 
€ 
ρξ ′
S( ) = φiψ′ kω l ,ξ′
*
φ jψ ′ kω l ,ξ′ φi
† ⊗φ j
ijkl
∑
= φiψ ′ kω l , ′ c m ′ φ m ′ ψ mωm
*
φ jψ ′ kω l , ′ c n ′ φ n ′ ψ nωn φi† ⊗φ j
ijklmn
∑
= ′ c k
2
φi,φ′ k
*
φ j ,φ′ k φi
† ⊗φ j
ijk
∑
= ′ c k
2
′ φ k
† ⊗ ′ φ k
k
∑ = ′ c k
2P ′ φ k( )
k
∑
 (3.23) 
where I have left out the tensor product sign ⊗ within scalar products.  This result means:  
unlike using the biorthogonal decomposition rule, using decoherence will give us a projected 
state of S that depends bilinearly on the states 
€ 
φ′ i  and therefore approximates a state diagonal 
in the 
€ 
φi  as 
€ 
bij →δ ij .  This is the result we found physically plausible in our considerations 
above:  whereas the biorthogonal decomposition gave us as the final state a mixture that was 
diagonal in some basis that depended on the initial state and could basically be any basis on S, 
decoherence gives us a state that is a mixture of the relative states 
€ 
φ′ i  to the pointer basis 
€ 
ψ′ i.  
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This means:  if we, for example, have a position measurement with an error 
€ 
Δx , then the 
resulting state of S will be a state of width 
€ 
Δx  around the position that the pointer state 
indicates. 
 The final state of M is: 
 
€ 
ρξ ′
M( ) = φkψ′ iω l ,ξ′
*
φkψ ′ jω l ,ξ′ ′ ψ i
† ⊗ ′ ψ j
ijkl
∑
= φkψ ′ iω l , ′ c m ′ φ m ′ ψ mωm
*
φkψ ′ jω l , ′ c n ′ φ n ′ ψ nωn ′ ψ i † ⊗ ′ ψ j
ijklmn
∑
= ′ c i
2
φk,φ′ i
*
φk,φ′ i ′ ψ i
† ⊗ ′ ψ i
ik
∑
= ckbki
2
′ ψ i
† ⊗ ′ ψ i
ik
∑ = ckbki
2P ′ ψ i( )
k
∑
 (3.24) 
That is:  
€ 
ρξ ′
M( )  is always diagonal in the pointer basis 
€ 
ψ′ i, and the probabilities approximate 
the correct probabilities as 
€ 
bki →δki .  Again, this is exactly the desired result.   An analogous 
treatment can be given to an approximate measurement of degenerate operators. 
 Of course, the question still remains whether measuring apparatus really are 
decoherent.  Because, as I have said, we don't have a universally applicable theory of 
decoherence yet, this claim remains an hypothesis.  But in the case of measuring apparatus, 
there is an argument why this should be the case:  remember that it is sufficient for the pointer 
basis to be decoherent that the states of the pointer basis will interact in such a way with the 
environment that the resulting states of the environment are orthogonal without changing the 
pointer states.  But this means simply that the interaction of the environment with the 
measuring apparatus is again a measurement interaction.  Now remember von Neumann's 
observation about the chain of measurement interactions:  the measurement apparatus itself is 
never the endpoint of a measurement, it must at least allow the possibility of an observation, 
i.e., the different pointer states must interact differently with the environment so that, if an 
observer is present, the environment can transmit the information about the pointer states to 
the observer.   
 In the most common case, the transmission from the measurement apparatus to the 
observer will be optical, that is, the measurement apparatus must look differently in its 
different pointer states, which is to say it must emit or reflect orthogonal states of the 
electromagnetic field.  Consider, for example, a photographic plate:  if different spots on the 
plate are blackened, this results in different patterns of absorption of incident light.  In the 
case of a measuring apparatus with a material pointer, this pointer will interact differently 
with the electromagnetic field depending on which position it is in.  In all these cases, it is 
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sufficient that the state of the environment (electromagnetic field) after the interaction is 
different for different states of measuring apparatus.  And of course it is the purpose of a 
measuring apparatus that its different states are simply discernible (generally just by looking 
at it).  But this means that different apparatus states lead to clearly different states of the 
electromagnetic field around the apparatus.  Otherwise we would not be able to see any 
difference between the apparatus states.  Of course, the measurement apparatus might be read 
by other means than by looking at it (printout, electrical signals, or sound, for example).  But 
then, whatever the states of the environment are that carry the information about the state of 
the measuring apparatus, those states have to be orthogonal.   
 Note that in case of approximate measurements, which of course may happen at any 
stage of the chain of measurement interactions, the argument above ensures that as long as the 
final states of the last  measuring system in the chain are decoherent, the final states of the 
measured system will be the relative states of these and therefore approximate the eigenstates 
of an exact measurement.  The question of the endpoint of the chain is of course still open.   
 Let us sum up what an analysis of von Neumann's model of the measurement 
interaction can tell us.  First of all, the disappearance of coherent states of the measured 
system can be explained from the interaction itself.  Any measurement will transform 
superpositions of  eigenstates of the measured variable on the system into mixtures.  If, 
furthermore, the measuring apparatus itself is decoherent, the combined system (object plus 
apparatus) will decohere into a mixture of states of the pointer basis for the measuring 
apparatus and the corresponding relative states for the system.  In this case, only the observed 
system plus the measuring apparatus plus the environment will be in a superposition.   
 It follows from this discussion that the transition from an initial superposition to a 
final mixture of eigenstates in the process of measurement can be explained, not by invoking 
an ad hoc biorthogonal decomposition, but from the decoherence of the measurement 
apparatus.  This makes it possible to say why just the eigenstates of the measured variable 
decohere:  this is exactly the purpose for which measurement apparatus are built.  A 
measuring apparatus only serves its purpose if its decoherent states get correlated with the 
eigenstates that it is supposed to measure, and therefore it serves to decohere the eigenstates 
of the measured observable (at least approximately.)  But as we found in section 3.1:  the 
resulting mixture is not an ignorance mixture and hence cannot be interpreted as a probability 
distribution over reduced states.  It is only at this point that reduction becomes necessary.  
Without it, as von Neumann argues, we cannot explain the repeatability of measurements:   
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 If all the measurement interaction does is producing an objective mixture of 
eigenstates then nothing tells us that repeated measurements will result in the same 
measurement outcome.  We would rather expect that there is a probabilistic distribution of all 
possible outcomes.  Is there anything in quantum mechanics that tells us otherwise?  This 
problem often has not been noticed by proponents of an interaction model of reduction.40  
They implicitly assume that the resulting mixture can be understood as an ignorance mixture, 
that is, that the system is really in one eigenstate and we just don't know in which one.  Once 
we know this from observation, of course, the system will be in this eigenstate whenever we 
perform a measurement again.  But why should we expect the same behavior in the case of an 
objective mixture?  Here we know that the system really is not in any pure state. 
 
3.4  The Reduction Postulate 
 Von Neumann bridges the difference between the objective mixture attainable by 
decoherence and the ignorance mixture demanded for the repeatability of measurement  by 
postulating that there is a separate process of reduction to pure states that happens upon 
measurement.  His reason for this postulate is that a physical process governed by a unitary 
transformation matrix can never produce a reduction to pure states (or, we might add, an 
ignorance mixture of these) (von Neumann 1932, 202-6).  Hence, there must be some 
fundamentally different process that explains that measurements give unique values for 
variables even if the initial state of the system did not have such a value. 
 While von Neumann does not explicitly distinguish between objective and ignorance 
mixtures, we can rephrase his treatment in the following way:  the interaction between a 
system and a measurement apparatus leads to an objective mixture of eigenstates of the 
measured variable, the separate and parallel process of reduction turns this objective mixture 
into an ignorance mixture, i.e., some unpredictable pure state.   
 That is:  if the initial state of the object system is 
€ 
ciφii∑ , where the 
€ 
φi  are eigenstates 
of the measured variable A, the state of the object system after the measurement is some pure 
state 
€ 
φi , but we don't know which.  All we know is that the probability for the outcome 
€ 
φi  is 
€ 
ci
2.  We can represent this fact by attributing to the system the state 
€ 
ci
2P φi( )i∑ , where this 
state has to be understood as an ignorance mixture.  As we have seen in the section 2.4, this 
                                                
40  See, e.g., Nancy Cartwright's criticism of the model of Daneri, Loinger, and Prosperi (Cartwright, 1983, 
p.169-171), and Hughes's criticism of Jauch (Hughes, 1989, p.283) 
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state cannot be obtained through a unitary transformation from the initial state of the system, 
and we found in this chapter that also the interaction with some other system cannot produce 
this state.  Therefore we have to postulate that there is some fundamentally different process 
in nature which happens when a measurement is performed and which, unlike all other 
physical processes, cannot be described by a unitary transformation.  This process is called 
the process of reduction. 
 Von Neumann justifies the existence of a process of reduction that cannot be 
explained within quantum mechanics with the necessary distinction between subject and 
object in our description of nature.  (Von Neumann, ibid., 222-23)  Consciousness is 
fundamentally different from any phenomenon that can be modeled in a physical theory.  Any 
theory of nature presupposes a conscious subject that formulates and entertains this theory.  
Therefore, the conscious subject always stands outside of the model.  
 Hence, it is possible that a process involving a conscious subject has a fundamentally 
different description than any other physical process.  Von Neumann's position here is 
subjectivist:  saying that the process of conscious observation is fundamentally different from 
all other physical processes is equivalent to saying that the conscious subject stands outside of 
the physical world.  If we were to take human observers as physical systems like others, this 
distinction would lose all plausibility.  But von Neumann does not want to refute the 
physicality of the human mind completely.  Rather, he invokes what he calls the "principle of 
psycho-physical parallelism."  Usually, this is taken as the thesis that mind and physical world 
are causally independent as in Leibniz's theory of preestablished harmony.  But von 
Neumann's claim is rather epistemological than metaphysical:  He says that it must be 
possible to describe the process of subjective apperception—which, in truth, is outside of the 
model—as if it was happening within the physical world.   This statement is yet another 
indication of the subjectivist position underlying von Neumann's argument:  The physical 
world is not the objective substratum of every phenomenon (including conscious observers), 
but the construct of our consciousness.  Therefore, consciousness itself is outside of the 
physical world.   
 If apperception is a process that is fundamentally different from ordinary physical 
processes, then we are faced with the following dilemma:  if we are to be able to give a 
physical description to the process of apperception, then how can we postulate that a 
fundamentally different process of reduction is consistent with a general description of 
physical systems given by quantum mechanics, which entails that all processes are unitary?  If 
on the other hand, measurement involves something that is outside of physics as described by 
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quantum mechanics, then how should we be able to give a description of this fact within 
quantum mechanics?   
 Von Neumann's answer to this dilemma is to give the process of reduction a strange 
ambiguity.  It is so to speak not fully physical, but as far as its physical effects are concerned, 
it can be shown to be consistent with unitary evolution in a certain sense.  The "not-quite-
physicality" is explained by the fact that it only happens in processes involving 
consciousness, which is beyond the reach of any theory of nature.  About the issue of 
consistency, von Neumann remarks that measurement doesn't just involve the interaction 
between an object system and a measuring apparatus.  It always involves a whole chain of 
such interactions eventually leading to a conscious observer.   
 Von Neumann cites the example of a measurement of temperature (von Neumann 
1932, 223):  one could say that a thermometer measures the temperature of its environment.  
But one could also describe the interaction of the mercury with its environment and its 
expansion by a suitable physical model and say that it is the length of the mercury column 
that is measured.  Further, one could physically describe the interaction of the mercury with 
the electromagnetic field and say that its state is measured.  Or, one could give a description 
of the refraction of the light and absorption in specific parts of the retina and claim that it is 
the position of the absorption that is measured.  One could go on to describe the excitation of 
cells of the optical nerve and certain areas of the brain and say it is this that the observer 
measures.  But, as he finishes:  ". . . however far we calculate . . . at one point we will have to 
say:  and this is perceived by the observer."  This means, however far we extend our physical 
model, we cannot get rid of a conscious subject perceiving a measurement outcome at the end 
of any measurement process.  This is the endpoint in the chain of interactions that actually 
defines a measurement and without which our definition from the last section would be 
incomplete.  But at the level of the conscious subject are we forced to require that variables 
actually have single values.  It is not possible to give a meaning to a conscious observer being 
in a superposition of conscious states.  But we are free to move the border between what we 
consider the observed object and the observer:  at any point in the chain we can say that this is 
the point where the observation happens, and therefore apply the reduction postulate.  Hence, 
if we want to avoid contradictions in the model, we have to show that it doesn't matter for the 
predicted measurement outcome at what point we choose to apply the reduction postulate. 
 The important argument for this proof of consistency is that because of the linearity of 
the equations of motion it does not matter at which point the process of reduction takes place.  
Every measurement in the chain only is an interaction with the measurement apparatus 
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before, not with the complete composite system.  Therefore, only the projected mixture plays 
a dynamical role and not the overall superposition.  Hence, all the reduction postulate 
amounts to is the reinterpretation of the projection mixture as an ignorance mixture, and it is 
obviously irrelevant at which stage this is done: the equations will look exactly the same 
regardless.  Von Neumann concludes from this that while it is necessary to postulate a distinct 
process of reduction, it is not necessary to worry about when exactly in the chain of 
interactions between the object system and human consciousness it happens.  It is sufficient to 
know that somewhere on the way from the system to the human consciousness a reduction 
takes place.  It follows from this argument that the only way to test the reduction postulate 
empirically would be to perform a measurement on the total state of the composite system:  
Only there could we see a difference between the superposition and the ignorance mixture.  
But as we have seen in our discussion about decoherence, such a measurement would be 
extremely difficult to perform if any decoherent system is involved. 
 Von Neumann's subjectivism is of a different kind than Bohr's (Bohr 1935):  Bohr 
takes the whole categorical system of classical physics as given and thinks that quantum 
mechanics can only be formulated within these categories.  First, we have to describe an 
experimental setup in terms of classical physics and only then can we predict the behavior of 
a quantum mechanical system in this setup.   
 Von Neumann, on the other hand, has no problem admitting that quantum mechanics 
is a fundamentally new and, in principle, self-sufficient way of describing nature.  Therefore, 
also measurement apparatus and even human observers must be describable by quantum 
mechanics.  But any physical theory does not give us nature as it is but only a model that the 
subject constructs.  Therefore, his subjectivism is not the same as Bohr's operationalism but 
more of the kind of Kant's transcendental idealism.  He acknowledges the demand for a 
universally applicable physical law (here for the case of the physicality of human observers), 
but not in the form of a direct postulate of physicality.  Instead, he formulates it as a 
methodological principle that we should be able to describe processes of human perception as 
if they were physical.  This is reminiscent of Kant's regulative principles or maxims,41 which 
are not to be understood as statements about how the world is, but what form our inquiry into 
nature should take.  Kant writes  (Kant 1929, B694): 
                                                
41  I take it that Kant uses "maxims" and "regulative principles of reason" as synonyms, at least in the Critique of 
Pure Reason.  For a more detailed analysis of his use of regulative principles, see (Lehner 1986). 
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I entitle all subjective principles, which are derived, not from the constitution 
of an object but from the interest of reason in respect of a certain possible 
perfection of the knowledge of the object, maxims of reason.  There are 
therefore maxims of speculative42 reason, which rest entirely on its speculative 
interest, although they may seem to be objective principles. 
When merely regulative principles are treated as constitutive, and are therefore 
employed as objective principles, they may come into conflict with one 
another.  But when they are treated merely as maxims, there is no real conflict, 
but merely those differences in the interest of reason that give rise to differing 
modes of thought.  In actual fact, reason has only one single interest, and the 
conflict of its maxims is only a difference in, and a mutual limitation of, the 
methods whereby this interest endeavors to obtain satisfaction. 
 Let us try to adapt Kant's ideas to our situation:  our interest in a systematic and 
coherent theory of nature compels us to extend the application of a mechanical model as far 
as ever possible.  From this "interest of reason" results a postulate of physicalism.  But we 
have no reason to take this postulate as an objective law:  all it tells us is to try to find a 
mechanical explanation for any phenomenon we encounter.  It does not make any statement 
about matters of fact independently of our modeling.  This is the content of von Neumann's 
postulate of psycho-physical parallelism, and like Kant, he stresses that it should be taken as a 
statement about our making of models. 
 Conflicting with this postulate of physicalism in von Neumann's account is the 
postulate that once we have performed a measurement, the system (and the measuring 
apparatus and any further element in the chain of measurement) is in a pure state.  Von 
Neumann justifies this claim by theory-immanent reasoning:  there is no other quantum 
mechanical state that we could ascribe to the system which would give us the right empirical 
predictions.  He obviously sees this as a sufficient reason to postulate the reality of the 
reduced state.  But notice that this argument goes from empirical knowledge (the value of a 
measurement outcome) to some statement within the model (i.e., a state description).  Hence, 
it is not a logical deduction but rather a form of inference to the best explanation.  Or, to put it 
in another way:  the theory itself does not tell us how to relate its elements to our perceptions.   
                                                
42  i.e. theoretical 
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  Kant invokes a different faculty of reason for the making of such connections 
between theory and empirical knowledge:  this is the faculty of judgment.  He claims that in 
all such instances of judgment we use a regulative principle:  nature is suitable for the 
formulation of systematic empirical laws (Kant 1952, B XXV - XXXIX).  This principle 
again is only justified by an interest of reason, namely the abstraction of theories from 
specific phenomena.  Therefore, postulating a pure state as the outcome of a measurement 
process should also not be seen as a statement about a matter of fact independent of the given 
theoretical framework, but merely as a methodological rule to ensure the applicability of 
quantum mechanics to our empirical knowledge.   
 There is a further parallel: von Neumann's solution to the conflict between unitary 
evolution and reduction resembles very much Kant's treatment of the antinomies:  there are 
two conflicting methodological principles that give the appearance of an objective 
contradiction.  But this is an illusion resulting from taking methodological rules as laws of 
nature existing objectively and independently of the perceiving subject.  If one was to be a 
realist about quantum mechanics, the coexistence of the two conflicting processes would 
clearly pose a problem.  But von Neumann claims that on a subjectivist account it is sufficient 
to show that within the theoretical account of quantum mechanics the application of the two 
different postulates is consistent.  This consistency proof is von Neumann's proof of the 
irrelevance of the moment of reduction discussed above.   
 It is not surprising that many people were not convinced of von Neumann's defense of 
the consistency of the two processes.  It is undoubtedly true that for all practical purposes the 
coexistence of the two processes does not lead to any inconsistencies in the application of 
quantum mechanics.  But even if we accept von Neumann's subjectivist standpoint, his 
solution of the measurement problem is not very satisfying.  First of all, if we are to take his 
notion of psycho-physical parallelism serious, it should be possible in principle to model a 
conscious observer in quantum mechanics.  This would be all the more important because, as 
we remarked earlier, the definition of a measurement in von Neumann's model is incomplete: 
it only makes the conditional statement that if a quantity is measurable on the apparatus, then 
a correlated quantity is measurable on the object.  If we don't give a quantum mechanical 
account of what constitutes the endpoint of such a chain of interactions, the definition is 
spurious.  Von Neumann does not say anything about how this endpoint is to be expressed in 
quantum mechanics.   This leads to a fundamental ambiguity in the status of the reduction 
process:  Are we to think of reduction as the subjective appearance of a quantum mechanical 
superposition and hence not as a physical process, but rather a redescription of the same fact; 
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or are we to take reduction as an objective physical process on the same footing as unitary 
evolution which is caused by a conscious act of observation? As I have argued in the 
introduction, this distinction makes sense independently of whether we ultimately hold a 
subjectivist or objectivist view about the epistemology of scientific theories.  In principle, this 
question is decidable by experiment, as we have seen before, because it is equivalent to the 
question whether the state of the composite system is a superposition or a mixture. 
 Notice that also on the Kantian account of von Neumann's position, his proposed 
solution is not admissible.  Compare the situation to Kant's solution of the third antinomy:  
Kant accepts that the principle of causality cannot exclude the existence of transcendental 
freedom (that is, absolute spontaneity of an act).  Nevertheless, he insists, such transcendental 
freedom necessarily lies outside of the reach of all possible experience.  The fact that 
universal causality is postulated by a regulative principle does not mean we can ever exempt a 
phenomenon in our experience from it.  More general: regulative principles are not limited in 
their scope, so that there could be a phenomenon that the principle does not apply to, but in 
the status of their claim:  they do not give us a categorical description of an object, but they 
tell us how we are to find a representation of the object within the categorical framework 
(Kant 1929, B537-38). 
 Von Neumann, though, attempts the former use: he tries to limit the applicability of 
the dynamical law of unitary evolution within the range of possible experience, and wants to 
express the transcendental nature of the observing subject by a different phenomenal law of 
causality.  This must lead to contradictions within the theory.  These contradictions appear in 
von Neumann's conflicting characterizations of the reduction process: his consistency 
argument seems to be an argument for the subjective nature of reduction, because it assumes 
that there should be no objective matter of fact when the reduction takes place.  On the other 
hand, his argument from the repeatability of measurement for a process of reduction is an 
argument for the objectivity of this process: because an ignorance interpretation of objective 
mixtures is impossible, there must be an objective process of reduction. 
 A subjective account of reduction seems quite implausible: how could an observer be 
in an objective mixture of states (i.e. there is no matter of fact about which measurement 
outcome she observed) and still have a definite belief about having observed one outcome?  
This problem led E. Wigner to assume that the dynamical evolution of conscious observers 
must be fundamentally different from the unitary evolution of other systems (Wigner 1961).  
This enables them to cause a physical process of reduction.  But not only is there no empirical 
evidence for such a difference, it even seems hard to imagine what kind of a nonunitary 
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process could be at work here and how this (quantum mechanical) process would manage to 
reliably produce pure classical states. 
 J. A. Wheeler has discussed a fundamental problem about an objective interpretation 
of the reduction postulate (Wheeler 1957 and 1979-81): how are we to apply the reduction 
postulate to cosmology, where we don't have a defined experimental setting and an observer 
who is external to this setting?  Should we assume that without the presence of a conscious 
observer no reduction of the state has ever taken place?  Then we will have to assume that the 
state of the universe evolved into more and more complicated superpositions for billions of 
years until the first conscious observer in the history of nature appeared.  Even worse, the 
appearance of a conscious observer itself cannot be supposed to happen simultaneously for all 
the components of the state of the universe, which presumably is an immensely complex 
superposition of eigenstates for any macroscopic variable.  But then, it becomes fully unclear 
when the reduction would happen.  This cosmological argument turns the ambiguity of von 
Neumann's postulate of psycho-physical parallelism into a serious paradox:  if a conscious 
observer is to be the agent of reduction as von Neumann postulates, then it has to be outside 
of the physical universe.  But if it is supposed to be a physical system (or at least can be 
described as such), then it must be part of the physical universe.   
 The gravity of the dilemma becomes fully visible if we consider measurement on 
entangled states.  This was first pointed out by Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen (1935) in their 
famous thought experiment:  Consider a composite system in an entangled state, and let the 
two subsystems separate to some large distance.  If we now perform a measurement on one of 
the subsystems, this measurement will not only reduce the state of the measured subsystem, 
but also the state of the distant partner.   
 This fact alone puts adherents of an objective process of reduction into an 
uncomfortable position:  they have to assume that the process acts nonlocally, i.e., directly 
from one system to the other without any intermittent medium.  It seems much more plausible 
(and that was Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen's intention) to assume that we simply learned 
about a fact about the second subsystem that objectively existed already before our 
measurement (although it was not described by the quantum mechanical state).  But there is 
little reason for a subjectivist to feel confirmed either:  we can, after all, measure any variable 
on the first subsystem, and from this it follows with a suitable entangled state that we can 
measure any variable on the second subsystem.  This is especially clear in David Bohm's 
(1957) version of the thought experiment.  Here, the entangled state is a singlet (spin zero) 
state, and we measure different components of spin on each subsystem.  Because the total 
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spin of the composite system is zero, if we measure the spin in any direction on one 
subsystem, we know that in the other system the spin in that direction has the opposite value.   
 A subjectivist now would have to assume that there are objective facts about any 
variable that is measurable in this way (in Bohm's example values for spin in any direction).  
John Bell (1964) was able to derive from this assumption an inequality of measurement 
outcome correlations that is in conflict with the values predicted by quantum mechanics.  But 
this means that there cannot be any local hidden variable theory that could explain away the 
nonlocality of the reduction process.  The result can be generalized to the assumption that the 
measurement outcomes depend only statistically from the hidden variables (Wigner 1970).  
The inequalities have been tested experimentally, and the quantum mechanical predictions 
have been vindicated.43  
 The Bell-Wigner inequalities have given rise to an enormous body of literature, 
because they seem to make metaphysical assumptions empirically testable without the need of 
a prior theoretical model.  An important result was found by Suppes and Zanotti (1976) and 
by Jarrett (1984):  The assumptions of the Wigner-Bell inequalities can be analyzed in two 
postulates: 
• The probabilities of measurement outcomes on one side are independent of what 
measurement was performed on the other side.  (Jarrett calls this assumption 'locality'.  It 
is not equivalent to the concept of locality I introduced in 2.2, although we would expect 
it to follow from locality as defined there, if no interaction through fields is present.) 
• The probabilities of measurement outcomes on both sides, given a complete description of 
the state, are statistically uncorrelated  (completeness). 
The quantum mechanical predictions fulfill the first postulate.  Therefore it seems plausible to 
require that also the theoretical model of the measurement process is local.  This conclusion 
has been disputed (Jones, 1991) because of the fact that locality is a notion that is only 
defined in field theory (see Section 2.2).  Nothing in point mechanics a priori excludes the 
possibility of action at a distance.  Nevertheless, locality seems a well-confirmed empirical 
principle and it plays a central role in experimental practice:  One fundamental assumption of 
experimental physics is that you can shield systems from their environment.  This would be 
impossible if there are non-local interactions.  Furthermore, there is nothing in the derivation 
of the Bell-Wigner inequality that could not be applied to a modeling of the process in a 
                                                
43Best known is the experiment by Aspect (1976) which also proved that if there is a reduction, it has to 
propagate faster than the speed of light. 
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relativistic quantum field theory.  The nonlocality, after all, does not stem from the non-
relativistic character of the Schrödinger equation, but from the reduction postulate, which is 
logically independent from any assumption about the dynamics of the theory and supposed to 
apply to any measurement on a superposition.   
 Because of the no hidden variable theorems, there is no way to get rid of some form of 
nonlocal process if we assume the reduction postulate.  It has often been pointed out that the 
nonlocality of the process cannot be used to send signals, so that the violation of relativistic 
locality is 'hidden' and one can assume that reduction is at least at the phenomenal level not 
inconsistent with theories that assume locality, such as the theory of relativity (Shimony, 
1980).  But this is of little comfort if one tries to give an interpretation of quantum mechanics 
in the sense discussed in the introduction:  then we don't look merely for empirical 
consistency, but for a joint model of both theories.   
 To sum up:  we have two weighty reasons to look for a replacement of the reduction 
postulate:  its conflict with desiderata of scientific methodology and its conflict with the 
assumption of locality.  Everett's formulation promises just that: it is a theory of quantum 
mechanics without an objective process of reduction, and it does not prohibit us from treating 
conscious observers as quantum mechanical systems. 
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Chapter 4 
The Interpretation of Everett's Formulation 
 
4.1  Everett's Relative State Formulation of Quantum Mechanics 
 The fundamental idea of Everett's model is that the repeatability of measurement can 
be accounted for within quantum mechanics.44   It is only for the interpretation of quantum 
mechanical states in terms of observations (i.e., the Born rule) that we need to introduce the 
consciousness of the observer.  The starting point of Everett's treatment of the question of 
repeatability is that we need some recording device that keeps track of an earlier measurement 
outcome if we want to be able to decide whether this outcome agrees with a later 
measurement or not.  Everett calls such a recording device an observer.  Note that despite this 
anthropomorphic term all we need at this point is a system that allows for some kind of 
permanent trace of a measurement outcome (e.g., a photographic plate, a written recording, or 
a computer memory).  I will call such systems memories.   
 A quantum mechanical model for a memory is not difficult to construct.  A memory 
should be a system whose states can permanently represent propositions about other systems.  
As we have found in Chapter 2, mechanical propositions contain four components that 
specify: 
(1)  a system 
(2)  a variable (or property) on that system 
(3) the value of the variable 
(4)  the time 
We will call such a specification a memory entry, and a (finite) set of entries a memory list.  
Everett represents an entry by a symbol 
€ 
ω i
j( ), where j designates the measured system, the 
choice of Greek letter 
€ 
ω  the measured variable, and 
€ 
ω i  the i-th eigenvalue of this variable.  
In Everett's model, the specification of time is not given explicitly, but by a linear ordering of 
the entries.  As long as we are only concerned with the temporal order of observations and not 
their exact time, this is sufficient.  Otherwise, we could easily add a fourth parameter to each 
entry specifying the time of the observation.  A memory list therefore will be written [A, B, ... 
, N], where each letter stands for a memory entry and the order of the letters represents the 
temporal order of the entries. 
                                                
44Throughout this section, I will rely on (Everett 1973)  
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 We can now define a quantum mechanical memory:  it is a quantum mechanical 
system which has states in its state space that represent memory lists.45  Such a memory state 
representing the list [A, B, ... , N] is written as 
€ 
ω [A, B, ... , N].  As in the case of a 
macroscopic measurement (section 3.3), it is more appropriate to say that a memory sequence 
is represented by a subspace of states of the memory, because generally a memory will be a 
macroscopic system and a lot of different quantum mechanical states will correspond to one 
memory sequence.  But again this generalization doesn't substantially change the argument, 
so I will generally use single states for simplicity of notation. 
 As in von Neumann's model of measurement, we require that two memory states that 
represent different lists be orthogonal, for the same reason as there:  it guarantees the 
distinguishability of different memory states.  Let us now turn to the dynamics of a 
measurement process for a memory, which is a simple analogue to von Neumann's model:  
the memory states must be stable over time, i.e., they must be stationary states of the system.  
The only change they can undergo is the acquisition of new information through a 
measurement.  This must not disturb the information already contained in the memory.  
Hence, the measurement interaction of a memory with an object that is in the eigenstate 
€ 
ϕ i  of 
a measured variable 
€ 
A  with eigenvalue 
€ 
α i will look like 
   
€ 
ϕ i ⊗ω …[ ]→ϕ i ⊗ω …α i[ ], (4.1) 
where    
€ 
…[ ] stands for any memory list that was recorded before the measurement, and   
€ 
…α i[ ] 
stands for the same list with the entry 
€ 
α i added at the end. 
 Here, we have assumed that the measurement interaction is exact (for simplicity), 
repeatable (because that is the case we are interested in), and only involves the object and the 
memory, without an intermediate measuring apparatus (which could easily be written in, but 
is irrelevant for our purposes).  In the case of a measurement on a superposition of 
eigenstates, linearity dictates, as we have seen, that the interaction will lead the initial state  
 
  
€ 
Ψ0 = ciϕ i ⊗ω …[ ]
i
∑  (4.2) 
into the final state 
 
  
€ 
Ψ1 = ciϕ i ⊗ω …α i[ ]
i
∑  (4.3) 
                                                
45The meaning of the memory states of course is not an intrinsic physical property of these states, but given by 
the form of the interaction given in equation 4.1. 
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 To represent a second measurement, all we have to do is replace the memory list   
€ 
…[ ] 
by   
€ 
…α i[ ] in (4.2), and we obtain for the state after the second measurement: 
 
  
€ 
Ψ2 = ciϕ i ⊗ω …α i,α i[ ]
i
∑  (4.4) 
While this state is still a superposition, the state of the memory now is an objective mixture of 
memory states in which the earlier and the later result agree.  According to the Born rule, only 
records in which both measurement outcomes agree have a nonzero probability.  This 
argument has a long history, it actually predates Everett's theory:  its original form was Mott's 
argument for the emergence of particle trajectories in quantum mechanics.46   Hence:  while 
there still is no objective matter of fact about the measurement outcome, it is an objective 
matter of fact that there are no outcomes which represent different values for 
€ 
A  in the two 
measurements.  To make this claim somewhat more precise, let us think of a second 
measurement apparatus that measures on the memory the property 'the last two entries agree'.  
That is, all   
€ 
ω …α i,α i[ ] are eigenstates of eigenvalue 1, all other   
€ 
ω …α i,α j[ ] with 
€ 
α i ≠ α j  
eigenstates of eigenvalue 0.  Then, 
€ 
Ψ2  is an eigenstate of this measurement, i.e. it also has the 
property 'the last two entries agree' although it is not an eigenstate for any single outcome 
  
€ 
ω …α i,α i[ ].  We will discuss this type of argument in more detail in the next chapter:  it is of 
fundamental importance for the interpretation of Everett's model. 
 This argument throws a new light on von Neumann's reason for postulating the 
reduction process.  Maybe the postulate is not necessary to ensure the repeatability of 
measurements.  But before we accept Everett's argument, there is still a major problem to be 
solved:  How are we to understand this claim:  that the state 
€ 
Ψ2 shows the measurement to be 
repeatable, although there is no matter of fact about a value for the observable?  It is at this 
point that Everett invokes the consciousness of observers.  He says (Everett 1973, 63): 
... we do not do justice to the theory of pure wave mechanics until we have 
investigated what the theory itself says about the appearance of phenomena to 
observers, rather than hastily concluding that the theory must be incorrect 
because the actual states of systems as given by the theory seem to contradict 
our observations. 
                                                
46Nevill F. Mott, "The Wave Mechanics of α-Ray Tracks," Proceedings of the Royal Society A126 (1929): 79–
84 
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That is:  assume the memory in question is a conscious observer.  Instead of trying to find a 
physical process that gives 
€ 
A  a value on a state like 
€ 
Ψ1, we could explain the observation of a 
value as a subjective appearance to an observer in these states.  It is obvious that any physical 
theory of a conscious observer has to distinguish between the physical state of this observer 
and the phenomenal quality that her state has for the observer herself.  This is the fundamental 
idea of Everett's interpretation:  that the difference between a superposition of observer states 
given by the unitary evolution and the observation of a single outcome has to be explained as 
the difference between an objective physical fact about an observer and its appearance to the 
observer. 
 Everett proposes the following interpretation:  we know that in a state 
€ 
Ψ1 we cannot 
say that the variable 
€ 
A  has one value.  But instead of saying that it has no value, let us assume 
that it has all eigenvalues given by nonzero components of 
€ 
Ψ1 simultaneously.  The state 
€ 
Ψ1 
describes not a single fact about the system, but a coexistent ensemble of facts, each element 
of the ensemble being represented by a component of 
  
€ 
ciϕ i ⊗ω …α i[ ]
i
∑ .  If the memory in 
€ 
Ψ1 
is instantiated by a conscious observer, each component   
€ 
ω …α i[ ] describes the observer as 
having perceived a single measurement outcome.  That is: for each component   
€ 
ω …α i[ ] the 
observer, as described by that component, is not conscious of any other component but 
  
€ 
ω …α i[ ]. 
 To be precise, Everett does not say quite that much.  The better part of his explanatory 
effort is contained in one footnote:  
At this point we encounter a language difficulty.  Whereas before the 
observation we had a single observer state afterwards there were a number of 
different states for the observer, all occurring in a superposition.  Each of these 
separate states is a state for an observer, so that we can speak of the different 
observers described by the different states.  On the other hand, the same 
physical system is involved, and from this point of view it is the same 
observer, which is in different states for different elements of the superposition 
(i.e., has had different experiences in the separate elements of the 
superposition) (Everett 1973, 68). 
 This is about everything that Everett gives us as an interpretation of his understanding 
of a superposition.  And clearly, it is not quite enough.  There are at least three problems for 
an interpretation of Everett's statement: 
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(1) It is quite obvious that we are not simply dealing with a 'language difficulty' here:  one 
should think that there is a clear answer to whether we are dealing with a single observer or 
many of them.  If it is one, how possibly could she be in many different states simultaneously, 
and if there are many, does that not mean that we have introduced a new physical process—
call it observer fission—that makes von Neumann's reduction process look perfectly 
harmless?  This means:  we are either left with a serious metaphysical or a serious physical 
problem.47 
(2) In whichever way we answer question (1), why would we as observers never be 
conscious of the process of splitting or the multiplicity of states?  This is an epistemic 
problem about Everett's model.  It has attracted less attention than problem (1), presumably 
because it seems hard to imagine how it could be addressed as long as problem (1) is not 
settled.  The first to seriously attempt to address this question were Albert and Loewer (1988) 
with a thought experiment that we will discuss in section 5.1. 
(3) Even if the observer herself is not conscious of the superposition, there could be 
interference between different components of the superposition.  Everett seems to assume that 
there are no possible interference effects between different observer states, but he does not 
give an argument for this assumption. 
 Before we turn to these problems, though, I will review how Everett argues that his 
model can substitute von Neumann's reduction process.  First of all, it is to be applied to the 
case of several observers:  we should demand that if Everett's model is to represent an 
apparent reduction, different observers measuring the same variable should agree on the 
outcome of the measurement.  If in the situation of equation (4.3) a second observer (with 
memory states   
€ 
′ ω …[ ]) observes the object, the total state after the second observation is 
 
  
€ 
ci ϕ i ⊗ω …α i[ ]⊗ ′ ω …α i[ ]( )
i
∑  (4.5) 
If then the first observer measures what eigenvalue the second has found (if the second 
observer is honest, she can simply ask her), and the result "observer two has found eigenvalue 
€ 
α i" will be recorded as a value 
€ 
′ α i  in the first observer's memory, the state is 
 
  
€ 
ci ϕ i ⊗ω …α i, ′ α i[ ]⊗ ′ ω …α i[ ]( )
i
∑  (4.6) 
This means:  for every possible component of the first observer's state, her observation of 
€ 
α i 
and the second observer's report about her observation (
€ 
′ α i ) agree. Again, the agreement is 
                                                
47This problem has been widely discussed in the literature.  See (Healey 1984) for a detailed treatment. 
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not an objective matter of fact, but only established 'within' the components of the 
superposition. 
 This argument together with the argument for repeatability seems sufficient to account 
for the appearance of reduction (of course only if we accept the possibility of a consistent 
interpretation):  neither any further observations of the observer herself nor any observations 
of other observers will contradict the value originally found.  That is: they are arguments for 
the stability and the intersubjectivity of an appearance of a measurement outcome, although 
there is no objective matter of fact about it. 
 But to recover the reduction postulate we need not only a statement about the 
repeatability of an observation, we also need a statement about the probability of each 
outcome.  Only these two statements together will give us the Born rule.  Everett addresses 
this issue by considering a sequence of measurements on an ensemble of N identically 
prepared systems.  If the initial state of each object system (numbered by the index j) is again 
€ 
ciϕ i( j )
i
∑ , the initial state for the composite system is: 
 
  
€ 
Ψ0 = ci1ciNϕ i1
(1)⊗…⊗ϕ iN
(N )⊗ω …[ ]
i1 ,...iN
∑  (4.7) 
After the first k systems are observed (k < N), the state is 
 
  
€ 
Ψk = ci1ciNϕ i1
(1)⊗…⊗ϕ iN
(N )⊗ω …α i1
(1),…α ik(k )[ ]
i1 ,...iN
∑  (4.8) 
All possible sequences of observation results   
€ 
…α i1
(1),…α iN(N )[ ]  occur in this superposition. 
Everett defines the probability for a specific sequence as a measure M defined over the 
components   
€ 
ω …α i1
(1),…α iN(N )[ ].  He then postulates two requirements for this measure: 
(1) It is a function of the coefficients 
€ 
ci and invariant under a change of the phase of the 
€ 
ci. 
(2) It is additive for the sum of components.  Everett justifies the additivity requirement 
with the conservation of probabilities over subsequent states 
€ 
Ψk  (being steps in a 
sequence of measurements).  The probability for a component   
€ 
ω …α i1
(1),…α iN(N )[ ]  of 
€ 
Ψk  
should be the sum of the probabilities for all components of 
€ 
Ψk+1 that have memory 
sequences that begin with   
€ 
…α i1
(1),…α iN(N )[ ]  , i.e. 
 
  
€ 
M ω …α i1
(1),…α ik(k )[ ]( ) = M ω …α i1(1),…α ik(k ),α ik+1(k+1)[ ]( )
ik+1
∑  (4.9) 
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This requirement ensures that the probabilities of later observations can be correctly 
conditionalized on the probabilities of earlier observations. 
He then shows that the only measure that fulfills these requirements is Born's square 
amplitude measure.   
 It follows from this definition that for long sequences (large N) the frequencies of the 
€ 
α i  within the memory lists will approximate the Born probabilities 
€ 
ci
2 for almost all 
component states, i.e. for a subset of the component states with a measure close to one, using 
the measure defined above.  Everett claims in the introduction to his paper (Everett 1973, 9) 
that he is able to deduce the probabilistic statements of the Born rule from his model.  
Apparently, what he has in mind is this argument linking probability to observed frequencies, 
which is completely analogous to the attempts to define probability from frequencies in 
frequentist theories of probability (mentioned in 2.3).  We see from the foregoing that this 
claim is exaggerated.  The law of large numbers for long sequences cannot be used to define 
the concept of probability in Everett's model, because the law of large numbers itself is a 
probabilistic statement: it requires a notion of probability already defined.48  The introduction 
of probabilities is part of the empirical interpretation of the model and logically independent 
of the model itself.  But this is not a problem for Everett's model as long as the interpretation 
does not lead to inconsistencies.  From this point of view, Everett's discussion of long 
sequences of observations can be seen as a check of consistency for his definition of 
probability: however probability is defined in his model, the definition must imply that 
observed frequencies approximate the probabilities. 
 Everett's introduction of probability has been criticized on several counts: 
(4) It has been argued widely49 that the measure that Everett defines cannot be interpreted 
as a probability if one is to assume that all outcomes of a measurement coexist: Because then 
all outcomes occur with certainty and are not probabilistic events. 
(5) A decomposition of a quantum mechanical state as a superposition of states is in no 
way unique:  we can represent it as a superposition of any basis of the Hilbert space.  Why 
should we, for the sake of the probabilistic interpretation, prefer one basis (the memory states) 
over any other?  This problem is known as the basis problem of Everett's interpretation.50  
                                                
48This mirrors the problem of a frequentist definition of probability in classical mechanics, see sect. 2.3. 
49For example, (Healey 1984) or (Hughes 1989) 
50(Cartwright 1974) raised this problem as a critique of an interpretation of Everett proposed by van Fraassen. 
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This problem leads to a host of puzzling questions if the measurement is not exact and 
produces a state that is not diagonal in the memory states. 
(6) Everett is silent about whether and how the measure M is defined for states other than 
the memory states.  But it follows immediately from his definition that the measure is also 
defined for the states of the observed systems   
€ 
ϕ i1
(1)⊗…⊗ϕ ik
(k ) (being the relative states of the 
memory states) and hence for any element of the basis  
   
€ 
χ I = ϕ i1
(1)⊗…⊗ϕ ik
(k )⊗ω …α i1
(1),…α ik(k )[ ]  (4.10) 
of the Hilbert space 
€ 
Hk  of the composite system of observer and observed systems (I is the 
collective index).  Now we are faced with a dilemma: if the measure 
€ 
M  is a normal quantum 
mechanical measure, it is the defined for any state in 
€ 
Hk .  According to Gleason's theorem, 
this means that there is exactly one quantum mechanical state (mixed or pure) that represents 
this measure.  It is easy to see that this state is not the superposition 
€ 
cI χ II∑  but the mixture 
€ 
cI
2P χ I( )I∑ .  (The measure given by the superposition is not additive.)  But this means that 
the assumption of the additivity requirement simply begs the question of the measurement 
problem:  how it is that a superposition of measurement outcomes can be treated like a 
mixture.  If on the other hand, we treat M as a classical measure only defined over the 
elements of the basis 
€ 
χ I  considered as a classical state space, then we have aggravated the 
basis problem (5) further: we have excluded any superposition of these states from ever 
occurring, that is we have introduced an explicit notion of a 'classical realm' (in form of an a 
priori superselection rule) for which the rules of quantum mechanics don't hold. 
 Notice, though, that if we were to find an answer to problem (5) that justified the 
existence of a preferred basis independently from the state 
€ 
Ψk , it would be possible to correct 
problem (6) if we accept that the concept of probability is not derived from the theory but 
explicitly defined:  instead of the square amplitude measure, we can simply interpret the 
overall state 
€ 
Ψk  itself as defining the measure over the final observer states.  While 
€ 
Ψk  does 
not give a classical measure on 
€ 
Hk , it does define a classical measure over the basis 
  
€ 
ω …α i1
(1),…α iN(N )[ ] of the observer's Hilbert space even if the projection of 
€ 
Ψk  on this space is 
not diagonal in the   
€ 
ω …α i1
(1),…α iN(N )[ ] (simply because it does so for any basis).  Notice on the 
other hand that even if we had made sure that the projection is diagonal in the memory states, 
this would not answer problem (5):  a mixture can be interpreted as a measure over any basis. 
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 Before we try to interpret Everett's model, it makes sense to give another reason why 
we should even try.  Such a reason is the fact that Everett's model can account for the EPR 
paradox without invoking nonlocality (Everett 1973, 82-83).  Assume a particle pair S1, S2 in 
a singlet state 
€ 
Φ0, separated by a large distance.  Now two observers O1 and O2 perform 
measurements on S1 and S2, respectively.  If O1 measures a variable 
€ 
A  whose eigenstates are 
€ 
ϕ1,ϕ2, we can write 
€ 
Φ0 in this basis as  
 
€ 
Φ0 = 1 2 ϕ11( )ϕ2(2) −ϕ21( )ϕ1(2)( )  (4.11) 
O2 measures a variable 
€ 
B with eigenstates 
€ 
η1,η2.  The 
€ 
ϕ i  can be expressed in the basis of the 
€ 
ηi as  
 
€ 
ϕ i = bijη jj
2
∑ , (4.12) 
where 
€ 
bij  is a 2×2 unitary matrix.  The two measurements result in the state  
 
€ 
Φ1 = 1 2 ω 1( ) α1[ ]ϕ11( ) ⊗ b1 jη j2( )ω 2( ) β j[ ]j
2
∑(
−ω 1( ) α2[ ]ϕ21( ) ⊗ b2 jη j2( )ω 2( ) β j[ ]j
2
∑ )
 (4.13) 
If O1 now goes on to find out what results O2 has obtained (in the way we discussed above), 
the resulting state is  
 
€ 
Φ2 = 1 2 b1 jω 1( ) α1, ′ β j[ ]ϕ11( ) ⊗η j2( )ω 2( ) β j[ ]j
2
∑(
− b2 jω 1( ) α2, ′ β j[ ]ϕ21( ) ⊗η j2( )ω 2( ) β j[ ]j
2
∑ )  (4.14) 
Following Everett's interpretation, we can give this state a probabilistic interpretation for 
observer O1.  The probability for a state 
€ 
ω 1( ) α i, ′ β j[ ] is the square of its coefficient, i.e., 
€ 
1 2 bij
2
.  This is the probability that quantum mechanics predicts.  But no assumption of a 
nonlocal physical process was necessary to derive this result:  all that happened were two 
local interactions between O1 and S1, and O2 and S2, and the temporal order of the two 
measurements is irrelevant.  Because all the possible outcomes are represented in state 
€ 
Φ1, the 
choice of one observer which observable to measure does not affect the state of the distant 
particle and observer at all (and hence lead to a nonlocal process), but only determines how 
the observer's state is correlated to the state of the particle pair—and that is a perfectly local 
process.  Of course, this answer is not satisfying if we are looking for an explanation of the 
phenomenon in classical terms, because the states 
€ 
Φ0 , 
€ 
Φ1, and 
€ 
Φ2 are entangled states:  they 
are not separable in our definition of Section 2.2.  What is important here is that there is a 
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good sense in which the dynamical evolution is local:  the measurement interaction on one 
side has no effect on the interaction on the other side.   
 Let us sum up the results of this section:  Everett's model of a memory can account for 
the repeatability of quantum mechanical measurement.  But it remains unclear how this model 
is to be interpreted:  Everett neither gives a satisfying metaphysical interpretation of the 
superpositions resulting from the measurement process, nor does he give a sufficient 
explanation of his claim that the reduction can be understood as a subjective appearance of 
observers objectively in a superposition.  Finally, his derivation of the Born rule is 
problematic.  Nevertheless, his derivation of repeatability and his ability to give a local 
account of the EPR phenomenon seem important enough to explore his formulation of the 
measurement problem further.  Is it possible to supply an interpretation of Everett that 
answers the open questions?  In the following sections, I will review some attempts at such an 
interpretation. 
 
4.2  The Interpretation of Everett's Theory 
 Everett’s model of observation had a peculiar fate.  This is already evident in the name 
it has become known under, the ‘Many-Worlds Interpretation,’ a term that Everett himself 
never used.  The name was coined by Bryce DeWitt who was one of several physicists who in 
the early seventies rediscovered Everett’s work (DeWitt and Graham 1973) which in the years 
before had found little attention.  But where Everett’s interpretation of his model was 
noncommittal in metaphysical terms, DeWitt offered a bold statement of ontology: 
. . . the real universe is faithfully represented by the state vector [the 
superposition of measurement outcomes].  This universe is constantly splitting 
into a stupendous number of branches, all resulting from the measurement-like 
interactions between its myriads of components.  Moreover, every quantum 
transition taking place on every star, on every galaxy, in every remote corner 
of the universe is splitting our local world on earth into myriad copies of itself.   
This very much is a straightforward answer to our first question about the interpretation of 
Everett's formalism:   if the universe splits upon an act of measurement, then a forteriori also 
the observer.  After the measurement, we have for every outcome a separate universe, 
inhabited by an observer who is convinced that she has found that outcome -- and no other.  
So far, so good.  But it is obvious that this interpretation is not satisfying as an answer to our 
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questions about the measurement process.  If the universe splits upon each measurement, then 
this is a physical process and as such is just as obscure as a physical process of reduction.  It 
actually is nothing but a fancy way to describe the reduction process.   And if we were 
worried about the subtle nonlocality of the reduction process as manifested in the EPR 
paradox, then the instantaneous splitting of the whole universe sure won’t make us sleep 
better.  Philosophers ever since have been worrying about how such a split could happen -- is 
it space-time that splits or rather the objects within space-time, are the splits reversible, and 
how can there be one state for many universes (e.g., Healey 1984)?  It seems that the many-
worlds phenomenon shows but one thing:  that physicists have a quite different attitude 
towards words than philosophers, and that DeWitt, writing for a popular scientific journal, 
might have used a bold metaphor -- mostly for shock value. 
 Let us return to Everett.  The closest to a mention of 'splitting' in Everett is his remark 
in the footnote (quoted in the last section) that after a measurement we could talk about many 
observers instead of one.  But should we conclude from this that we have to understand 
Everett as postulating a physical process of 'observer splitting'?  Although not as blatantly 
nonlocal, such a process still would not be something you would like to find in your physics 
textbook.  Many criticisms have been leveled at the violation of conservation of energy or 
particle number that such a process would imply.  But there is an even more straightforward 
argument against any numerical increase in observers:  Everett's claim that he does nothing 
but extending the scope of quantum mechanics.  And of course, in standard quantum 
mechanics, a system's being in a superposition does not mean in any way that there are 
several systems.  Therefore, we would have to reintroduce the distinction between observers 
and ‘normal’ quantum mechanical systems at the level of the interpretation of a superposition.  
But this means that Everett would not have satisfied his own requirement. 
 Moreover, Everett himself states (Everett 1957, 459): 
Throughout all of a sequence of observation processes there is only one 
physical system representing the observer, yet there is no single state of the 
observer (which follows from the representation of interacting systems). 
The remark in parentheses refers to his earlier discussion of composite systems (ibid., 456): 
There does not, in general, exist anything like a single state for one subsystem 
of a composite system.  Subsystems do not possess states that are independent 
of the states of the remainder of the system, so that the subsystem states are 
generally correlated with one another. … It is meaningless to ask the absolute 
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state of a subsystem—one can only ask the state relative to a given state of the 
remainder of the subsystem. 
What Everett refers to here is the fact, discussed in section 3.1, that subsystems of composite 
systems cannot be ascribed pure states in quantum mechanics.  In 3.1, I called such states 
objective mixtures: they are represented mathematically as mixed states (i.e. distributions 
over states), but this distribution cannot be given an ignorance interpretation, that is, be 
understood as representing our incomplete knowledge of the true state.  Everett's proposal, 
then, is to take this puzzling feature of quantum mechanics seriously: objective mixtures 
describe a system that is simultaneously in several—mutually exclusive—states or, 
equivalently, that has several mutually exclusive properties.51 
 This reading of Everett has long been overshadowed by the many worlds 
interpretation, at least in the discussions of philosophers.  Here its only serious defender has 
been Simon Saunders.52  Plausibly, it is also this reading of Everett that underlies the work of 
many of the physicists that have worked on the basis of Everett's model, even if they typically 
have been reluctant to engage in an analysis of the metaphysical presuppositions of their 
work.  Noteworthy in this group is especially Wojciech Zurek in his work on decoherence 
(e.g. Zurek 1993) who has been the most willing to discuss 'philosophical' issues of 
interpretation.  The decoherent histories approach53 in quantum cosmology rests on Everett's 
model, and while its proponents have mostly been silent on the issue of interpretation, the 
approach clearly presupposes an understanding of quantum mechanics as I have sketched 
above: it starts from a complex quantum mechanical state of the universe that evolves 
unitarily and tries to find conditions on the emergence of classical behavior through 
decoherence of nonclassical components of the state. 
 It is undoubtedly true that this interpretation of Everett amounts to a radical revision of 
our fundamental beliefs about the logical structure of nature.  But this fact in itself cannot be a 
reason to reject the interpretation.  It has to be shown, though, that the metaphysical 
assumptions are self-consistent and that Everett's model under this interpretation is consistent 
with our experience as described by standard quantum mechanics.  I will address the latter 
                                                
51Notice that it still makes good sense in quantum mechanics to call states of properties mutually exclusive: 
according to von Neumann's identification of properties with Hilbert space projection operators, the conjunction 
of two properties is identified with the product of the two operators.  If this product is zero, then the properties 
are mutually exclusive, i.e. we can never observe a system having both.  For states, the same is true if the states 
are orthogonal. 
52See (Saunders 1996) for a concise exposition of his views. 
53For example, (Griffiths 1984) or (Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990) 
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question in chapter 5.  The issue of self-consistency is not easy to address, especially in a 
theory that is so at odds with our everyday way of thinking.  It can basically only be shown 
that certain seeming inconsistencies can be resolved and that the theory can be successfully 
used in a variety of situations.  I will return to this issue in chapter 6.  In the remainder of this 
chapter, I will make a preliminary attempt at clarifying some of the fundamental 
consequences of the interpretation and try to make plausible that they do form a coherent 
picture.   
 How can we think of a system having several incompatible properties simultaneously?  
There is an instructive parallel in the case of contingent properties: an object can have 
incompatible properties at different times.  One way to think about this (that I mentioned in 
section 2.2) is that the object is extended in time, i.e. that it has temporal parts, and that it has 
different properties at different parts of its extension.  Even simpler, a spatially extended 
object can have different local properties at different spatial parts of its extension.  Similarly 
we can think of quantum mechanical systems as extended, not only in geometrical space and 
time, but also in logical space, and as having different properties at different parts of their 
"logical extension".54  The logical space of a mechanical system is its state space—in 
quantum mechanics the Hilbert space.  Therefore another way to explain this interpretation is 
to say that it is a realist interpretation of the Hilbert space of quantum mechanical systems, 
just as a geometrical interpretation of time is a realist interpretation of e.g. the Minkowski 
space of special relativity.  This means: the ensembles that superpositions represent in Everett 
are not physical ensembles of objects (like worlds or observers) but logical ensembles of 
properties of one and the same object.  The do not describe a singular matter of fact about 
many things, but a range of possibilities for one thing.  We have already encountered this 
difference in our discussion of statistical ensembles in section 2.3:  There it was the difference 
between a physical ensemble of particles in some piece of matter and the Gibbs ensemble of 
possible states for that whole piece of matter (a logical ensemble). 
 If a quantum mechanical state is understood as describing a range of possibilities, then 
the foremost question arising is:  How does this interpretation represent the difference 
between the one state in the ensemble (for example, of measurement outcomes) that is actual 
and all the others that are not?  Everett's answer is simple and radical: there is no objective 
difference whatsoever.  He writes (ibid. 459, note): 
                                                
54The analogy between the status of time in the theory of relativity and the status of possibility and actuality in 
quantum mechanics has been pointed out by Saunders (1996) 
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The whole issue of the transition from "possible" to "actual" is taken care of in 
the theory in a very simple way—there is no such transition, nor is such a 
transition necessary for the theory to be in accord with our experience.  From 
the viewpoint of the theory all elements of a superposition (all "branches") are 
"actual," none any more "real" than the rest. 
Actuality is not an objective "metaproperty" that picks out certain states in the state space and 
distinguishes them from counterfactual possibilities, but it is an indexical, i.e. a relational 
concept that is only defined once a specific "position" in logical space is given, just as the 
word 'here' is only meaningful if a spatial position is given.  Again, there is a close analogy to 
the case of time: because in special relativity the notion of simultaneity depends on the rest 
frame of the observer, it is quite implausible to assume that there is an objective fact about 
which events happen now in Minkowski space-time.  Instead, it is natural to interpret 'now' as 
an indexical that is defined only in relation to a given point on a specific trajectory.55  
Therefore, it is not surprising that Everett stressed the notion of relativity in his model and 
called it "relative state interpretation".  This interpretation of actuality is known in 
metaphysics as modal realism. 
 I will return to the discussion of the metaphysical issues connected with Everett's 
interpretation in chapter 6.  For now, I will only remark that a consequence of the modal 
realism and relativism of Everett's model is that there is plenty of opportunity for 
terminological confusion about concepts of reality of actuality.  The Everett quote above is an 
example for this: saying that all elements of a superposition are actual does (strictly speaking) 
not make sense even for a modal realist—objectively the term 'actual' is not defined, and for 
any given reference frame, i.e. a definite component of the state, only one element is actual.  I 
believe that such confusions are to blame for the suspicion that Everett's interpretation (and 
modal realism in general) is inconsistent or incomprehensible.  I will attempt to minimize the 
risk of misunderstanding by distinguishing a concept of objective reality comprising the 
totality of facts described by the quantum mechanical state (e.g. "All the outcomes of a 
measurement process are equally objectively real.") and a concept of actuality defined relative 
to a given state of a physical system (e.g. "After a measurement has been performed, only one 
outcome is actual for any state of the observer.") 
 All of this is to say: Everett does give an answer to question (1), even though this 
answer has been widely eclipsed by the notion of a "many worlds interpretation":  
                                                
55Simon Saunders has explored this analogy in detail (ibid.) 
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Superpositions describe logical ensembles of possible states of one physical system.  But he 
does not attempt to justify this answer.  And it certainly would be desirable to have an 
argument for it before we accept such a fundamental revision of the metaphysical model of 
physics.  Furthermore, Everett's interpretation makes question (2) even more pressing:  Why 
should a conscious observer not be aware of this multiplicity of states if they all are to be her 
states?  This means: the fundamental question of empirical adequacy is whether Everett's 
claim is correct that it follows from quantum mechanics (in this interpretation) that the 
phenomenal reality of conscious observers is given by the indexical 'actuality' (i.e. the relative 
state) and not by the concept of objective reality (the complete quantum mechanical state). 
 
4.3  Saving Reality: Hidden Variables 
 The radical assumptions of Everett's theory are a good reason to wonder if we cannot 
make do with a more conservative metaphysical picture, but still construct a theory that 
avoids the troubling reduction postulate.  And it looks like we have come rather close to that 
goal: maybe what Everett's theory shows is that Einstein's suspicion was correct, after all, that 
quantum mechanics cannot be a complete theory of nature.  It only describes the possible 
trajectories of systems, like statistical mechanics.  We have found that the simplest strategy, 
namely treating quantum mechanical states as statistical distributions, leads to conflicts with 
the predictions of quantum mechanics.  But to save the objectivity of actuality, a more modest 
move would be sufficient: we can admit the objective reality of the quantum mechanical state 
but stipulate that there is an additional theoretical entity that marks what is real in the range of 
possibilities described by the quantum mechanical state. 
 Such a theory will have two kinds of state: the quantum mechanical state, evolving 
according to a Schrödinger equation without collapse, and a value state which assigns values 
to certain variables (the pseudoclassical or hidden variables) to which the quantum 
mechanical state only assigns a distribution.  In a measurement situation, the value state then 
should single out one outcome as real—all the others are counterfactual.  Even then, 
additional value assignments are problematic in quantum mechanics: we would get a conflict 
with Kochen and Specker's no-hidden-variable proof if we assumed that the value state 
specified values for all variables and that these values are revealed in a measurement.  The 
extent to which we can assign values to variables (in addition to eigenvalues) without getting 
into conflict with the minimal requirement that these variables have consistent functional 
relations for commuting variables has been explored by Bub and Clifton (1995).  Roughly 
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speaking, their result is that only one additional maximal variable (or a commuting set of 
nonmaximal variables) can have a value for a given state.56  Two basic strategies have been 
explored to pick this pseudoclassical variable:  Either one variable can be singled out a priori, 
or the quantum mechanical state itself determines which variables have values.  Both 
approaches have been used by well-known no-collapse interpretations. 
 The first approach is exemplified by Bohm's hidden variable interpretation.57  Here the 
hidden variable is position:  Every mechanical system (particle) always has an exact position 
and a deterministic trajectory.  The quantum mechanical state represented in position 
variables is considered as a physical field (the wave field).  This field evolves under the 
Schrödinger equation without collapse.  The particles move under classical forces and an 
additional 'quantum force' that the wave field exerts on them.  Probability in this 
interpretation is to be understood purely subjectively, that is statistical distributions describe 
of lack of exact knowledge of the particle positions.  Because the Schrödinger equation is 
formally equivalent to a form of the classical equations of motion (the Hamilton-Jacobi 
equation), it turns out that one can consistently regard the square of the wave field as a 
probability density for the particle position:  If the initial probability distribution for the 
position of a particle is given by the square of the wave function, then the equation of motion 
for the particle implies that any later probability distribution will be given by the square of the 
wave function at that time.   
 The value state in Bohm's theory is a classical state, i.e. it specifies values for all 
mechanical variables.  The reason why this fact does not lead to conflicts with quantum 
mechanical predictions is that these values do not determine the measurement outcomes for 
variables other than position (unless the system is in an eigenstate of the variable).58  Rather, 
such measurement outcomes are contextual, i.e. they are determined by the particle position 
and by how the measurement is set up.  Hence a measurement of any variable other than 
position does not reveal anything about the true value of that variable.  Nevertheless, after the 
measurement the particle will be in the component of the wave function that is an eigenstate 
of the measured variable with the measured eigenvalue.  Hence the realist could take comfort 
                                                
56The exact result is more complex.  Simultaneous value assignments are possible in noncommuting subspaces 
as long as these subspaces are orthogonal to the given state.  I will not discuss these results in detail here, 
because no attempt has been made to exploit such value assignments for the purpose of interpretation.  
(Obviously what is of interest for the interpretation are the non-orthogonal subspaces.) 
57(Bohm 1952).  See (Albert 1992) for a concise presentation in the context of other no-collapse interpretations. 
58See (Albert 1992) for a detailed discussion of this fact. 
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in the idea that what we are really measuring in measurements of such variables are field 
variables of the wave field. 
 But is the wave field a comfortable object to be realist about?  First of all, it is not a 
field in geometrical space proper but in phase space.  This means that for many-particle 
systems of N particles, it is defined not in three-dimensional space, but in 3N-dimensional 
space.  (After all, it simply is the quantum mechanical state in a specific representation.)  And 
it is this feature of the wave function (that it is defined on the tensor product space) that is 
responsible for its nonclassical behavior.  Therefore that all the weirdness of entangled states 
is still with us, represented by the wave "field".  And of course we know from our discussion 
of Everett what it means that the wave field represents the total uncollapsed state of the 
world:  It describes the totality of all possible histories of the universe.  All the "ontological 
baggage" of Everett's interpretation has not gone away—it just has been relegated to a realm 
of shadows, the wave field, which represents all these possible histories—and Bohm's theory 
explicitly requires from us to take this as an objectively real physical object.  Just like in 
Everett's theory we need an argument why there are no interference effects from other 
components of the wave field, i.e. why after a measurement all other components of the wave 
field will have no effect on the subsequent motion of the particle. 
 Other than Everett's theory, Bohm's has to use nonlocal effects to explain EPR 
measurements.  These effects result from the fact that the wave field is defined in phase 
space:  Any change in the wave function on one side of the particle pair can have an 
immediate effect on its interaction with the particle on the other side.  If the reason why we 
were unhappy with the reduction postulate was its assumption of action at a distance, Bohm's 
theory is not an improvement.59 
 Lastly, there is a deeper problem with Bohm's theory:  As we have seen, the 
consistency of its probabilistic predictions with standard quantum mechanics depends on the 
assumption that all we know about the initial particle position is the probability distribution 
given by the initial wave function.  Because the particle position determines any measurement 
outcome, if we knew any more about the initial particle position, we could predict 
measurement outcomes with more accuracy than quantum mechanics admits.  In Bohm's 
theory, this assumption is justified with the fact that any measurement (also measurements of 
position) has to rely on physical interactions, and these interactions always are interactions 
with the wave function, not with the particle itself.  The particle only gets carried along 
                                                
59See the discussion of this issue in section 3.4. 
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passively with the wave function, but its position has no effect in turn on the wave function.  
Hence, if we perform a position measurement, the final pointer position will be correlated to 
the particle position only insofar as the pointer's wave function is correlated to the particle's 
wave function.  And this means that even if we could know the pointer position exactly, all 
that we knew about the particle's position was its wave function relative to the pointer 
position (i.e. Everett's relative state) but not where within this wave function the particle is 
located.  Put simply, through position measurements we can localize the wave function of a 
particle, but never localize the particle within the wave function.  But this means that the only 
element that distinguishes Bohm's theory from Everett's, namely the particle positions, have 
no physical effects and are unobservable in principle. 
 This leaves us with a strange tension.  Because in ones sense, the particle positions are 
observable: namely by introspection.  After all, they are supposed to explain why after a 
measurement we experience one outcome as real: because it is the one designated by the 
hidden variables.  But this means that different from any other process in nature, for which 
the particle positions are completely irrelevant, for consciousness they do matter.  Hence, 
consciousness is fundamentally different a process than any other in nature.  And on the same 
token, this means that conscious phenomena do not matter for whatever else happens in 
nature:  They are purely epiphenomenal. 
 To sum up: Bohm's theory does not get rid of the "ontological ballast" of 
counterfactual possibilities existing in nature, because it treats the full wave function as 
existing objectively.  Rather, it adds a new theoretical entity (The particle position vector) to 
explain why we experience only one of the possibilities as actual.  The decisive question is 
now:  Can we explain our experience of reality, namely the actuality of only one component 
of the quantum mechanical state, from Everett's theory alone (without invoking an additional 
value state)?  If this is so, then the introduction of a value state serves no explanatory purpose 
(besides being unobservable as a physical quantity) and should fall prey to Ockham's razor.  
Even worse for Bohm, introducing such a value state would leave us with an inextricable 
sceptical problem:  If the pure wave function is enough to account for the experience of 
conscious observers, then even introspection cannot reveal any information about the value 
state.  The fact that I consciously experience one measurement outcome (or any state of 
affairs) does not imply that this is the outcome that is picked out by the value state.  I might 
just as well be part of the "realm of shadows", the vast expanses of the wave function that are 
not inhabited by the value state. 
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 The second approach for picking the pseudoclassical variable is taken by the so-called 
modal interpretations.  This is a group of interpretations of quantum mechanics whose best 
known representatives are Richard Healey (1989) and Dennis Dieks (1989).60  In these 
interpretations, the overall quantum mechanical state defines which variables have values.  
The pseudoclassical variables are defined for subsystems of composite systems through the 
biorthogonal decomposition rule discussed in section 3.1.  As we have seen, given a pure state 
of the composite system, each of the subsystems is in a mixed state and there always are bases 
of the subsystem spaces that diagonalize these mixed states (eqs. 3.6 and 3.7).  I already 
remarked then that it is very tempting to interpret these mixed states as ignorance mixtures for 
some pure state (which in the case of a von Neumann measurement would just be the desired 
result).  Modal interpretations do just that:  Those variables on the subsystems have values 
which have eigenstates that are elements of such a basis.  As we have seen, this would lead to 
deviant predictions for variables defined on the composite system (such as correlations).  
Therefore, modal interpretations have to assume that the total quantum mechanical state 
objectively exists and that it determines the predictions for measurements on irreducible 
variables of the composite system.  But in addition to this, there are value states for the 
subsystems which assign values to the additional (pseudoclassical) variables.  The value states 
are quantum mechanical states defined on the Hilbert space of the subsystem or (as in 
Healey's interpretation) subspaces of this Hilbert space called system representatives. 
 Modal interpretations have the advantage over Bohm's interpretation that in the case of 
an exact von Neumann measurement they give a straightforward explanation why we always 
find one well-defined value: because in such a measurement both the state of the object and 
the state of the apparatus are mixtures diagonal in the eigenstates of the measured variable, 
and therefore this variable has a value, given by the value state.  But as we have seen in 
section 3.1, the biorthogonal decomposition rule runs into problems in the case of non-exact 
measurements. 
 On the other hand, modal interpretations have problems that Bohm's interpretation 
doesn't have:  It is not clear how the overall state is to be decomposed if we have composite 
systems of more than two parts, because in this case there is no possibility to have subsystem 
states that both are elements of a basis and are perfectly correlated with each other (which is 
what we need to explain a measurement outcome).  And of course, in nature we will always 
                                                
60Bas van Fraassen's interpretation (van Fraassen 1991) shows some marked differences in how the value state 
is assigned.  I will not discuss his interpretation here.  But my main criticism is aimed at the introduction of a 
value state in general, and therefore also addresses van Fraassen's interpretation. 
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encounter systems that have interacted with countless other systems in the past.  Even worse, 
it seems a completely intractable problem to define explicit equations of motion for the value 
states as soon as there is any interaction between the subsystems (Albert 1992: 191–97).  This 
means that modal interpretations don't actually give us a physical theory, but only promissory 
notes for one. 
 But finally and in my view, most fundamentally, modal interpretations share with 
Bohm's theory all the problems caused by the fact that they simply add a new theoretical 
entity to Everett's quantum mechanics without changing the empirical predictions of quantum 
mechanics: 
– As in Bohm's theory, there are explicit nonlocalities in EPR measurements:  Upon 
measurement on one particle, the value state of the other particle will change 
immediately.61 
– As in Bohm's theory, the quantum mechanical state of the universe exists objectively, 
representing all possible histories of the universe.  The irreversibility of measurement has 
to be shown:62  Why can we ignore the total quantum mechanical state after a 
measurement for all practical purposes? 
– Again, all interactions have to be described by the full quantum mechanical state, the value 
states are just being carried along.  This fact is of even more central importance for modal 
interpretations, because we don't even know the equations of motion for value states.  As in 
Bohm's theory, this means that we can measure value states only insofar as we can 
establish correlations in the quantum mechanical state.  And this, like in Bohm's theory, 
leaves us with a picture of consciousness that is somewhat unphysical and fully 
epiphenomenal. 
For these reasons we are led to the same conclusion as with Bohm's theory:  If Everett's 
theory can explain the subjective appearance of single measurement outcomes, then the 
introduction of additional variables is simply superfluous and burdens our theory with 
completely unobservable entities.  In the next chapter I will turn to this question, the central 
problem of this thesis. 
                                                
61Both Healey (1989: 137–79) and van Fraassen (1991: 338–74) discuss this issue extensively. 
62Both Dieks and Healey (1995) have appealed to decoherence for this. 
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Chapter 5 
Quantum Mechanics and Consciousness 
 
5.1  Supervenience and the Interpretation of Superpositions 
 In this chapter, I will return to the questions about Everett's model enumerated in 
section 4.2.  In this section, I will treat Everett's claims about the appearance of superpositions 
to conscious observers (problems 1–3), in the next section I will discuss his claims about 
probability (problems 4–6).   
 The fundamental question about the consistency of Everett's theory with our 
experience is:  If I am the observer who has performed an observation as described in eqs. 
(4.2) and (4.3), is there a contradiction between my belief that I have observed an outcome 
€ 
α f , and the description of me as an observer given by the state Ψ1 in eq. (4.3)?  It is at this 
place that the consciousness of the observer comes into play.  We have to assure that our 
"belief states" can also be described by Everett's quantum mechanical model.  The novel 
feature in our discussion (compared to discussions of self-knowledge in the philosophy of 
mind) is the possibility of superpositions of conscious states.  The question we have to answer 
is, put somewhat sloppily:  "What does it feel like to be in a superposition?"63  
 First, it is necessary to precisely formulate the notion of supervenience of mental 
states for a quantum mechanical system.  The traditional definition is that for a conscious 
subject, every mental state corresponds to a set of physical states of that subject (or her 
brain—this distinction need not worry us here), so that whenever the subject is in one of the 
physical states from the set, the corresponding mental state obtains.64  Mental states are not 
states in the physical (mechanical) sense of the word, because they don't give a complete 
description of the system.  It is perfectly consistent that I see a tree and feel a pain and have a 
longing for pickled herring.  Therefore, mental states are properly speaking properties of the 
                                                
63Albert 1992, 112 
64See, e.g., (Kim 1984).  Note that I don't assume that this correspondence be the same relation for different 
subjects.  In the terminology of the philosophy of mind, I do not assume a type-type identity of mental and 
physical states, just a token-token identity.  It is often contended that the definition of mental states also depends 
on matters of fact about the environment ("wide content").  But what is meant with that is the definition of types 
of mental states across individuals.  It may very well be that the physical constitution of different individuals 
varies enough to make the definition of mental state types by purely intrinsic properties impossible, i.e. different 
mental states might supervene on the same physical state in different individuals.  But this is not relevant for our 
discussion.  I do take it as implied by the assumption of supervenience that my belief "This is a glass of water" 
does not become a different mental state if a mischievous naturalist, without me noticing, replaces the water with 
vodka. 
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subject and supervenience means that they are physical properties. I will also refer to them as 
mental qualities.  An important condition for the present purposes is the requirement that 
mental states supervene on the present physical state of the system, not on its whole history.  
If we were to give up this requirement, there would be no need for a physical memory, 
because a remembrance of a past event could supervene on this event directly, without any 
physical memory.  Then the core element of Everett's formulation, the physical model of 
memory would lose its function. 
 In quantum mechanics, the analogous statement of supervenience is that to every 
mental state corresponds a subspace of quantum mechanical states of the subject, so that 
whenever the state of the observer is within that subspace, the corresponding mental state 
obtains.  As I mentioned in section 2.4, the reason for identifying properties with subspaces 
instead of subsets is the linearity of quantum mechanics:  this amounts to the postulate that if 
two states have a property 
€ 
L , then any linear combination of these states also has the property 
€ 
L .   Therefore, one has to identify the subsets of the classical state space with subspaces of 
the Hilbert space in quantum mechanics.  
 Now consider the following thought experiment, a variation of a thought experiment 
devised by David Albert and Barry Loewer (Albert and Loewer 1988):  we have an 
observation modeled by equations (4.2) and (4.3).  We prepare the observed system so that its 
initial state is an eigenstate 
€ 
ϕ i  of the observed observable 
€ 
A .  Then the observation process 
happening approximately at some time 
€ 
t0 will in our model look like this: 
   
€ 
φi ⊗ω …[ ]→φi ⊗ω …α i[ ] , (5.1) 
where 
€ 
α i is the eigenvalue corresponding to 
€ 
ϕ i , and, naturally, in the final state there will be 
a well-defined result 
€ 
α i for the observation of 
€ 
A .  The observer's state   
€ 
ω …α i[ ] corresponds 
to the observer's belief "I have made an observation at 
€ 
t0 (as noted earlier, this information is 
not explicit in our notation) and observed a unique and well-defined outcome of 
€ 
α i."  
Equivalently, we can say that the observer's belief is characterized by the following qualities:  
(1)  It is a belief that the observer 
€ 
O has made an observation at 
€ 
t0. 
(2) It is a belief that 
€ 
O has observed a unique and well-defined measurement outcome. 
(3) It is a belief 
€ 
B α i( ) that the outcome was 
€ 
α i. 
 According to our supervenience assumption, each of these qualities defines a subspace 
of the space of possible quantum mechanical states of 
€ 
O, and   
€ 
ω …α i[ ] is an element of each 
of these subspaces.  This, of course, is true for any   
€ 
ω …α i[ ].  Let us call the subspaces 
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corresponding to qualities (1), (2), and (3), 
€ 
S1, 
€ 
S2 , and 
€ 
S3i  respectively, where 
€ 
S3i  depends on 
the value of 
€ 
α i.   
 Now, assume that the initial state of the system is a superposition of eigenstates 
€ 
ciϕi∑ .  Then, the final state will be the state Ψ1 from eq. (4.3), which, of course, is not 
contained in any of the subspaces 
€ 
S3i , so on the standard account of superpositions, there is no 
matter of fact about the belief 
€ 
B α i( ).  Nevertheless, because Ψ1 is a linear superposition of 
the outcomes that would have resulted if the initial state had been an eigenstate, it still is an 
element of the subspaces 
€ 
S1 and 
€ 
S2 .  This means:  Even in state Ψ1, the observer believes 
that she has made an observation and found a definite outcome.  The importance of the 
thought experiment is that it questions an assumption that most interpreters of quantum 
mechanics have made implicitly: that it is impossible that an observer be in a superposition of 
conscious states, because she would surely notice if she was.  But the thought experiment 
shows that there can be no feeling of fuzziness (or blankness, or what have you) that comes 
with being in a superposition of conscious states if we require that feelings (as mental states) 
supervene over physical states.  Nevertheless, the fact that Ψ1 is an element of 
€ 
S2  leaves us 
with a puzzle:  how can we attribute a belief to 
€ 
O that she has observed a unique and well-
defined measurement outcome if we don't attribute any one of the beliefs 
€ 
B α i( ) to her? 
 Albert and Loewer take the paradoxical result as an argument against supervenience.  
They use the thought experiment to justify their "many-minds" interpretation, the dualist 
picture of the brain as physical system (which is in a superposition) and different minds 
(corresponding to the different subjective beliefs about the measurement outcome).  They take 
the objective state Ψ1 to describe an ensemble of real minds which somehow coexist in the 
physical brain of a conscious observer.  Every mind has a well-defined belief 
€ 
B α i( ), i.e. the 
beliefs supervene on the state of the mind, not the physical state.  This is how statement (2) 
can be understood despite the fact that overall, there is no matter of fact about which 
€ 
B α i( ) is 
true.  This picture suggests that the outcome of the experiment is caused by a special relation 
between mental states and brain states (hence the failure of supervenience).  
 I do not think that the experiment forces us to this conclusion.  Note that the result is 
not due to any special property of consciousness or introspection (all we assumed was 
supervenience), but to the nondistributivity of quantum logic:  An object can have the 
property   
€ 
S1∩ S2 ∩ S31 ∪ S32 ∪…∪ S3n( )  without having the property 
   
€ 
S1∪ S2 ∪ S31( )∩ S1∪ S2 ∪ S32( )∩…∩ S1∪ S2 ∪ S3n( ). 
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We would have arrived at a similarly paradoxical result if we had used a mechanical 
measuring apparatus and measured a set of exclusive measurement results and their 
disjunction.  For example, assume we wanted to build an apparatus that measures whether the 
spin of a spin-
€ 
1
2  particle is a pure eigenstate of spin in a certain direction or a superposition of 
these: it only beeps if the particle is in a spin eigenstate with the eigenvalue of either +
€ 
1
2  or -
€ 
1
2  
in the given direction.  If we feed this apparatus with a particle in a superposition of these two 
spin states (i.e., not an eigenstate), we can conclude by an analogous argument that the 
apparatus will beep, anyway.  This means:  the inability to distinguish a superposition from 
the logical disjunction of its components is not a special property of consciousness, but 
applies to all quantum mechanical measurements.  Rather, it is based on the fact that 
properties are represented by subspaces of the Hilbert space (from which it follows that there 
can be no property that two states have but a superposition of them doesn't have). 
 I agree with Dennis Dieks who argues against Albert's and Loewer's interpretation that 
if we were to accept that the state after measurement is a superposition, 
it would not be obvious a priori that this would be in conflict with a physical 
description in terms of one single recorded spin value.  Everything depends on 
the precise link between the mathematical formalism on the one hand and 
physical properties on the other; on what it means on the physical level to be 
represented by a superposition in the theoretical formalism (Dieks 1991). 
Rather than an argument against supervenience, the thought experiment is an argument for the 
interpretation of superpositions as describing ensembles of properties.  Again, the analogy 
with time is instructive: there is nothing mysterious in claiming that a (classical) particle 
always has a well-defined position, even when it doesn't have the same position at all times.  
Equivalently, we can say that an observer in state Ψ1 has a definite belief (everywhere in her 
logical extension, i.e. in all her possible states) without having the same belief in all her 
possible states.  Notice that this argument does not work if we take the superposition as 
describing an ensemble of objects (as in the many-worlds interpretation), because it doesn't 
make sense to claim that an ensemble of objects has a well-defined property because the 
property is well-defined for each of its elements:  Properties of physical ensembles are 
different from the properties of their elements. 
 Interpreting superpositions as describing logical ensembles, then, is justified because it 
can explain the nondistributivity of quantum logic.  The formal similarity between quantum 
logic and modal logic has been noted for a long time (Dalla Chiara 1986).  The interpretation 
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shows a way to understand this similarity.  Of course, this argument is an inference to the best 
explanation:  It doesn't follow from quantum logic that superpositions are descriptions of 
logical ensembles.  But an inference to the best explanation, I believe, is as good as we can 
do.  As I discussed in the introduction, the task of the interpretation of quantum mechanics is 
finding a metaphysical model for quantum mechanics.  And like any theoretical model, this 
will not be a logical consequence of the data, but merely a consistent way to account for 
them.65   
 Notice, though, that the thought experiment by itself does not give us reason to accept 
the second part of Everett's interpretation, namely the modal realism about the logical 
ensemble.  We can explain its result just as well if we assume that all but one possibility is 
counterfactual.  Then the fact that Ψ1 is an element of 
€ 
S1 and 
€ 
S2  but not of the 
€ 
S3i  is simply 
due to its incompleteness: like a statistical state, it is not a full description of the physical 
situation.  Of course, this assumption leads us to the hidden variable theories described in 4.3. 
 We still have to address Albert and Loewer's conclusion from the thought experiment:  
If we claim that to an observer in state Ψ1 this state can have the appearance of a definite 
measurement outcome, does this not contradict the assumption of supervenience?  This 
question can be answered if we consider the definition of supervenience.  As I remarked in 
the last section, mental states are, properly speaking, properties of the subject and 
supervenience means that these properties supervene on the subject's physical properties.  
What the thought experiment shows is not that supervenience breaks down, but that the 
relation between quantum mechanical states and properties is more complex than in the 
classical case.  While in classical physics, every state either has a certain physical property or 
does not, in quantum mechanics there is the possibility that a state is neither in the subspace 
corresponding to the property or in its orthogonal complement (corresponding to the negation 
of the property).  Commonly, it is said that in this case there is no matter of fact about the 
system's having the property or not.  The thought experiment gives us a reason to qualify this 
statement:  We can understand it by representing such a state as a statistical ensemble of a 
state in which the system has the property and a state in which it doesn't.  What the no-
hidden-variable proofs show is that such an ensemble representation is not sufficient to 
determine other properties of the system (and hence also not to predict its evolution).  But this 
only means that there is more to a quantum mechanical state than its being an ensemble state, 
                                                
65If we were to have more than one model that does this job equally well, then all the better.  But I don't think 
that the measurement problem is still with us because too many satisfying interpretations for quantum mechanics 
have been found. 
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not that it cannot be understood as an ensemble state at all.66  This interpretation helps to 
understand the peculiar nature of improper mixtures:  The formal equivalence between proper 
and improper mixtures is not a superficial coincidence.  Improper mixtures, like proper 
mixtures, describe logical ensembles, and they have exactly the same form because the 
nonclassical nature of the total state does not affect properties that are defined on one 
subsystem alone. 
 Let us return to question (2) about the consciousness of being in a superposition.  As I 
have argued, Albert and Loewer's thought experiment does not teach us anything new about 
consciousness itself.  Nevertheless, it shows that if we assume supervenience, the logical 
ensemble interpretation has an important consequence for mental states:  Being in an 
ensemble of mental states does not imply that we are conscious of being in such an ensemble.  
It might seem (at least as long as we think of the ensembles as counterfactual ensembles like 
in a hidden variable interpretation) that this is all we need to answer question (2).  But this is 
not the case as long as we haven't shown that all our mental states supervene over commuting 
subspaces:  While the thought experiment tells us that a superposition of mental states would 
not by itself carry consciousness of the fact of the superposition, it leaves open the possibility 
that this superposition (which is, after all, just another pure quantum mechanical state) could 
be a mental state in its own right, i.e. belong to the subspace that some other mental state 
supervenes over. 
 Consider the following example: assume a conscious (but not very bright) being 
whose brain consists of a single spin-
€ 
1
2  particle, and its belief "It is raining" supervenes on 
some state 
€ 
ϕ1 while its belief "It is not raining" supervenes on the state 
€ 
ϕ2 orthogonal to 
€ 
ϕ1.  
From the argument so far it follows that if this being is in any superposition of these states, it 
will perceive itself as having a definite belief about the weather outside.  Nevertheless, it 
could be the case that its brain state 
€ 
1
2ϕ1 + 1 2ϕ2 comes with a belief "I am hungry."  
Whatever it would be like to be such a creature, it would be radically different from what we 
know:  Its beliefs definitely cannot follow a Boolean logic like ours do (at least as long as our 
beliefs follow any logic).  This means: our mental states are classically describable only if 
they supervene on commuting subspaces (and if they weren't classically describable, we 
wouldn't be mystified by quantum mechanics).  But if we are serious about the assumption 
that an observer is a quantum mechanical system, how can there be anything that singles out a 
                                                
66This is the intuition behind the path integral method in quantum mechanics:  We can represent the evolution of 
a superposition of states by the evolution of the ensemble of these states if we allow for interference between the 
different states.   
82 
particular basis (or a particular set of orthogonal subspaces) as the relevant memory states, 
while superpositions of these states have no meaning? 
 There is a simple answer to this question which does not work: the observer in state 
Ψ1 is not in a superposition, she is in an objective mixture.  And this mixture is diagonal in 
the memory states, therefore it singles out these states as the relevant possible states.  We 
have already discussed why this answer is not sufficient in section 3.3: in general, we cannot 
expect the mixture being exactly diagonal in the memory states if the observation process is 
not ideal; and, more importantly, the fact that the mixture is diagonal in one basis does not 
mean that the quantum mechanical state can only be understood as a measure over that basis: 
the objective mixture (as any quantum mechanical state) attributes a probability to any state in 
the Hilbert space.   
 But we have also found a remedy for this problem in 3.3: the assumption of 
decoherence.  If we assume that an observer is a decoherent system, then any superposition of 
states from different coherent subspaces will quickly evolve into a mixture of these states and 
therefore cannot have any independent functional role in the dynamics of the observer system.  
But it is plausible to assume that a state that has no independent functional role will also not 
have an independent conscious quality.  (This does not amount to the assumption of 
functionalism, i.e. that mental states are defined by their functional properties, but merely to 
the assumption that consciousness itself is some kind of dynamical process that supervenes on 
a physical process.)  This means that all mental states will supervene over the decoherence 
basis (defined by the interaction with the environment) and all the subspaces representing 
mental qualities will commute.  And that justifies Everett's assumption that the memory states 
supervene over a set of pairwise orthogonal states and completes our answer to question (2):  
Our mental states obey a Boolean logic, not because of some special status of consciousness, 
but because our conscious processes supervene over processes of a decoherent physical 
system. 
 Of course, the assumption of decoherence also answers question (3):  Decoherence 
ensures that the transition to a mixture of observer states is irreversible in practice (although 
the overall state is still a superposition) and therefore the different components will evolve 
completely independently of each other in the future.  Notice also that all no-collapse 
interpretations of quantum mechanics have to find an answer to this question and that 
decoherence so far has emerged as the only plausible and physically realistic scenario to give 
such an answer.  (See the discussion in section 4.3.)  The reference to decoherence for the 
purpose of interpreting quantum mechanics here is in no way unique. 
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 Why should we assume that memory states decohere?  As I remarked already in 3.3, it 
is very plausible to assume that all macroscopically different position states decohere, unless 
we very carefully shield the system from its environment.  A more substantial argument for 
the decoherence of memory states of course depends on how the memory is physically 
realized.  In the case of inanimate recording devices, the same argument as for measurement 
apparatus holds:  the requirement that records are easily discernible already implies that 
different memory states interact differently with their environment.  In the case of conscious 
observers we would need to assume some functionalist theory of mental states to make the 
same argument.  But this is not necessary, if we have a more detailed theory of memory in 
conscious beings:  The physical processes in the brain that are most probably relevant for our 
conscious processes, the firing of neurons in the case of perception and the building of 
synaptic connections in the case of memory,67 both involve irreversible exchanges of energy 
and matter with the environment that are large on a quantum mechanical scale.  Therefore, 
classically defined neurophysiological states should decohere just like classically defined 
pointer states of a measuring instrument.  Decoherence therefore can address the question of a 
preferred set of conscious states without invoking a nonphysical "phenomenal perspective" 
(Lockwood 1989)  or the existence of nonphysical minds (Albert and Loewer, 1988). 
 Notice that given our supervenience assumption, there is no need that the decoherence 
of observer states be perfect, that is that the set of subspaces that decoherence singles out is 
exactly defined, because supervenience itself need not be defined absolutely exactly.  It is 
certainly more realistic to assume that a mental state is defined not by some specific variable 
on our brain (or whatever the mental state supervenes over) having an exact value, but that it 
has a certain 'fuzziness around the edges', i.e. that it is defined by a characteristic density 
operator that approximates a projection operator of a subspace, especially if we are dealing 
with continuous operators.  This is analogous with von Neumann's treatment of continuous 
variables like position: Particles never have an exact position, but always a certain spread in 
position: their states are to be represented by wave packets, not by delta functions. 
 Decoherence, therefore, plays an important role in the justification of Everett's model.  
But the relevant assumption is not decoherence in the objects , but decoherence in the subject  
(the observer).  Even if the state of the rest of the world was quantum mechanically coherent, 
a decoherent observer would find definite measurement outcomes (only the dynamical law 
                                                
67According to the theory of neural networks, which is the standard neurophysiological model of memory 
(Lockwood 1989). 
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describing the outcomes would not be classical mechanics, but quantum mechanics.)  Of 
course, this doesn't change the fact that the assumption of decoherence in macroscopic objects 
explains their classical behavior.  (This issue is logically independent from the question 
discussed here.)  But critics of the decoherence approach have remarked, the mere fact that 
the states of macroscopic systems decohere does not guarantee that observations lead to 
determinate results.68  We need an argument that tells us how the objective mixtures that 
result from decoherence relate to our experience.  It is such an argument that I have attempted 
to give in this section. 
 
5.2  The Subjective State 
 Let us return to the situation of the thought experiment.  The argument so far was 
supposed to show that an observer's belief 
€ 
B α i( ) that she has found a definite measurement 
outcome is consistent with the fact that she objectively is in the superposition 
€ 
Ψ1.  But this is 
not enough to make any predictions about the future, because it follows from the argument 
that the belief is consistent with a great number of different states of the observer.  In von 
Neumann's formulation, it is postulated that the state after the measurement is an eigenstate of 
the measurement.  If we want to show that Everett's model can replace the reduction 
postulate, we have to show that the observer could consistently ascribe to herself the quantum 
mechanical state   
€ 
ω …α i[ ]  corresponding to the belief 
€ 
B α i( ) and that this state ascription can 
be used to give correct (probabilistic) predictions for future observations.  In the rest of this 
section I will argue that this is indeed the case. 
 Because the state ascription is based on a belief of the observer, I will call the state 
  
€ 
ω …α i[ ] the subjective state.  Note that "subjective state" here does not simply mean "state of 
the subject," but that the state ascription is based on a belief of the observer (and is therefore 
epistemologically subjective).  Let us furthermore, for the moment, assume the realist position 
that the state (2) is the true state of the observer and the object and call this state the objective 
state, because it represents an objective matter of fact about observer and object.  (I will say 
more about the issue of realism and the reality of quantum mechanical states later.) 
But so far, we do not have the means to check equivalence:   
(A) The objective state has a well-defined equation of motion (the Schrödinger equation), 
so we can predict future objective states.  But so far, we do not know how an objective state 
                                                
68(Healey 1995).  See also (Zurek 1991)   
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describes events , because we do not have a rule that analyzes superpositions like state Ψ1 in 
terms of empirical events.  (We know from the thought experiment, that there is no distinct 
subjective quality connected to being in state Ψ1.) 
(B) The subjective state, on the other hand, gives us a well-defined empirically accessible 
event, namely having the corresponding belief.  But we do not have a dynamical law for 
subjective states which would enable an observer to predict her future from her present 
subjective state.  Even worse: we don't even have a notion of identity over time for these 
states:  What does it mean for an observer in some subjective state to claim that another 
subjective state was her past state of will be her future state, if a multitude of such states 
objectively exist?69 
Let us consider problem (A) first:  As we already found in section 4.2, the objective state 
describes a range of possible subjective states for an observer.  Because the subjective states 
describe events, that implies that the objective state describes a range of possible events.  
Therefore, the obvious way of interpreting Ψ1 in terms of actual events is understanding Ψ1 
as giving a probability measure for the observer having a belief 
€ 
B α i( ).  Notice that 
probability, so introduced, is not part of the dynamics of the theory (which is still given by the 
unitary evolution of Hilbert space states), but of the interpretation of the theory, and logically 
independent of the theory itself.   
 But because the probability measure relates the theory to observation, we are not free 
in our choice of the measure if the interpretation is to be empirically equivalent with von 
Neumann's interpretation of quantum mechanics.  The Born rule predicts that in the process of 
our example the probability for a measurement outcome 
€ 
α i is 
€ 
ci
2.  Because in our 
interpretation the measurement outcome is not part of the objective description but is 
represented by the belief 
€ 
B α i( ), we have to postulate the following correspondence rule: 
If the objective quantum mechanical state of an observer is a superposition  
€ 
cIΦ I ⊗ω AI[ ]
I
∑  ,  
where 
€ 
AI  is any memory sequence, 
€ 
I  a collective index, and 
€ 
cIΦ I  the product 
of the corresponding states of the observed objects, then the probability that 
the observer is in the subjective state 
€ 
ω AI[ ]  is 
€ 
cI
2 .  
                                                
69This problem has been widely discussed in the literature for the case of future states, see e.g. (Healey 1984).  
Healey refers to Bell noticing that the same is true about the past. 
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Notice that it is not trivial that we can use the quantum mechanical state to define a 
probability measure for the subjective states.  A quantum mechanical state generally defines a 
measure on the subspaces of its Hilbert space.  But, as we remarked earlier, the subspaces do 
not form a Boolean algebra (but a so-called partial Boolean algebra).  Therefore the measure 
is not a probability measure in the usual sense (i.e. fulfills the Kolmogorov axioms).70  I our 
case, though, the subspaces 
€ 
S3i  defined  by the observer's beliefs are pairwise orthogonal 
(according to the orthogonality postulate of Everett's model).  But a set of pairwise orthogonal 
subspaces forms a Boolean subalgebra of the partial Boolean algebra of subspaces of the 
Hilbert space71  Therefore, if we restrict the measure on this subalgebra, it does fulfill the 
Kolmogorov axioms and forms a traditional probability measure for the beliefs 
€ 
B Ai( ) .  But as 
we have seen from our discussion of projected density matrices in section 3.1, the 
probabilities 
€ 
cI
2  are simply the probabilities given by the objective state Ψ1 for the basis 
€ 
ω AI[ ]  of observer states.  Therefore, we have answered questions (5) and (6):  we can take 
Ψ1 itself as defining the probability measure for the possible subjective states.  This means 
that the correspondence rule is simply: 
The probability for a subjective state is given by the measure that the objective 
state defines on the subspace (of the observer's Hilbert space) corresponding to 
the subjective state. 
Of course, this rule is perfectly natural, because, first of all, quantum mechanical states are 
defined as measures on the state space.  Further, the rule explains the formal equivalence 
between the two kinds of mixtures we get in von Neumann's interpretation:  the objective 
mixture of measurement outcomes attained by unitary evolution and the ignorance mixture of 
outcomes after the reduction process.  Notice again that all of this is completely independent 
of the issue of modal realism:  The probability measure is simply defined on a set of possible 
subjective states.  Whether on of them is actual as an objective matter of fact or whether all of 
them equally exist is perfectly irrelevant.  Lastly, notice again that the reason why the 
objective state defines a classical measure on the subjective states is not because it is diagonal 
in these states (although this is the case for our simple model of an exact measurement).  
Rather, it is because the subjective states form a set of orthogonal subspaces defined by the 
requirement of stability under decoherence. 
                                                
70(Suppes 1966) 
71(Hughes 1989 192-96) 
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 As the objective state evolves, it defines a time-dependent probability distribution on 
the subjective states.  Consider this in a simple example: a two-dimensional system with 
eigenstates 
€ 
ϕ1, 
€ 
ϕ2 and eigenvalues 
€ 
α1, 
€ 
α2  of the observable 
€ 
A , and a "model observer" with a 
three-dimensional state space:   
€ 
ω …[ ] (the "ready" state),   
€ 
ω …α1[ ], and   
€ 
ω …α2[ ] (the states 
corresponding to a definite outcome for the observation of 
€ 
A).  Then, in Everett's model, the 
observation process is described by a unitary transformation  
   
€ 
c1ϕ1 + c2ϕ2( )⊗ω …[ ]→ c1ϕ1⊗ω …α1[ ] + c2ϕ2 ⊗ω …α2[ ] (5.2)  
A simple time-dependent unitary evolution with the initial and final states as in (9) is given 
by:  
 
  
€ 
Φ t( ) = c1ϕ1⊗ cos t ⋅ω …[ ] + sin t ⋅ω …α1[ ]( ) +
+c2ϕ2 ⊗ cos t ⋅ω …[ ] + sin t ⋅ω …α2[ ]( )
 (5.3) 
where   
€ 
t  is a time parameter with 
€ 
0 ≤ t ≤ π 2 . 
 The probability distribution induced by (5.3) on the subjective states of the observer 
is: 
 
  
€ 
cos2 t for ω …[ ]
c1
2 sin2 t for ω …α1[ ]
c2
2 sin2 t for ω …α2[ ]
 (5.4)  
This means:  the continuous unitary evolution (5.3) of the objective states induces a time-
dependent probability distribution (5.4) on the possible subjective states.  This distribution is 
consistent with the observer originally being in state   
€ 
ω …[ ] and at some point of time   
€ 
t   
changing into state   
€ 
ω …α1[ ] or   
€ 
ω …α2[ ] (with the probability 
€ 
dP = 2ci
2 sin t dt ) in which 
state she remains from there on.72  
 But notice that neither the evolution of the objective state nor the time-dependent 
probability distribution defined by it suffice to define a unique time evolution of subjective 
states (as in statistical mechanics at time-dependent distribution does not define an equation 
of motion for the micro states):  All we have is a definition of global transition probabilities.  
The subjective state could as well flip-flop many times between the possible states.  This is 
our problem (B).  It is at this point that the ways part between a relativist (modal realist) and 
                                                
72Notice in this example the coexistence of the objective, continuous, and deterministic process of unitary 
evolution, and the discontinuous and probabilistic transitions between subjective states.  It is interesting to 
compare this model to the discussion of the temporal structure of experience in the philosophy of mind, for 
example with William James's lucid remarks on substantive and transitive parts of the 'stream of thought.' in 
(James 1981, 236-40) 
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an objective realist interpretation:  For an objective realist, the actuality of one subjective state 
must express an objective matter of fact very much like the value states discussed in 4.3.  
Hence she has to construct objective dynamics for these states and compare the dynamics to 
the evolution of the objective state.  As in the modal interpretations discussed in 4.3, this 
leads to rather intractable problems (besides the nonlocality imposed by the Bell inequalities).  
A relativist on the other hand only needs to show that the beliefs of an observer about her 
history are consistent with the evolution of the objective state.  This means that it must be 
possible to conditionalize the objective probabilities (i.e. the probabilities given by the 
objective state) on a given subjective state and arrive at the probabilities given by von 
Neumann's theory.73  This means that the objective probabilities conditionalized on an earlier 
subjective state are the Born probabilities for later measurements calculated on the basis of 
the subjective state. 
 Let us consider this in an example, too:  Take an observer performing two subsequent 
observations on an object system.  First, she observes an observable 
€ 
A  with eigenstates 
€ 
ϕ1 to 
€ 
ϕn  and eigenvalues 
€ 
α1 to 
€ 
αn , then she observes another observable 
€ 
B with eigenstates 
€ 
ψ1 to 
€ 
ψ n  and eigenvalues 
€ 
β1  to 
€ 
βn .  
€ 
A  and 
€ 
B in general will not commute, the transformation 
between the 
€ 
ϕ i  and the 
€ 
ψ j  is given by the unitary transformation 
 
€ 
ϕ i = bijψ j
j
∑   with  bij*b jk = δ ik
j
∑ . (5.5) 
If the initial state of the object is 
 
€ 
η0 = ciϕ i
i
∑ , (5.6) 
then the objective state develops according to Everett's model: 
 
  
€ 
η0 ⊗ω …[ ] → ciϕ i ⊗ω …,α i[ ]
i
∑ → cibijψ j ⊗ω …,α i,β j[ ]
ij
∑  (5.7) 
 First of all, there is the question of how we can say that any subjective state given by a 
component in the final state of (5.7) has a history, i.e. has unique predecessors under the 
earlier subjective states.  The subjective state, being a memory state, makes definite claims 
about past events.  Specifically, being in a memory state   
€ 
ω A1,A2,…An[ ] implies the belief that 
I was in any of the states   
€ 
ω A1,A2,…Ak[ ] with 
€ 
k < n  at some earlier time.  But this means that 
for any subjective state there is a well-define sequence of predecessor states that represents 
the "subjective history" of this state.  On the other hand, any subjective state has several 
                                                
73Of course, an objective realist needs this argument, too, if she does not want to arrive at the conclusion that we 
are typically misguided about our objective history. 
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possible successors and the probability for each of these should be given by the Born rule.  
The following diagram shows the possible successor relations (as arrows) for the subjective 
states in our example: 
  
ω …[ ]
ω …α1[ ], ω …α2[ ] … ω …α n[ ]
ω …α1,β1[ ] … ω …α1,βn[ ], ω …α2 ,β1[ ] … ω …α2 ,βm[ ] … ω …α n,β1[ ] … ω …αn ,βn[ ]
(5.8)
 
In this case, according to the Born rule, the probability for the transition  from   
€ 
ω …[ ] to 
  
€ 
ω …α i[ ] is 
€ 
ci
2, the probability for the transition from   
€ 
ω …α i[ ] to   
€ 
ω …α i,β j[ ] is 
€ 
bij
2
.   
 The question of consistency in this case is whether the measures given by objective 
states at different times lead to a conditionalization which agrees with the transition 
probabilities given by the Born rule.  The transition probabilities can then be understood as 
conditional probabilities determined by the objective probability measure.  Although the 
answer to this question seems rather obvious, it is important to see that it is not trivial.  It is 
well known that in general conditionalization is not possible in quantum mechanics at all, 
because of interference between different "histories" or "paths" of a system.74  The reason 
why conditionalization is possible in our case is because every subjective state has a unique 
predecessor in the hierarchy.  Therefore, between any two states, there is maximally one path 
connecting the two, and there are no interference effects.  Hence, we only need to check 
whether the transition probabilities agree with the quotients of the total probabilities.  For 
example, in the case of the states   
€ 
ω …α i[ ] and  
€ 
ω …α i,β j[ ], we have for the transition 
probability 
€ 
P β j |α i( ): 
 
  
€ 
P ω …α i,β j[ ]( )
P ω …α i[ ]( )
=
cibij
2
ci
2 = bij
2
= P β j |α i( )  (5.9) 
Hence, the dynamics defined on subjective states in terms of transition probabilities given by 
the Born rule are consistent with the dynamics defined on the objective state given by unitary 
                                                
74The standard textbook example for this is the double slit experiment.  See e.g. Hughes (1989), 232-237 
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evolution.  The different cases of observation on several systems and by several observers that 
Everett discusses75 are straightforward applications of the model from equations (5.5-8) to 
composite systems.  We have already mentioned the two most salient examples in section 4.1:  
the repeatability of measurement and the agreement of different observers about the value of 
the same observable. 
 We can see now that Everett's argument for the introduction of probability (section 
4.1, equations 4.7-4.9) is just another example of this argument.  As we have seen, Everett 
does not (as he seems to claim) derive the probabilistic dynamics from his model.  Rather, he 
shows that if we interpret the measure defined by the objective state as an absolute 
probability, we get the usual Born probabilities as conditional probabilities for transitions 
between subjective states.  This also clarifies the status of his argument about the law of large 
numbers: it shows that if we interpret the measure defined by the objective state as 
probability, we can say that it is probable that observed frequencies approximate the Born 
probabilities, because of all the subjective states possible under the objective state, such states 
that represent frequencies close to the Born probabilities will have the greatest objective 
probability. 
 Together, these arguments show that any future observation (including observations of 
other observers) will be consistent with the original assignment of the subjective state and the 
assumption of a probabilistic evolution according to von Neumann's reduction postulate state.  
This concludes our argument for the consistency of subjective state assignments.  An observer 
can always represent her quantum mechanical evolution by a probabilistic transition law on a 
hierarchy of subjective states.  But notice that the consistency argument relies on restricting 
the interactions of the observer to one specific type, namely observations as modeled by 
Everett's theory.  For any other interaction (except those that leave the subjective states 
invariant) the dynamics of subjective states are not defined, nor is the notion of their identity 
over time.  Such interactions also would allow an outside observer to measure superpositions 
of subjective states and show that the subjective description is incorrect.  But notice that a 
measurement of an observable on subjective states which does not commute with the memory 
states would mean interfering with the function of the memory, that is, it would change the 
content of the memory.  Therefore, it is not surprising that a consistent subjective state 
ascription based on the observer's memory is not possible.76 
                                                
75(Everett 1973, 68-83). 
76Such interactions are discussed in (Albert 1992) and (Albert and Putnam 1995).  
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 Lastly, let us return to question (4):  It should have become sufficiently clear by now 
that the worry whether a concept of probability can even be defined in Everett's interpretation 
results from the confusion about the concept of reality in this interpretation.  The fact that all 
measurement outcomes are described by the objective state does not mean that they are all 
actual (much less certain).  I will discuss the meaning of modal statements in the next chapter, 
but we have already seen in the last section that all the interpretation implies about 
components of the objective state is that they are all possible as subjective states and that 
(when an observer performs a measurement) there is no objective matter of fact about which 
of these possibilities is actual for her.  This does not mean that we cannot have a concept of 
probability, just that this concept (like all modal concepts) will have to be defined differently 
than in an objective realist framework:  Probability is simply defined as a measure on a set of 
possible events (subjective states).  What we don't have is the stipulation that one of these 
events is eventually going to be real not just as a phenomenon to me, but as a matter of 
objective truth—but this stipulation is completely unnecessary to understand a concept of 
probability.  What we do need is that probabilities so defined hook up in the right way with 
the frequencies of events (which are the only observable element).  And that this is so is 
shown by Everett's argument about the law of large numbers.  Apparently, an important 
reason for the confusion about probabilities is that Everett himself did not make sufficiently 
clear what constitutes an event in his model (and that events are not part of the objective 
description).  It is this gap that the introduction of subjective states is supposed to close. 
 We can now understand the difference between the interpretation discussed here and 
Albert's many-minds interpretation.  Albert postulates a new kind of theoretical entities, 
namely minds, as  correlates to our subjective appearances.  These minds are substances in 
the sense of our discussion of section 2.1: they have individual histories through time.  In this 
sense, Albert's interpretation is quite similar to the hidden-variable interpretations discussed 
in 4.3: as they do, Albert attempts to solve the measurement problem by introducing new 
theoretical entities that are thought to exist objectively.  And, like in their case, my main 
argument against Albert's interpretation is that we can do without such new entities.  (And of 
course, the introduction of non-physical substances into a physical theory is not a move that 
many philosophers would want to do lightly.)  Furthermore, as in the case of hidden-variable 
interpretations, the introduction of individual minds as carriers of subjective perceptions 
necessitates postulating dynamical laws for these minds that are consistent with the overall 
probability distributions given by the objective state and with the no-hidden-variable 
theorems.  Albert, like the defenders of modal interpretations, doesn't offer such a theory; and 
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while it is easy to postulate an appropriate dynamical evolution for normal von-Neumann type 
observations (this is what the consistency argument of this section has shown), it is not clear 
at all what its general form should be.   
 In contrast, the subjective states discussed here are not new individual substances, but 
physical properties of observers.  Hence there is no objective matter of fact about their 
identity over time, i.e. they do not have objective histories in all cases.  Nevertheless, we can 
ascribe histories to subjective states if the overall evolution allows us to do so consistently.  
As we have seen in this section, this is the case for von-Neumann type observations.  But also 
for a much wider class of interactions will it be possible to ascribe histories to subjective 
states if we invoke the assumption that such states are decoherent, because decoherence 
ensures the existence of consistent histories (Zurek 1993).  Under the assumption of 
decoherence, Albert's and my interpretation will therefore not disagree in practice about the 
existence of histories, only about their status. 
 
5.3  The Empirical State 
 So far, we have given an argument that Everett's formulation of quantum mechanics is 
empirically adequate by showing that it is consistent with a subjective appearance of well-
defined measurement outcomes.  It would of course by possible to claim that this is all that 
needs to be said about the model.  But there is a central feature of the model that is 
unsatisfactory from a philosophical point of view:  it seems natural to think of the objective 
state as the element of the model that describes the physical system "as it is" independent of 
any observation, while the subjective state is merely an erroneous description of the system 
brought about by the physical limitations of the process of observation.  This picture leads us 
to the conclusion that we can never have knowledge about the state of a physical system:  any 
observation will only create a new illusion but can never reveal the real state.77  While 
Everett's argument shows that we necessarily agree in our illusions, this only means that the 
illusion is collective. 
 Notice that the argument about the observability of the objective state resembles a 
classical sceptical argument.  We give a model of observation within our theory and from that 
conclude that we cannot have knowledge about objective matters of fact.  I propose to deal 
with this problem in a way that is analogous to Kant's answer to the sceptical argument.  To 
                                                
77A consideration of the hierarchy (5.8) shows that every subsequent subjective state will be "further away from 
the truth", if we take the scalar product between subjective and objective state as the measure of distance. 
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put it in the simplest possible way, the answer is that the absolutely unobservable objective 
state cannot be what we mean by reality.  Reality is what corresponds to our observations in 
the object, not the absolutely objective cause of our observations.   
 Kant distinguishes two concepts of reality:  transcendental reality, that is, the existence 
of things in themselves, absolutely independent of our perception, and empirical reality, that 
is, the lawful existence of things as we perceive them.78  Transcendental reality cannot be 
perceived although we have to assume it to explain our perceptions.  What we mean by reality 
in our normal use of the word is empirical reality.  Far from being a lawless aggregate of 
illusions, it is ordered by the conceptual framework that our mind imposes on it.  We will 
return to the comparison with Kantian metaphysics in the next section.  For now, regard this 
allusion to Kant merely as an analogy supposed to motivate the search for a correlate of 
empirical reality other than the objective state (which is obviously unsuitable for this 
purpose).   
 The sceptical problem is reflected in our interpretation by the fact that the transition 
probabilities (5.9) of the subjective state are given by the objective state.  The question 
therefore is:  can the observer in a given subjective state ascribe a quantum mechanical state 
to the object that leads to the correct probabilities for future observations conditional on the 
observer's subjective state?  If there is such a state, we can regard it as representing empirical 
reality for an observer in the given subjective state.  We have already found this state in 
section 3.1:  It is the relative state to the subjective state.  For any subjective state 
€ 
ω  of the 
observer, the objective state 
€ 
ψ  uniquely defines a relative state of the object.  This relative 
state gives the correct conditional probabilities for future observations (that is, their resulting 
subjective states) under the condition that the observer initially was in the subjective state 
€ 
ω .  
Let us call this state of the object that corresponds to the subjective state of the observer the 
empirical state.   
 Notice that the correspondence is a purely physical and objective relation and is 
independent of any notion of meaning of the subjective state.  This is important in the case of 
an imperfect measurement when the belief 
€ 
B α i( ) can be false.  Then the empirical state is not 
simply the eigenstate of 
€ 
α i, but a state of the object that gives the objectively correct 
predictions for future measurements.  Consider the model of an approximate measurement 
with a decoherent measuring apparatus from section 3.3:  The pointer basis 
€ 
′ ψ i  there now is to 
                                                
78For a discussion of this distinction, see Allison (1983), especially chapter 1. 
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be understood as the subjective states   
€ 
ω …α i[ ].  An observer in the subjective state 
  
€ 
′ ψ i =ω …α i[ ] has found the measurement result 
€ 
α i and hence (implicitly) believes that the 
object is in the corresponding eigenstate 
€ 
ϕ i .  But because the measurement is not exact, the 
relative state to   
€ 
ω …α i[ ] (the empirical state) is not 
€ 
ϕ i  but 
€ 
′ ϕ j = N j cibiji∑ ϕ i  (eq. 3.21) which 
is a "wave packet" of finite width (depending on the error of the measurement) around 
€ 
ϕ i .  
(And if the observer performs a second measurement of the same variable, we can show by 
using the empirical state that there will be a finite probability that the second measurement 
does not agree with the first, just as it follows from the objective state.)  This means: the 
empirical state does not represent an absolutely objective matter of fact independent of the 
process of observation, but it does not merely reflect the belief of the observer, either.  As we 
would expect from a notion of reality, the empirical state gives us a stable criterion that the 
truth or falsity of an observer's beliefs can be judged by. 
 The dynamics of the empirical state are given by the evolution of the subjective state 
and the relative state formalism.  This leads to a well-known picture of the evolution of the 
empirical state:  as long as object and observer don't interact, the state undergoes the usual 
unitary evolution given by the Hamiltonian of the object.  When object and observer interact, 
the subjective state changes indeterministically, and therefore the same happens to the 
empirical state:  it changes into one of the eigenstates of the measured observable; the 
transition probabilities are given by the transition probabilities of the subjective state.  In the 
example of equations (5.3-4):   the initial empirical state 
€ 
ϕ0 in this example is 
€ 
c1ϕ1 + c2ϕ2  (the 
relative state to   
€ 
ω …[ ]).  When the subjective state changes at   
€ 
t , also the empirical state 
changes to either 
€ 
ϕ1 or 
€ 
ϕ2.  The total probability for a change to 
€ 
ϕ1 is 
€ 
c1
2, for a change to 
€ 
ϕ2, 
it is 
€ 
c2
2 .  The evolution can be represented in the following diagram: 
empirical state subjective state evolve into: entangled state
 
equivalent to (5.10)
  
empirical state subjective state
ciϕ i∑ ⊗   ω …[ ] →   ciϕ i ⊗ ω …αi[ ]∑
⇓
ϕ f ⊗   ω …α f[ ]
 The dynamical rules for empirical states obviously are von Neumann's two processes 
of quantum mechanical evolution:  as long as no observation happens, the evolution is unitary 
(governed by the Schrödinger equation); if an observation takes place the evolution is 
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probabilistic (von Neumann's reduction process).  Hence, the empirical state is equivalent to 
the quantum mechanical state as given by von Neumann's theory.  This shows the equivalence 
of Everett's theory (in the interpretation offered here) and von Neumann's.   
 But as we can see from diagram (5.10), the empirical states themselves do not form a 
closed model: in any measurement interaction they evolve into an entangled state which is 
only subjectively equivalent to the reduced state.  Therefore, we cannot simply treat them as 
objective states or our account of the observation process will be incomplete:  it does not give 
us a physical model of the observation process, nor does it tell us how our subjective 
experience relates to quantum mechanical states.  This is the most fundamental deficit of von 
Neumann's model.  It is a deficit on his own postulate of psycho-physical parallelism that it 
must be possible to describe the process of subjective perception as a physical process.79  But 
the process of reduction he postulated is not a physical process in the strict sense: it differs 
fundamentally from the usual unitary evolution of quantum mechanics.  The project of this 
interpretation can be seen as a completion of von Neumann's unfinished project of psycho-
physical parallelism in quantum mechanics.   
 The new and seemingly paradoxical feature of this interpretation is that probabilities 
here have a fundamentally different epistemological role than in a traditional ignorance 
interpretation of statistical physics:  there, the values of the observables are objective, and it is 
the probability distributions that are subjective, resulting from incomplete knowledge of the 
objective state of the system.  In our case, the probability distribution is objective (given by 
the objective state), and the possessed values are subjective.  But the attempt to salvage a 
more traditional metaphysical model results in one of the hidden variable theories discussed 
in 4.3.  And, as the argument in the present chapter should have shown, their additional 
theoretical entities (the value states of hidden variables) serve no explanatory purpose:  We 
can account for our experience of single measurement outcomes without them.  This means: if 
one wants to, one can of course introduce these additional variables and struggle with the host 
of theoretical problems they bring with them: the nonlocality, contextuality of measurement, 
obscure dynamics, and dualism of the physical and mental.  But then one should admit the 
fact that their introduction does not serve any theoretical purpose (i.e. the explanation of 
empirical phenomena) but solely is motivated by metaphysical prejudice: the unwillingness to 
accept that the world could be the way Everett's model describes it. 
 
                                                
79(Neumann 1932, 223).  See the discussion in section 3.4 
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Chapter 6 
Reality in Quantum Mechanics 
 
 
6.1  Kantian Epistemology 
 As we have seen, there are different possible readings of Albert's thought experiment.  
While Albert himself takes it as an argument against supervenience of mental states on 
physical states, I propose to understand it as an argument against the possibility of complete 
introspective knowledge of our objective physical state.  In this reading, Albert's thought 
experiment therefore can be seen as a sceptical argument:  starting from an analysis of how 
we arrive at beliefs about certain objects, it concludes that our beliefs are not truthful 
representations of these objects.80  In the interpretation offered here, I use this argument in a 
way that is similar to Immanuel Kant's use of the sceptical arguments of eighteenth-century 
epistemology:  Kant uses skepticism as a reason to reject a traditional model of epistemology 
which often is called the Cartesian model and to replace it with his model, which he calls 
transcendental idealism.  With 'similarity' I mean an analogous fundamental conceptual 
structure, which I will sketch in this section. 
 It is often said that the central point of Kant's metaphysics is the distinction between 
appearance and the thing in itself:  our knowledge is not about things in themselves, but about 
things as they appear to us under the conditions of our forms of intuition, space, and time, and 
of the pure concepts of understanding, the categories.  While this point is generally well 
known, another equally important point is frequently misunderstood:  the distinction between 
appearance and thing in itself does not only hold for external objects in space but also for our 
own representations.  Also these are not known as they are in themselves but only as they 
appear to us.  Whereas they are not subject to space as the form of outer intuition, they still 
fall under the condition of time because we only perceive them as they are represented by our 
'inner sense,' the Kantian term for consciousness.  Therefore, we also perceive ourselves as 
appearances and not as we are independent of our form of sensibility.   
 Kant discusses this distinction less prominently than the distinction for external 
objects but there are several places in the Critique of Pure Reason  (Kant 1929) where it is 
stated unambiguously:  quite obviously, in the discussion of time in the transcendental 
                                                
80This is actually stronger than most classical skeptical arguments in epistemology, like Descartes' or Hume's, 
which only assert that we cannot know whether representation and object agree. 
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aesthetic, especially B66-69 but maybe even more pointedly in his discussion of 
transcendental idealism within the Antinomy of Pure Reason (B518-525) where he says:   
Even the inner and sensible intuition of our mind (as object of consciousness) 
which is represented as being determined by the succession of different states 
in time, is not the self proper, as it exists in itself—that is, is not the 
transcendental subject—but only an appearance that has been given to the 
sensibility of this, to us unknown, being.  This inner appearance cannot be 
admitted to exist in any such manner in and by itself; for it is conditioned by 
time and time cannot be a determination of a thing in itself (Kant 1929, B520). 
This shows that the distinction between appearance and thing in itself is independent of the 
distinction between object and subjective representation.  The former distinction can be 
applied on either side of the latter.  Henry Allison calls the failure to distinguish between 
these two distinctions the 'standard picture' of Kant interpretation.  It results in a confusion of 
Kant's transcendental idealism with a subjective idealist position like Berkeley's (which Kant 
calls empirical idealist) and therefore disputes Kant's claim that he can salvage empiricism.81  
 The distinction between representation and object is an empirical distinction between 
different kinds of things whereas the distinction between appearance and the thing in itself 
distinguishes the mode of our knowledge of objects:  an appearance is an object known 
through the representation of our senses (be this object external or an internal representation 
itself), and therefore according to Kant subject to the conditions a priori of our sensibility; a 
thing in itself is the object thought of as independent of our sensibility and its conditions.  
While it is impossible to know anything about the object independent of these conditions, it is 
still possible to think of an object in this way (even necessary, as Kant claims, once we realize 
that we know objects only as appearances).82  This means, appearance and thing in itself are 
not two different objects (like representation and its object), but two ways of considering an 
empirical object.   
 Kant's double distinction can be applied to any epistemological model even if it does 
not attempt to be a priori, i.e., formulated without the use of empirical knowledge about 
objects, representations, and their relation.  Any epistemological theory will model objects on 
one side and epistemic subjects and their beliefs or representations on the other side.  The 
interpretation of such a theory is more complex than the interpretation of a theory that does 
                                                
81(Allison 1983, 4-5 and 247-254).   
82(Kant 1929, B306). 
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not contain a model of the observing subject.  First of all, the model of the subject and its 
states (or representations) is not identical to us as the 'true' subject—as little as in any theory 
the model of an object is identical to the actual object.  Therefore, the theoretical description 
of the subject is in need of an interpretation, which relates the description to our actual 
experience.  But this interpretation in turn determines the interpretation of the model for the 
objects in the theory, because according to the theory, the objects are given through their 
relation to subjective representations as modeled by the theory.  Especially, once the 
interpretation of the subjective representations determines which representations are 
observable, then this will in turn determine which features of the model for objects are 
observable.  We therefore generally have a distinction between observable (phenomenal) and 
non-observable (noumenal) elements of the model, which is given by the interpretation of the 
model and is independent of the distinction between objects and their subjective 
representations given by the theory itself.   
 In Kant's case, the theory concentrates almost exclusively on the faculties of reason.  
This, of course, has to be understood from the anti-sceptical intention of his argument.  Kant 
tries to justify the assumption of a fundamental logical structure of nature under the categories 
and therefore cannot start with any substantial assumptions about this structure.  On the other 
hand, he assumes that we can have knowledge about our mental faculties by means of logical 
analysis, which is not vulnerable to sceptical arguments.  This is not the place to assess 
whether Kant's theory of faculties is immune to sceptical questioning.  The interesting point in 
our context is his version of what I call the interpretation of the epistemological theory.  This 
argument is given in the transcendental deduction of the categories.  In the following brief 
outline of the argument, I will not attempt to analyze this famously difficult argument, but 
merely compare its overall structure with the general schema given in the last paragraph.83   
 Kant starts with a fundamental principle (his 'principle of interpretation') that for a 
representation to be conscious it is necessary that it be unified by an act (the synthesis) of our 
mental faculties, because any conscious representation must carry the consciousness of its 
unity which cannot be part of what is given through the senses.  Therefore, any conscious 
representation will obey certain formal conditions imposed by these functions of unity.  These 
criteria are represented by a set of formal concepts, the categories.  The second step of Kant's 
argument translates these formal conditions on conscious representations into conditions on 
                                                
83This structure can be seen more clearly in the version of the transcendental deduction given in the second 
edition.  At the same time, my reading of this version adds plausibility to the peculiar two-step argument offered 
there, which many commentators have found puzzling. 
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objects of our experience.  This step is described by Kant's famous statement:  'the conditions 
of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility of the 
objects of experience.'84  An object can only be observable if its subjective representation 
fulfills the conditions of unity of consciousness, therefore any observable object will fall 
under certain universal rules that represent the conditions of possible experience.  We can 
think an object independent of these conditions, but because we don't have a universal theory 
(ontology) of objects that would describe objects independent of the conditions of our 
experience, we can know nothing about such an object.   
 In the interpretation of Everett's theory, other than in Kant's case, we start with an 
empirical model of the observation process.  Albert's thought experiment forces us (at least in 
the interpretation given here) to distinguish the state of the observer as given by the model 
(the true state) from its appearance to us as conscious observers of ourselves (the phenomenal 
state).  This distinction is not part of the 'bare' theory but of its interpretation, and is analogous 
to Kant's transcendental distinction between appearance and thing in itself.  Unlike in Kant's 
case, there is a formal way to represent the noumenon, because the theory is not a priori, but 
starts with empirical assumptions about the character of its objects.  But like in Kant's case, 
the argument from the interpretation shows that the noumenon (the true state of the observer) 
cannot be known.  And, like in Kant's case, the theory itself gives us the means to infer from 
the phenomenal state of the subject to a phenomenal state of the object (the empirical state).  
The dynamical rules inferred for the empirical state are the familiar von Neumann rules.  This 
demonstrates the empirical adequacy of Everett's model, assuming that the von Neumann 
rules reflect our empirical knowledge about quantum mechanical systems.   
 The parallels between Kant's and my conceptual distinctions can be represented in the 
following two diagrams:   
Interpretation of Everett: 
   
€ 
phenomenal state
      of subject
relation given by
quantum mechanics← →      
empirical state
of object
     distinction given by the interpretation      distinction given by the interpretation
true state of subject
not fundamentally
distinct← →      true state of object  
                                                
84(Kant 1929, B197).  
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Kant's metaphysics: 
 
  
€ 
representations under the
conditions of consciousness
empirical relation← →     
object under the
conditions of experience
transcendental distinction     transcendental distinction     
transcendental subject
not materially
distinct← →     transcendental object
 
Here, the columns describe the distinction within the theory between subject and object while 
the rows describe the distinction given by the interpretation of the theory (in Kant's case, the 
transcendental distinction) between appearance and thing in itself.   
 There is an important remark to be made about the lower row:  the distinction between 
subject and object is itself part of the level of appearances and cannot be maintained as a 
fundamental distinction on the noumenal level.  In quantum mechanics, this is reflected by the 
fact that if we assume an absolutely true state, it will be an immensely complex state of the 
whole universe, not a state of distinct subject and object systems.  Presumably, both the 
observer and the object exist only in certain components of this state (certain 'branches of the 
wave function of the universe').  This point has been stressed in the discussion of the many-
histories interpretation of quantum mechanics.85  Here, it is interesting to see the parallel with 
Kant's assertion in 'The Paralogisms of Pure Reason' that on the transcendental level we 
cannot assume a material distinction between transcendental subject and transcendental 
object:   
The something which underlies the outer appearances and which so affects our 
sense that it obtains the representations of space, matter, shape, etc., may yet, 
when viewed as noumenon (or better, as transcendental object), be at the same 
time the subject of our thoughts.86 
 
6.2  Reality in Quantum Mechanics 
 A Kantian epistemology in the sense sketched in the last section necessitates a 
reformulation of the concept of reality.  Obviously, once we accept an epistemology that 
implies that the form of our knowledge is fundamentally determined by the way how we 
experience objects and not simply by the form of the objects of our experience in themselves, 
                                                
85See, for example,(Zurek1993, 307-8). 
86(Kant 1929, A358).  
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we cannot anymore identify phenomenal reality (the totality of facts of our immediate 
experience) and objective reality (the totality of facts independent of our experience).  The 
question is if we can have in such a theory a concept of empirical reality which is both 
epistemically accessible (which the transcedentally objective reality is not) and epistemically 
objective (unlike phenomenal reality which is merely an aggregate of subjective experiences).  
We expect epistemic objectivity to imply that empirical reality is stable over time, 
intersubjective, and suitable to predict future events. 
 Kant defines his concept of reality in the analytic of principles (B272-74) and 
discusses it in detail in the A version of the paralogisms (A366-80).  He defines:  "That which 
is bound up with the material conditions of experience, that is, with sensation, is actual."  This 
means: the reality of an object is not its (noumenal) existence as a thing in itself, i.e. its 
independence of the conditions of our knowledge, but the fact that it is given through an 
actual perception.  With 'bound up' Kant means that the object does not have to be the 
immediate object of the perception: 
What we do, however, require is the connection of the object with some actual 
perception, in accordance with the analogies of experience, which define all 
real connection in an experience in general.87 
The analogies are the principles a priori of persistence of the substance, of causality, and of 
interaction of the simultaneous.  They allow us to infer the reality of objects indirectly from 
our perceptions through empirical laws (of stability, causality, or interaction) which are 
granted objective validity by the a priori principles they stand under.  Reality, therefore, is not 
given by disconnected subjective perceptions either, but is the objective correlate to the whole 
of our experience (the totality of perceptions through time), united by general laws.  
 The epistemic accessibility of reality is ensured by the fact that it is constituted of 
appearances and therefore given directly to our perception (A370-71), its epistemic 
objectivity on the other hand is to be guaranteed by the necessity of its general laws (which 
reflect the necessity of the synthesis of objects in the transcendental apperception, A106-10).  
Kant's argument for epistemic objectivity of his concept of reality is problematic:  It remains 
questionable whether the argument in the transcendental deduction can give us a sufficient 
notion of objectivity or, more general, whether such an argument can be given on purely 
internalist grounds at all. 
                                                
87(Kant 1929, B272).   
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 In the interpretation of quantum mechanics, we don't have this problem.  The model 
itself comes with a concept of objectivity (at the cost of not being a priori in Kant's sense), so 
we can have an externalist argument for the epistemic objectivity of the empirical state, and 
this argument was given in chapter 5:  The empirical state is independent of the content of the 
beliefs of the observer, it is intersubjectively defined, it has a well-defined dynamics and it 
gives objectively correct predictions for future observations.  On the other hand, we have not 
shown yet that the empirical state is epistemically accessible.  Given that it is not necessarily 
the state the observer believes the object to be in, how can the observer know what the 
empirical state of an object is?  According to our definition of the empirical state as a relative 
state, it depends both on the subjective state and on the objective state (eq. 3.2)  But the 
objective state cannot be perceived: this follows directly from Albert and Loewer's thought 
experiment.  It seems that our knowledge will be forever confined to our own subjective 
states and our interpretation leads to the subjective idealism that realists have seen as the 
inevitable consequence of the Kantian program.   
 Let us consider the problem in our earlier example from equations (4.2-3) and diagram 
(5.10): There, the objective state Ψ1 develops out of the state Ψ0 that is a conjunction of the 
state of the observer before the observation and the initial state of the object.  But this means:  
if we know the initial state of the object and have a physical description of the observation 
process (or at least some general information of the form:  if the initial state of the system 
is..., then the state of the observer after the observation is...), then we can infer the objective 
state Ψ1 (although it cannot be perceived).  Hence, we can know the empirical state from an 
earlier observation if we know its initial empirical state.  Because then, our consistency proof 
has shown that we can consistently use the initial empirical state for any predictions of the 
future behavior of the system.  This means, we can use the prior empirical state in place of the 
objective state, and, through unitary evolution, arrive at a composite state Ψ1, which, although 
it is not the true objective state, is an empirically adequate stand-in for it and especially allows 
us to infer the final empirical state.  But now we are led to a regress:  How are we to know the 
initial empirical state? 
 Somewhere we must reach a point where we don't have any prior information about 
the observed system.  Von Neumann has shown (1932, p. 179-84), that in this case we can use 
the identity operator as the prior density operator of the object system, representing the fact 
that we have no information about its state (this is the so-called von Neumann rule).  Here, the 
identity operator represents a mixed state that is equally distributed over the whole Hilbert 
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space.  Because the identity operator is invariant under any unitary transformation, the notion 
of equidistribution is independent of the basis we choose to express it in.  Von Neumann 
shows that if the observation is exact (i.e., there is no error) and complete (i.e., the eigenstates 
of the observed observable are non-degenerate), the relative state after the observation will be 
the same as the relative state obtained from the objective state.  This means: an exact and 
complete measurement fully determines the empirical state—the objective state plays no 
epistemic role. 
 If the measurement is approximate, we can use our model from section 3.3 again.  
Instead of a wave packet 
€ 
′ ϕ j = N j cibiji∑ ϕ i  as in our discussion in section 5.3 we now obtain 
a mixed state 
€ 
′ P j = biji∑
2
ϕ i ⊗ϕ i
† .  This state represents a statistical distribution that (like the 
wave packet) approximates the exact state   
€ 
ϕ i ⊗ϕ i
† .  If, on the other hand, the observation is 
not complete (that is, if the observed eigenvalue only specifies a subspace, not a single 
eigenstate), the relative state is an equidistributed density matrix over that subspace.  In this 
case the relative state describes how the measurement has narrowed down the possibilities for 
the empirical state. 
 Von Neumann's argument has been criticized in the case of incomplete observation 
(Lüders 1951).  It is true that if we assume a pure state as the objective initial state of the 
system, then the von Neumann rule does not yield the true empirical state.  But remember that 
there is no way of having knowledge about the objective state independent of acts of 
observation.  We can express this fact by postulating that the objective state is represented 
generally by the identity operator.  The issue here is closely related to the question in 
statistical mechanics about the status and the justification of a maximum entropy principle.88  
Note that unlike in the classical case where we don't have a unique notion of equidistribution 
over the phase space (which makes the concept ill-defined as an a priori measure), the Hilbert 
space structure allows for a unique definition of this concept (because the identity operator is 
invariant under any unitary basis transformation).  
 We can interpret these results in two ways:  The straightforward reading is that the 
empirical state gained through the von Neumann rule is a reflection of our ignorance of the 
objective state (and hence of the true empirical state):  There is one true objective state of the 
universe, incredibly complex and completely unknown to us, that determines the correct 
empirical state.  The empirical state gained from the von Neumann rule is an approximation 
                                                
88Guttmann, forthcoming: chap. 1 
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to the true empirical state of the object which we can improve by refining our measuring 
instruments of by repeated measurements.  The von Neumann rule then describes (basically 
like the Bayesian method in statistics) a way of updating our description when we gain new 
information.  The true empirical state is still epistemically accessible, although only 
approximately in real-life situations.  But a realist would not expect more than that, anyway. 
 But there is a second, more radical interpretation that is more in the spirit of the 
Kantian analogy:  We can renounce the realism about the objective state altogether.  As there 
is no absolutely objective matter of fact about the reality of one possible state of affairs, there 
is also no absolutely objective matter of fact about the probabilities of possible states of 
affairs.  Then the empirical state given by the von Neumann rule simply is the empirical state 
of the object.  Any quantum mechanical state ascription is not the description of some "fact in 
itself," but a description of where in the logical space of possibilities I (the conscious subject) 
am situated.  Notice that also on this interpretation, the empirical state is epistemically 
objective, because its relation to the subjective state is still physical and objective, only that 
now the empirical state is fully defined by this relation and does not depend at all on a prior 
probability distribution (represented by the objective state).  Borrowing from Kant's 
terminology, we can call the absolutely objective state a transcendental state.  Like Kant's 
transcendental object, we can think of it as describing the absolutely objective matters of fact 
standing behind every concrete process of observation, but we are never able to determine it.  
On our first (realist) interpretation, this state is some unknown pure state of the object, on the 
second (idealist) interpretation it is an equidistributed density matrix representing our 
ignorance of the state prior to any measurement. 
 For any practical predictions we make, the choice of interpretation is completely 
irrelevant because the most we can ever know is the empirical state gained by the von 
Neumann rule, which, as we have seen, is independent of the choice of the prior 
(transcendental) state of the object..  The difference only shows in contexts like cosmology, 
where the non-realist interpretation forces us to abandon the notion of the objective state of 
the universe as a basis for explanations in cosmology.  Rather, we can only speak about the 
state of the universe "from our point of view," i.e. conditional on the matters of fact here and 
now.  This is analogous to the methodological approach advocated in cosmology as the 
anthropic principle (Harrison 1981):  It has been noted that complex biological processes and 
hence consciousness in the universe seems only possible if certain cosmological constants 
have narrowly defined values.  The anthropic principle postulates that the values of these 
constants should be explained by the fact that conscious beings like us exist. Similarly, on a 
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non-realist interpretation we cannot explain our present observations from a (transcendental) 
total state of the universe.  Rather, we deduce an empirical state of the universe from our 
present observations (which is all we do in practice, anyway).  It is interesting to note that our 
interpretation could be a basis for the anthropic principle, if dynamical processes could be 
found that determine the values of cosmological constants. 
 Let us return to the concept of empirical reality:  Reality should be more than a 
momentary empirical state: it should comprise a notion of history that is as epistemically 
objective as the present empirical state of the world.  We have already seen that because 
subjective states are memory states, they contain information about past subjective states of 
an observer.  This means that they represent a subjective history of the observer.  For each 
stage of this history, there is a corresponding empirical state of some object.  But this is still 
not all there is to empirical reality:  We also consider facts as real that we have only inferred 
knowledge of.  But this means that we extrapolate the empirical state from our knowledge 
about the dynamics of a system.  This is just Kant's definition of reality quoted in the 
beginning of this section:  Real is every fact that is lawfully connected to our observations.   
 The new phenomenon in quantum mechanics is that these extrapolations will not 
always match seamlessly:  If we measure noncommuting observables, we will have a 
situation as in diagram (5.10), where the state inferred from an earlier observation and the 
state inferred from a later observation are not identical.  This means that in quantum 
mechanics, reality is not a seamless whole: there can be breaks between the "patches of 
reality" defined by different observations.  These seams are nothing but the instances of state 
reduction in von Neumann's formulation.  Now we can understand von Neumann's 
observation (which we discussed in section 3.4) that the point in time at which reduction 
happens can be moved at will:  this reflects the fact that the different states (before and after 
reduction) don't represent an objective change in the object, but merely a change in 
perspective, namely which subjective state the description is made from.  Von Neumann's 
proof for the mobility of the time of reduction is identical to our argument that we can 
conditionalize on subjective states.89 
 Everett's model therefore does not only reproduce the empirical predictions of non 
Neumann's.  It leads to exactly the same concept of empirical reality.  The difference is that in 
Everett's model this reality is intertwined with countless possibilities that exist beside it.  And 
this brings us back to the question about Everett's model that probably has vexed philosophers 
                                                
89Sect. 5.2 
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the most:  How can it be said that possibilities exist?  I believe that the answer to this has to 
be pragmatic:  They are (so I have tried to show) necessary elements of a highly successful 
theory of nature.  Neither the attempt to cut them out of the picture (by postulating a physical 
process of reduction) nor the attempt to make them part of reality (for example, by 
reinterpreting them as a field as in Bohm's theory) leads to satisfying results.  In either case, 
we will cone into conflict with the no-hidden-variable proofs of quantum mechanics.  
Although these conflicts can be solved by brute force, the resulting theories have an air of 
desperation:  They need a huge theoretical apparatus with unobservable and unphysical 
interactions, variables, and states.  On the other hand, as I have tried to argue in this chapter, 
admitting possibilities into existence does not mean that we lose a coherent concept of reality.  
So why should we not admit them into our scientific ontology, just as we have admitted 
atoms, fields, or the curvature of spacetime? 
 
6.3  Conclusion 
 Let me briefly recapitulate the assumptions made in the argument of this thesis that 
Everett's theory can account for the phenomena of quantum mechanics: 
(1) The metaphysical model. 
Quantum mechanical states describe coexistent ensembles of possible facts.  
Moreover, there is no objective matter of fact which of these possible states is actual.  
Actuality is only defined relative to a given possible state. 
(2) The decoherence assumption. 
Conscious observers, like all other macroscopic objects under normal circumstances, 
are decoherent systems.  They are in constant interaction with their environment.  This 
interaction singles out a set of (pairwise orthogonal ) subspaces which contain the only 
dynamically stable states of the system. 
(3) The memory assumption. 
Conscious observers have memories, i.e. physical systems whose states contain stable 
records of past states. 
(4) The supervenience assumption. 
The mental qualities (mental states) of conscious observers supervene over their 
physical properties. 
 As I discussed in the introduction, the metaphysical model gives an interpretation of 
the mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics.  This interpretation implies an 
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interpretation in terms of observations (namely, the Born rule), but it is more general than 
such an interpretation:  It gives an interpretation in terms of "what the world is like", i.e. in 
terms of a set of fundamental (metaphysical) entities.  The model may seem rather 
extravagant.  But it is interesting to note that it is not really new in physics.  A model of 
interfering possibilities is implicitly contained in the path integral method.  In this method, the 
quantum mechanical amplitude of a state is calculated by adding contributions from all 
possible paths (histories) leading to that state (Feynman 1948).  Historically, the intuition 
behind the many histories interpretation was based on this method.  This is a good example 
for the claim from the introduction that a metaphysical model grows out of the application of 
the theory.  One might conjecture that, if Feynman had not been so afraid of getting drawn 
into metaphysics, he could have seen that the intuition behind the development of his path 
integral method leads to a radically new interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
 Assumption (4), on the other hand, is an embedding assumption:  It shows how to 
embed the metaphysical model of classical mechanics into the metaphysical model (1).  But 
(4) uses a fundamentally new concept of subjective appearance.  Therefore, it does not simply 
reduce classical mechanics to quantum mechanics.  (4) has a similar status as the ergodic 
principle in statistical mechanics or the supervenience assumption in philosophy of mind:  All 
these principles make us understand how two different theories can be consistent with each 
other by constructing models of the theoretical entities of one theory out of the theoretical 
entities of the other.   
 The decoherent histories interpretations have concentrated on criterion (2), and to 
lesser extent, on criterion (3).  But this is not sufficient for an interpretation of quantum 
mechanics.  Without assuming a metaphysical model like (1) it is not clear why and how 
decoherent mixtures of states should be understood as probability distributions.  Assumption 
(4) is necessary to establish a concept of reality.  Describing measurement outcomes as 
mixtures is not sufficient for this end, as I discussed in section 3.3.  Zurek acknowledges the 
insufficiency of (2) and (3): 
This issue of the "collapse of the wave packet" cannot be really avoided: ... we 
perceive outcomes of measurements and other events originating at the 
quantum level alternative by the alternative, rather than all of the alternatives 
at once. 
An exhaustive answer to this question would undoubtedly have to involve a 
model of "consciousness", since what we are really asking concerns our 
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(observers) impression that "we are conscious" of just one of the alternatives.  
Such model of consciousness is presently not available (Zurek 1993, 310). 
Zurek addresses the problem by assuming that consciousness is to be understood as a kind of 
information processing; and in physical information processing devices the physical state 
must in some way reflect the information content.  He sees these assumptions as 
"considerably more speculative than the rest of the paper" (ibid.), which is concerned with 
decoherence.  In section 5.1 I have attempted to show that speculation on the nature of 
consciousness is not necessary for the purpose at hand:  The supervenience assumption is all 
we need.  (Notice that supervenience is also hinted at by Zurek's account.)  And it had better 
be this way:  for if our concept of reality depended on a substantive assumption about the 
nature of consciousness, there would be little hope of extending it beyond the state of the 
subject, and we would be left with a subjective idealism of Albert's kind. 
 This concludes my argument that the metaphysical model for quantum mechanics 
offered in this thesis can give an account of measurement.  But of course, this is not all that 
needs to be done.  On the account of a metaphysical model given in the introduction, the 
decisive criterion for a metaphysical model is its usefulness for concrete applications of the 
theory.  Lewis makes a similar argument for his modal realism:  "Why believe in a plurality 
of worlds?—Because the hypothesis is serviceable, and that is a reason to think that it is true 
(Lewis 1986, 3)."  I will hold off the issue of truth until later, but usefulness should all the 
more be the decisive criterion for the worth of a model.  Although a theory of measurement is 
one such application and although it has played a prominent role in our attempts to understand 
quantum mechanics, it certainly is not the only application of quantum mechanics we want.  
The exploration of other possible uses for my model is beyond the scope of this thesis.  But 
we have encountered one substantial example here:  The research about decoherence, which is 
based on the intuitions of this model.  The theory of decoherence has practical impact that is 
independent of any metaphysical model, and which goes far beyond a model for the 
measurement process.   
 I believe that the kind of "modal realism"90 advocated here has many more fruitful 
applications.  This is a promissory note, not more.  It should be plausible, however, that if 
                                                
90I would rather not use this label, which even Lewis himself considers somewhat of a misnomer (Lewis 1986, 
viii).  For one it seems to imply the categorical mistake to assume that possibilities are real objectively where I 
want to say that reality is not an objective matter.  Secondly, this position has nothing to do with scientific or 
metaphysical realism which assumes that it is facts about the world "in itself" that make scientific theories true 
or false (Lewis's opinion notwithstanding).  Therefore, I much prefer the association with transcendental 
idealism described in section 5.4.
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Lewis's possible worlds are "a paradise for philosophers (ibid., 4),"  the assumption of causal 
efficacy of possibilia implied in our model will make this paradise all the more relevant to our 
world.  We may expect consequences for our accounts of causality, intentionality, and the 
like.  The discussion of section 5.2 hints at an account of our experience of time that is much 
richer than what can be had from the classical model. 
 Lewis admits that the attractivity of his metaphysics depends crucially on the 
impossibility of getting its benefits "more cheaply elsewhere (ibid., 136-91)."  For this I 
believe to have a good case:  The persistence of the measurement problem itself shows that 
already the modest benefit of having a well-defined reality in quantum mechanics is not to be 
had cheaply elsewhere.  Nevertheless, one might be reluctant to let go of a metaphysics so 
deeply engrained in our thinking.  Against that I can only hold that there are good reasons not 
to feel all too nostalgic about the classical model.  It surely has had its many good uses.  But it 
also has had quite a few failures.  In Chapter 2, we encountered some examples: the problems 
of a classical account for probability or for the tense structure of time.  Mere metaphysical 
conservatism should not stop us from trying new roads exploring such issues. 
 And finally, what about truth?  Does the usefulness of our model entail its truth?  We 
have seen that Lewis thinks so.  But, one might object, metaphysics is not (like science may 
be) about the construction of useful models, it is about how the world truly is.  And the 
usefulness of a model has no bearing on whether it is true of the world.  The reader may 
expect by now that I align myself with Kant and consider this dispute as misguided, in science 
as well as in metaphysics.  Neither metaphysics nor science are about how the world is in 
itself, but about how it appears to us.  And we cannot anymore in metaphysics than in science, 
step outside of any conceptual framework to decide whether a conceptual framework is true 
or not.  I do not share Kant's optimism that we can turn this limitation into a method to settle 
the problems of metaphysics once and for all by constructing a metaphysics from the inside, 
i.e. from the conditions of our experience.  But this, I believe, means that metaphysics, like 
other sciences, is about constructing models of what the world is like. 
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